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5ABSTRACT
This is an ethnographic study of the lived experiences of young activists 
during the last years of Mubarak’s presidency in Egypt. Its general aim is 
to provide an understanding of what it was like to be involved in opposition 
politics during a period when the eventual end of Mubarak’s rule in 2011 
was little more than a collective aspiration. Drawing on different strands 
of qualitative social science, including anthropology, sociology and youth 
research, the study is based on 12 months of fieldwork in Cairo, conducted 
between 2007 and 2011. It makes use of political engagement as an open 
analytic that enables the examination of different activities that were ori-
ented towards, but not exclusive to, public political processes and formal 
avenues to political participation. In this vein, the study explores the activi-
ties that the young activists regarded as meaningful in terms of challenging 
the status quo, and how being young in itself shaped their ways of partici-
pating in public political life. While it focuses on the experiences of young 
Cairenes who were predominantly male and aged in their 20s, it is acknowl-
edged that important differences existed among them that conditioned their 
efforts to acquire new visibilities and political roles, including social differ-
ences such as class, gender and global connectedness. In order to explore 
the diversity of their political experiences, the study discusses four principal 
areas of analysis and related topics: namely, generational consciousness, 
tactical practice, friendship relations and ethical reflections. 
It is demonstrated that, firstly, the new forms of youth activism in the 
2000s promoted a critical generational consciousness as a disenfranchised 
social location in the intergenerational order, while also providing reinvig-
orated meanings to youth as a subversive political category, and in some 
ways a privileged experiential realm, ready to conduct public political dis-
sent on its own terms. The new youth movements, such as Youth for Change 
and April 6 Youth that emerged on the fringes of larger processes of conten-
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6tious politics, assumed new roles in public political life and merged, at least 
temporarily, young Egyptians from different backgrounds and affiliations 
into collective actions: forging alliances, largely beyond the formal political 
institutions.
Secondly, the young activists resorted to a number of tactical practices 
in order to reach out to wider publics via both offline and online avenues. 
Their operating preferences lay in organizing unlicensed street protests 
in the popular, lower-class residential areas and tapping into the subver-
sive potential of the new information and communication technologies, 
including blogs and social media. Although these forms of public dissent 
expanded their otherwise narrow political opportunities, their adoption was 
not, however, equally available to everyone. Some either had the necessary 
social networks in place, including family support, or the available time and 
the economic means to do so, while those, who were less equipped for pub-
lic dissent, could nonetheless acquire new combinations of practical skills, 
knowledge and social connections that enabled them to enact their sense 
of meaningful political action. At the same time, the efforts to build youth 
coalitions faced a number of challenges, one of which was internal faction-
alism, which, coupled with the growing use of social media, diversified the 
scope of youth activism in the run-up period to the 2011 uprisings.
Thirdly, being a young activist in the late 2000s provided much more 
varied everyday experiences than merely the acts of public political dissent. 
It also involved absorbing pre-existing oppositional culture and adopting 
dissident lifestyles that were filled with shared moments of being and doing 
things with others on a daily basis. In the absence of representative political 
institutions, the experiences of having friends and being a friend to oth-
ers offered intimate avenues to public political life that stretched beyond 
kin ties and formal organizations. Although oppositional youth activism 
was divided along lines of class, gender and political affiliation, the young 
could forge mutual grounds for friendship relations on the basis of their 
shared experiences and stories of contention, while frequenting downtown 
Cairo as the main hub of their everyday trajectories. Although friendship 
relations were at times volatile in the contested field of politics, safeguard-
ing the bonds of trust, belonging and everyday solidarity represented highly 
relevant everyday activities.
Fourthly, the young Cairenes were faced with a number of ethical reflec-
tions on the meaningfulness of their own dissent practices, not the least 
due to the personals risks that opposition politics involved in authoritarian 
settings. While the prospect of impoverishment did not generally motivate 
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7their political engagements, they shared a sense of injured patriotism that 
prevailed in the wider prodemocracy movement, and aspired to greater rec-
ognition as rightful citizens. At the same time, they operated on an ambiva-
lent moral terrain that required positioning one’s self and others in relation 
to normative claims to the common good; furthermore, they had to contend 
with popular suspicion about the impact of their public political dissent and 
about possible motives for their activism, such as the pursuit of social sta-
tus and personal wellbeing. Despite the differences that existed among the 
activist youth in terms of class and gender, however, they could in part chal-
lenge these types of speculations by enacting the prevailing ideals of per-
sonhood in terms of bravery, righteousness and self-sacrifice. Meanwhile, 
although the young Cairenes were embedded in the moral worlds of prode-
mocracy mobilization, they were also compelled to balance their political 
engagements in terms of multiple life transitions, especially in terms of bal-
ancing their activism with the requirements of gaining a livelihood. 
While there were multiple ways of being or becoming an activist in the 
late Mubarak era, the young Cairenes’ political engagements were con-
nected to their collective pursuit of playing a meaningful role in what 
happened in the present, while acknowledging that Egypt’s future was inti-
mately tied to their own life trajectories.
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
In this study, I have transliterated Arabic terms according to the guidelines of the Interna-
tional Journal of Middle East Studies (ICJMES Transliteration System). I have, however, 
made a few modifications in order to attend to the spoken Egyptian dialect in Cairo, espe-
cially in citations, where the letter jīm (ج) is pronounced as g and the letter qāf (ﻖ) as a 
glottal stop (’). For proper names of persons, place names and political groups, the common 
English forms are used, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser instead of Jamāl ‘abd al-Nāṣir.
Consonants      Long vowels
ء  ’    ط ṭ  ا or ى ā
ب b    ع ‘  و ū
ت  t    غ gh  ي ī
ث th    ف f
ج j (and g)   ق q (and ’) Short vowels
ح ḥ    ك k  __َ    a (fatḥa)
خ kh    ل l  __ُ  u (ḍamma)
د d    م m  __ ِ     i (kasra)
ذ dh    ن n
ر r    ه h
ز z    و w
س s    ي y
ش sh    ة a (and -at)
ص ṣ    لا al- (and -l-)
ض ḍ
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PREFACE
On February 11, 2011, President Hosni Mubarak resigned from office 
after 18 days of popular demonstrations across the country. Young activ-
ists, inspired by the sudden removal of Tunisia’s president Ben Ali from 
power a month or so earlier, played an important role in triggering these 
street protests, spreading protest calls via the Internet and text messages, 
painting anti-Mubarak graffiti on the walls and distributing thousands of 
leaflets across Egypt. Subsequent events took everyone by surprise, includ-
ing the activists, as they witnessed a revolutionary mass emerging across 
the country. The protests erupted in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and other cities 
on Tuesday, January 25, but it was not until Friday January 28, when the 
government cut virtually all Internet traffic in Egypt, that most cities across 
the country witnessed unprecedented waves of street protests which the 
police tried to disperse using violent means, deploying rubber bullets, shot-
guns, water cannons and tear gas to no avail. By evening, the land forces of 
the Egyptian military stepped in and, effectively, replaced the police as the 
state arbiter of public order until – and beyond – the demise of President 
Mubarak as the representative of state power.
I travelled to Cairo soon after the protests started, and witnessed the daily 
demonstrations on Tahrir Square until Mubarak’s resignation. As a frequent 
traveller to Egypt, having first lived in Alexandria in the late 1990s, I had 
never imagined the historical scene unfolding before my eyes. Hundreds of 
thousands of Egyptians, from different social and ideological backgrounds, 
occupied public spaces in central Cairo. They established voluntary com-
mittees to organize traffic, raised Egyptian flags in the windows and painted 
anti-Mubarak graffiti on the city walls. At the height of the protests Tahrir 
Square came to epitomize the symbolic gist of a popular revolution and its 
collective aspirations that had brought Egypt’s public life to a temporary 
standstill. “People want the regime down!” (al-sha‘b yurīd isqāṭ al-niẓām!) 
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was a slogan the protesters had appropriated from Tunisia and directed at 
Mubarak, his regime, and all the misgivings it incorporated. The slogans of 
“Leave! Leave! Leave!” (irḥal! irḥal! irḥal!) would alternate with “Bread! 
Freedom! Social Justice!” (‘īsh! ḥurriyya! ‘adāla igtimā‘iyya!) for days and 
nights on end. 
On Tahrir Square, then sealed off with make-shift barricades and check-
points set up by a voluntary Committee of Organization (lagnat al-niẓām), 
the atmosphere of heightened solidarity and benevolence was almost tangi-
ble. People distributed food and water to one another, offered seating places 
to strangers, helped with setting up tents, joked and burst into spontaneous 
song. At the peak of the revolutionary moment, young women spoke of the 
strange absence of sexual harassment or even innuendo inside the square 
– otherwise a frequent occurrence in Egypt’s urban public spaces. Former 
strangers were now friends, unified by the bonds of solidarity and collective 
endurance of “outside aggressors” machinated by the ruling National Dem-
ocratic Party to reoccupy Tahrir Square and other urban spaces across the 
country. Everyone talked about politics, past events and of their experiences 
during what they openly called a popular revolution. Heated and vivid, yet 
immensely hopeful, debates emerged on shared futures and appropriate 
lines of action. Many had lost a friend, relative or acquaintance, and grief, 
pride and determination intertwined as soon as the discussions turned to 
the thousands of “martyrs of the revolution” (shuhadā’ al-thawra) who had 
either been injured or killed in clashes with the police and Mubarak’s sup-
porters. The Tahrir protesters, young and old, men and women, seemed to 
enjoy the micro-scale polity they had established and fought for: something 
which appeared at least momentarily to be Egyptian society as it could be. 
I had encountered similar sensibilities even before the revolution-
ary moment. In April 2008, a few days after the localized uprising in the 
Nile Delta city of al-Mahalla al-Kubra that ended in several casualties and 
detentions, I walked through the narrow side streets of central Cairo with 
Muhammad, a young blogger whom I had accidentally met a year earlier. 
We were coming from his workplace at a leftist human rights organization, 
and he told me that he was wanted by the police. The events of al-Mahalla 
al-Kubra had coincided with a campaign by several opposition movements 
to stage a general strike in the country – the first such attempt since Egypt’s 
independence in 1952. The personal threats he faced concerned a number 
of people who had taken part in a Cairo-based voluntary network that pro-
vided legal, logistical and media support to the detainees and their fami-
lies in al-Mahalla al-Kubra. Negotiating our way through the dimly lit side 
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streets and alleys, away from the grid of commercial streets that govern the 
cityscape of Cairo’s downtown, he said that, for now, he was safe: a friend 
had offered him a place to stay, as he could not go home because of the risk 
of being arrested by the police on the way. As he told me, “It’s very difficult 
to find someone who can do this and who is not involved in politics. But 
luckily I got hold of this one.” 
Amidst the social upheaval and personal turbulence, he was a changed 
person. Even back at the office, he was more quick-witted and humorous 
than normal. The frustration he had endured from time to time was seem-
ingly replaced by a vivid sense of now having a meaningful part in what 
was happening around us. Moving from an alley to a wider side street con-
taining a string of garages and car repair shops, he sang love songs and 
burst into sudden laughter, the origins of which eluded me. I was particu-
larly struck by his repeated efforts to take care of my health: “Henri, please 
promise me, never smoke cigarettes while walking, it’s really bad for your 
health, it’s really bad for your heart especially!” Facing risks for his per-
sonal safety, and experiencing the immediacy of the authoritarian state, he 
seemed more “alive” than before. Only years later, I realized that the young 
activists’ sense of caring for others and here, literally, for my heart beat, can 
be seen as an extension of a deeper human experience – that of a meaning-
ful life – which is part and parcel of the political engagements examined by 
this study.
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INTRODUCTION
A great deal has been said about young Egyptians who participated in the 
historic events of 2011. Some observers, especially foreign journalists, went 
to Egypt to celebrate the young protesters who “spearheaded” the upris-
ing. Even before Mubarak’s resignation, the New York Times ran the head-
line “Wired and Shrewd, Young Egyptians Guide Revolt”, thereby drawing 
attention to Egypt’s young revolutionaries:
They are the young professionals, mostly doctors and lawyers, 
who touched off and then guided the revolt shaking Egypt, mem-
bers of the Facebook generation who have remained mostly face-
less – very deliberately so, given the threat of arrest or abduction 
by the secret police. […] Yet they brought a sophistication and 
professionalism to their cause – exploiting the anonymity of the 
Internet to elude the secret police, planting false rumors to fool 
police spies, staging “field tests” in Cairo slums before laying out 
their battle plans, then planning a weekly protest schedule to save 
their firepower – that helps explain the surprising resilience of the 
uprising they began. (Kirkpatrick 2011)
While some observers readily assigned the main roles and agencies in 
the making of the events of 2011 (Alexander 2011: 31-46) to young people, 
others were critical of prevailing media narratives that the young urbanites 
were the main subjects in the revolutionary events (El-Mahdi 2011; Win-
egar 2012). Critics were quick to point to longer standing processes of con-
tentious politics and social movements such as prodemocracy mobilizations 
against Mubarak’s authoritarian regime or the workers’ strike movements 
that emerged in different areas of Egypt’s economy towards the end of the 
first decade of the millennium (Beinin 2011, 2012). Nonetheless, soon after 
Mubarak’s ousting, Egyptian anthropologist Selim Shahine documented the 
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appearance of a new segment of young Egyptians who had lived through a 
post-revolutionary process wherein “the traditional social divisions are tak-
ing a back seat, as people experience a new sense of connectedness along 
the lines of age and generation” for living through “the same historical con-
ditions” (Shahine 2011: 2-3). 
In comparison with the exponential increase in scholarly interest in 
“young revolutionaries” in Egypt, and elsewhere in the Middle East and 
North Africa (Honwana 2013; Joseph 2013), ethnographic studies of Egypt’s 
oppositional youth activism before 2011 are few and far between.1 With this 
study I hope to make a contribution to this lacuna, with the general aim of 
understanding what it was like to be a young opposition activist in the late 
Mubarak era. In this light, this study represents an attempt to look back to 
the years before the 2011 popular uprisings, often termed the “January 25 
Revolution”, when the hoped for end of Mubarak’s rule was still little more 
than a shared dream for the young activists. Analysis is based on twelve 
months of ethnographic fieldwork in Egypt which took place between 2007 
and 2011. In what follows, I will look at, and beyond, the public processes 
of contentious politics in which young activists were involved at the period, 
while also exploring the more experiential dimensions of their everyday 
lives. In other words: How did they strive to gain new political roles and 
visibilities in the late Mubarak era? Why did they engage in public politi-
cal life in the first place? What did they view as meaningful activities in 
the context of their everyday lives, and why? How did their experiences of 
being young shape their roles, visibilities, and experiences in politics? This 
is the kind of curiosity with which I have conducted this research. 
However, before presenting the specific research questions below, and 
discussing the analytical avenues I pursued to explore them, let us first look 
briefly at the historical conditions under which Egyptian youth lived their 
lives prior to 2011.
1.1. COMING OF AGE UNDER ONE PRESIDENT 
The young activists, whose lived experiences this study examines, were in 
the main born and raised under Mubarak’s presidency. Hosni Mubarak (b. 
1928) became President of the Arab Republic of Egypt (Jumhūriyyat Miṣr 
1  A bibliography compiled by Fiona Friedli includes nearly 400 titles in English and French on the 
popular uprisings in Egypt, and elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa, that were published 
in 2011 and 2012 alone (Friedli 2012). 
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al-‘Arabiyya) under exceptional circumstances in 1981. His predecessor, 
Anwar Sadat, was assassinated by Islamic Jihad only two weeks earlier, on 
October 6. As an act of good will, Mubarak released hundreds of political 
prisoners from jail, making a pledge to Egyptians that under his rule Egypt 
would prosper. Indeed, today’s Egyptian youth were accustomed to hearing 
about the “social contract” during Mubarak’s successive governments and 
its public promises to steer Egyptians towards social welfare and democ-
racy – in that order (El-Mahdi and Marfleet 2009). Public authorities made 
repeated claims to pursue social and economic reforms – in areas such as 
literacy, education, healthcare and other public services – which were pro-
jected as prerequisites for the functioning of democracy and political plural-
ism. To put it polemically, Egyptians were perceived by their leadership as 
not yet ready to practice democratic politics and their social and economic 
development was the first priority.
1.1.1. Narrow margins for dissent 
As with many countries in the Global South, Egypt’s centralized and cor-
poratist state structure derives from its colonial past and the emergence of 
a national political elite since independence in 1952 (Sa‘id 2005).2 Presi-
dent Gamal Abdel Nasser, a leading figure in the Free Officers, who led 
a coup d’état in 1952 against the Khedive monarchy and the British, soon 
monopolized the political power held by the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC). He was a charismatic leader and enjoyed wide popular sup-
port in Egypt, and his visible role in the Non-Aligned Movement, coupled 
with his Arab Socialist and anti-imperialist stances, would also resonate in 
other Arab countries, including Syria and Yemen (Hourani 1991: 407-411). 
Nasser’s project of building a self-reliant public economy and nationalizing 
private ownership – in cotton, gas, and vital revenues from the Suez Canal 
which Nasser nationalized in 1956 – and his project to build a large middle 
class was coupled with new educational reforms that allowed the working 
classes new opportunities for higher education and upward social mobility. 
In addition to the construction of the High Dam of Aswan in 1963 that pro-
vided self-reliance in electricity, the Agrarian Reform Law of 1952 which 
2  Abdelrahman defines state corporatism as “a model in which interest associations are dependent 
on and penetrated by the State, and thus maintained as auxiliary organs of the State” which “has the 
capacity to bestow public status on leaders of these organizations in order to secure the compliance of 
their members” (Abdelrahman 2004: 36-37).
Henri.vaitos.final.indd   25 18.5.2015   8.55
26
offered land ownership to near-landless peasants was among Nasser’s most 
celebrated innovations, much to the detriment of landowning families of the 
pre-independence era (Vatiotikis 1980: 390-399; Bush 2009: 52-54). 
In parallel with a number of socioeconomic reforms, Nasser developed 
a centralized state structure which, coupled with freedom-restricting laws, 
monopolized political life into the 1970s and beyond, leading, according to 
Maye Kassem (2004: 11), to “one of the most resilient personal authoritar-
ian systems in the world”. The centralized political system dates back to the 
early 1950s when the RCC controlled all aspects of political life, especially 
after Nasser increased the persecution of political dissenters on surviving an 
assassination attempt by a Muslim Brotherhood member in 1954. In 1956, 
he established the National Union and, in 1962, the Arab Socialist Union 
(ASU) as its successor, at the apex of a single-party system, and jailed many 
of his opponents, including Islamists, Communists and Liberals. In 1977 
Anwar Sadat, who became president after Nasser’s death in October 1970, 
introduced the Political Parties Law (Nr. 40 of 1977), effectively dissolving 
the ASU in favour of a restricted multiparty system; many of those who rose 
into leadership positions remained at the apex of person-centred hierarchies 
into the new millennium. The new parties were the leftist National Progres-
sive Unionist Party (Ḥizb al-tajammu‘ al-waṭanī al-taqaddumī al-waḥdawī, 
or Tagammu), Liberal Socialist Party (Ḥizb al-aḥrār al-ishtirākiyīn) and 
the Egyptian Arab Socialist Party (Hizb Miṣr al-‘arabī al-ishtirākī) though 
Sadat changed the latter’s name to the National Democratic Party (al-ḥizb 
al-waṭanī al-dīmūqrāṭī, or NDP) in 1978. 
During Mubarak’s reign, the ruling NDP, headed by the president, con-
solidated all important positions in Egypt’s public political life. Although 
the bicameral parliamentary system, encompassing the People’s Assembly 
(Majlis al-Sha‘b) and the Shura Council (Majlis al-Shūra), was endowed 
with a legislative position by the constitution, it served in a mostly consulta-
tive role, discussing and passing laws designed by the ruling party elite. In 
the 2000s, the latter increasingly comprised the Policies Secretariat (amānat 
al-siyāsāt), headed by the president’s youngest son, Gamal Mubarak. 
Although parliamentary elections provided the political opposition with 
opportunities to advance alternative claims and visions for legal reforms, 
the political parties themselves harnessed meagre constituencies. In 2005, 
the voter turnout in the People’s Assembly elections was estimated at 23% 
of eligible voters, and, in 2010, less than 15% (Sika 2012: 183). According 
to a survey in 2009, 16% of Egyptians between 18 and 29 years of age had 
voted in the past (Population Council 2011: 140). In general, Egyptian elec-
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tions were more about the candidates’ promises of economic distribution 
of goods and services to their local constituencies, rather than ideological 
policy outcomes (Boutaleb 2004; Shehata 2008; Ibrahim 2006). More-
over, the NDP effectively had the right to right to issue new party licenses 
through the Political Party Committee (PPC), and, as a practical rule, the 
PPC denied license for promising party initiatives on the basis of the Politi-
cal Parties Law (Law Nr. 40 of 1976) – relegating a number of promising 
initiatives to the status of “party-in-waiting” (for official licence) including 
the neo-Nasserist Karama (Dignity) Party and the moderate Islamist Wasat 
(Centre) Party (Gohar 2008; Norton 2005). The PPC’s decisions were at 
times overturned by the rulings of the High Administrative Court, as hap-
pened, for instance, with the liberal Ghad (Tomorrow) party in 2004, indi-
cating the degree of autonomy from executive powers which the Egyptian 
judiciary enjoyed during Mubarak’s era. In the 2000 parliamentary elec-
tions, for instance, the judges practiced their constitutional right to super-
vise the polling stations, but only after a decade-long legal struggle that 
was supported by a number of opposition parties and civil society activists 
(El-Ghobashy 2012). 
At the outset of his presidency, Mubarak promulgated the State of Emer-
gency that was in place until 2011 and beyond.3 It placed extensive powers 
in the hands of  the executive branch, principally the ruling National Dem-
ocratic Party, the military and the police forces, to control many aspects 
of Egypt’s public life (Kassem 2004a; Albrecht 2013). Under the State of 
Emergency, which was renewed every three years, the police could place 
anyone in administrative detention for 15 days “pending investigation” 
which, in turn, could be repeated for a period of up to 6 months, and civil-
ians could be tried before the military courts. Under the penal code, the 
police could detain anyone “who shouts or sings in public with the purpose 
of inciting dissent” or distributes “false or instigating news, information, or 
rumours that disturb the public peace, frighten people, or harm the public 
interest” or “anyone inciting the overthrow of the ruling regime in Egypt, 
or expressing hatred or contempt” (Articles 98b, 102, 102b, and 174 of the 
penal code) (Kassem 2004a: 57). These broadly written articles allowed 
Mubarak’s successive governments “much room for interpretation and 
leave political opponents with participatory constraints” (ibid.).
During Mubarak’s presidency, the largest opposition group was the Mus-
lim Brotherhood which, while being outlawed, entered the People’s Assem-
3  The Emergency law (Nr. 162 of 1958) was first introduced by Nasser in 1958.
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bly through electoral alliances with the Liberal Wafd party in 1984 and with 
the Amal (Labour) Party in 1989. Since the 1980s, however, some of the 
25 syndicates (niqābāt) that represented the educated professionals – such 
as lawyers, doctors, engineers and journalists – provided alternative ven-
ues for political opposition (Wickham 2002: 176-203), while the labourers’ 
trade unions were incorporated under the Egyptian Trade Union Federation 
(ETUF), the state-controlled umbrella organization that Nasser established 
in 1957. In reaction to the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood 
through the syndicates, the NDP modified the Law of Professional Syndi-
cates (Law Nr. 100 of 1993) in 1995, placing severe conditions on the syn-
dicates’ internal elections, bringing some to a temporary standstill. 
Egypt’s state security apparatuses, the draconian legacy of Nasser era, 
had swollen by the time of Mubarak’s late presidency, with the different 
security branches that fell under the Ministry of the Interior amounting to 
1.7 million personnel by the end of his rule. Two security branches in par-
ticular were concerned with constraining public dissent during the Mubarak 
era, namely, the Central Security Forces (CSF) and the State Security Inves-
tigations (SSI). The Central Security Forces (amn markazī) filled the role 
of “riot police” that controlled demonstrators in public spaces while the 
State Security (amn al-dawla) was infamous for intelligence practices that 
included using informants in opposition movements, and different forms 
of torture during interrogation. In the 2000s, State Security also benefited 
from digital surveillance tools such as high-tech software purchased from 
Europe (McVeigh 2011). These two police branches functioned to yield a 
truly panoptic form of social control (Foucault 1977) over society and pub-
lic dissenters, at times enforcing the so-called Assembly Law (Nr. 10 of 
1914) which was promulgated at the outbreak of World War I to criminal-
ize the gathering of more than five persons in public places. These policing 
practices also prevented meaningful contact and communication between 
political dissidents and their target audiences, the Egyptians at large, while 
cultivating a sense of being surveilled in both. In sum, different forms of 
intimidation and physical punishment by certain police officers, coupled 
with the impunity of the perpetrators and their superiors, amounted to a 
social fact which Egyptians, not only the young, had internalized from early 
on and with which they were compelled to live.
Since the 1980s, the growing number of civil society formations – includ-
ing non-governmental organizations (NGOs), rights advocacy groups, com-
munity development associations and religious associations – played a 
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dynamic role in public life (Abdelrahman 2004; Ben Nefissa et al. 2005).4 
The activities of civil associations were, however, sequestrated by Nasser-
era legislation (Law Nr. 32 of 1964) which placed severe restrictions on 
their registration and activities. In 2002, the new and modified “NGO 
Law” (Nr. 84 of 2002) was also contested since it authorized the Ministry 
of Social Affairs – as the state arbiter of civil society activities – to moni-
tor the associations’ internal elections, to freeze their assets and to dissolve 
their governing bodies. The Ministry also regulated NGOs’ rights to hold 
public seminars and raise funding either nationally or from abroad. In spite 
of the constraints over their operational space, however, an increasing num-
ber of NGOs and the burgeoning human rights movement advanced vocal 
criticism against the incumbent authorities by holding public seminars and 
issuing reports on the human rights situation in Egypt. Furthermore, some 
rights advocacy groups, which were denied official “NGO status”, in part 
bypassed the restrictive legislation by registering themselves as private 
firms. Since the 1990s, the government and the governmental press peri-
odically accused human rights advocates of accepting foreign funding for 
the purpose of harming Egypt’s image abroad, or even serving the interests 
of other countries, especially those of the “West” and their foreign policy 
“agendas” in the Middle East (Pratt 2006; Alhamad 2008: 39-40).
1.1.2. Living through neoliberal times
Today’s young Egyptian citizens came of age in a period that witnessed 
the coinciding processes of neoliberal economic reforms and the securitiza-
tion of public life. At the turn of the new millennium, Mitchell (2002: 296) 
observed:
Alternative claims, costs, visions, and agendas had to be kept out 
of the picture, using various combinations of persuasion, argu-
ment, threat, and violence. Those pursuing alternative political 
agendas in Egypt had very little space for maneuver before the 
economic reforms, although the judiciary, the press, opposition 
political parties, religious groups, universities, human rights orga-
nizations, and professional associations all offered limited arenas 
4  According to the Ministry of Social Affairs, there were some 15,000 registered NGOs in Egypt in 
1996 (Abdelrahman 2004: 121).
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in which people could criticize the authorities and challenge 
aspects of the state’s political program. The economic reforms 
were facilitated by a continuous narrowing of these limited oppor-
tunities for dissent. 
In the 2000s, Egypt fared high in terms of official figures. Between 2001 
and 2010, economic growth was estimated at an average of 5%, peaking 
in 2007 at 7.2%5 though the neoliberal restructuring of the national econ-
omy benefited select segments of Egyptians rather than the population at 
large (El-Mahdi and Marfleet 2009).6 Egypt entered the globalized market 
economy in earnest in the 1970s. In 1974, President Sadat’s “open door” 
(infitāḥ) economic policies of state-led liberalization marked a shift from 
the Nasser-era emphasis on the developmentalist goals of Arab Socialism 
– such as state-led industrialization, a large public sector and a self-reli-
ant economy – towards its integration into the globalized market economy. 
Moreover, in the context of the Cold War, Sadat’s rule gradually aligned 
the previously Soviet-friendly Egyptian government towards the Western 
sphere of influence in terms of political, economic and development coop-
eration. American foreign aid flows to Egypt, for example, were secured on 
highly political premises when Sadat signed the Camp David peace agree-
ments with Israel in 1979. At the same time, the 1970s’ austerity measures 
– cutting public expenditures in services, schooling and state subsidies of 
daily commodities – created new trajectories of economic growth and afflu-
ence which in the 2000s did not ameliorate the livelihoods of the major-
ity of Egyptians – some 90% of the population (Beinin 2008). Families of 
the withering middle classes had to endure the downsides of a neoliberal 
economic restructuring that was often couched in the rhetoric of develop-
ment, sustainable growth and, even, modernity (Amin 2011: 85-100; Mitch-
ell 2002). During Mubarak’s presidency, the restructuring of the national 
economy, as the condition for loans and development aid from international 
donors such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, in prac-
tice accentuated the processes of socioeconomic polarization and benefited 
only the privileged few, which included the political and business elites, 
large landowners and the military establishment (Kienle 2001; Springborg 
and Henry 2011).7 
5 Global Finance Magazine: Egypt. Source:  http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/280-
egypt-gdp-country-report.html#axzz31vfY3tmR <accessed 1.5.2014>
6  In the mid-2000s, 43.9% of Egyptians lived on less than 2 USD a day (Chaaban 2009: 55).
7  The Egyptian government implemented the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program 
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In the first decade of the new millennium, especially after 2004 when 
Mubarak nominated Ahmed Nazif as Prime Minister, neoliberal reforms 
accelerated. The government privatized many public sector companies, and 
salaries could not keep up with high inflation rates which were subject to 
fluctuations in the globalized market economy, leading to a gradual rise in 
the prices of daily foodstuffs and housing. In rural areas, wealthy families 
were gradually able to purchase or occupy farming land, often with the 
help of local authorities, due to the reversal of Nasser’s land reform which 
had been taking place since the early 1990s (Bush 2009: 58-62). By the 
2000s, the real estate market had become a lucrative “fast-cash” business 
for venture capitalists and foreign investors, while the military establish-
ment dominated both the construction and real estate sectors in Egypt, play-
ing an important role in the emergence of new gated communities in the 
desert around Cairo that drew the new neoliberal classes from traditional 
bourgeois neighbourhoods in the capital city (Mitchell 2002; Denis 2006). 
Meanwhile, the livelihoods of many Egyptian families who were less 
affected by the “trickle-down effects” of neoliberal reforms were in part 
balanced by remittances from migrant workers who had been working in 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Persian Gulf countries, Europe and the United States 
since the 1970s. The remittances, however, often fluctuated according to 
political and economic crises: in 1991, for example, Egyptian workers who 
had been invited to Iraq had to leave in anticipation of the Gulf War though 
were offered new job opportunities in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries 
(El-Sakka 2010).8
By the 2000s Egyptian society and its economy had diversified into a 
myriad of clusters, securing the welfare of new segments of Egyptians at 
the expense of the majority. On the winner side of the neoliberal reforms 
were not only the “new bourgeoisie” who had benefited from Sadat’s infitāḥ 
policies but an increasing number of business elites who had acquired 
monopolies in different economic sectors such as the steel industry, con-
struction, media and naval traffic. Importantly, the making of neoliberal 
Egypt has coincided with, and in part contributed to, the growth of a parallel 
Islamic sector – in the context of Islamic revival (al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyya), or 
a growing religious concern and practice – that harnessed popular support 
(ERSAP) in 1991 after negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank. 
8  According to El-Sakka, the remittances to Egypt’s economy between 1985 and 2009 amounted to 
an average of 4.22 billion USD, an average of 5.9% of the GDP. In the 2000s, the largest amounts 
came from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and the United States, and in Europe, from 
Great Britain, Switzerland and Germany (ibid.). 
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and influence in several areas of society and politics (Munson 1988; Tripp 
1996). Since the 1970s, Islamic welfare associations compensated the dete-
riorating levels of public services in rural and impoverished urban areas – in 
terms of schooling, healthcare, orphanages and legal aid – that were left 
unattended due to the scarcity of public funds. The conservative Salafist and 
piety movements, often with tacit state approval on the condition they did 
not interfere with politics, drew resources and influence from Saudi Arabia 
and the Persian Gulf, and combined their social work with proselytization 
(da‘wa) activities (Ben Néfissa 2002; Ismail 2006: 66-95).
1.1.3. The new culture of protest in the 2000s
Many of the young activists who feature in this study were sensitized to 
public politics in the context of an unprecedented wave of public mobiliza-
tion during Mubarak’s presidency (Shehata 2008; Hopkins 2009; El-Mahdi 
and Marfleet 2009; El-Mahdi 2014). Between 2000 and 2002, the break-out 
of the 2nd Palestinian Intifada instigated the first instances during Mubarak’s 
presidency whereby Egyptians, not only the young, organized themselves 
into protracted collective actions beyond state tutelage, collecting food, 
clothes, blood and other forms of humanitarian aid for the Palestinians. At 
the time, diverse political forces managed to put aside their differences, 
paving the way for the Egyptian People’s Committee for Solidarity with the 
Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI) in which various opposition groups – Left-
ists, Liberals, Arab Nationalists and Islamists – forged tactical alliances for 
the support of the Palestinians (Schwedler and Clark 2006; Abdelrahman 
2009). In 2003, the outbreak of the US-led war in Iraq witnessed the largest 
street demonstrations in Egypt since the 1970s, in which tens of thousands 
of protesters flooded to Tahrir Square on March 20, only to be violently 
dispersed the following day (Schemm 2012). For many Cairenes, including 
school pupils, university students as well as opposition politicians, the anti-
war demonstration was the first experience of public protest on this scale, 
and discussion among protesters quickly framed the Mubarak regime as 
Washington’s closest ally and the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the 
world after Israel, some two-thirds of which went to the military.
By the end of the decade, the new cycles of public mobilization were 
increasingly turning attention to domestic affairs (El-Mahdi 2009). In 
2005, President Mubarak amended Article 76 of the Constitution in order 
to allow the first multicandidate presidential elections, to replace the plebi-
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scite by parliament members, since independence. During the electoral 
period, the Egyptian Movement for Change (Ḥaraka miṣriyya min ajl 
al-taghyīr) – commonly known through its central slogan as the Kifaya 
movement (“Enough”) – gained public prominence for its repeated street 
protests against the renewal of Mubarak’s presidency and his alleged plans 
to transfer presidential office to his son Gamal Mubarak. The prodemoc-
racy movement that rallied around the central demand – “No to renewal, no 
to succession!” (lā li-l-tamdīd, lā li-l-tawrīth) – and the protesters’ direct 
criticism of the head of the state was at the time unheard of in Egypt and 
other countries in the Middle East. The Kifaya movement, and the parallel 
initiatives of its “spin-off” groups such as Writers and Artists for Change, 
Journalists for Change, Workers for Change, and Youth for Change – which 
I shall discuss in more detail in this study – would vitalize Egypt’s public 
political life in a series of protests, confrontational public seminars, garner-
ing media presence in Egypt and abroad (Browers 2007; Shorbagy 2007). 
Ultimately, the parliamentary elections later that year reinstated the NDP 
dominance over the People’s Assembly, while the Muslim Brotherhood got 
an unprecedented 19% (88 seats of 454).9 The electoral period provided the 
political opposition with new opportunities for public dissent and mobiliza-
tion which, however, has gradually withered since 2006 while international 
policymakers, especially those from Washington, have placed less emphasis 
on democratic opening in the region since Hamas won the parliamentary 
elections in Palestine.
After the 2005 elections reinstated Mubarak for a fifth six-year term in 
office, periodic protests spread beyond the capital and big cities, taking 
form in localized protest groups around “bread and butter” issues: clean 
water, land rights and rejection of the dominance of the NDP and State 
Security at university campuses (Bush 2009; Dessouki and Galal 2007). 
Workers’ strike movements, in particular, multiplied in various areas of 
Egypt’s public sector – from railway workers and textile factories to real 
estate tax collectors – to demand pay-rises and better working conditions. 
Some academics argued that the prodemocracy coalition and protest move-
ments of the mid-2000s promoted a new culture of civil disobedience, and 
that street protesting helped to break the “barrier of fear” and raise “the 
ceiling of expression” in public life (Shorbagy 2007; Browers 2007). Oth-
ers give less credit to urbanized middle-class protesters and emphasize the 
9  Since the 1990 Elections Law, elections have selected 444 members, while the President has had 
the right to nominate 10 members in the People’s Assembly.
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role of Egyptians’ grievances in terms of socioeconomic demands such as 
pay-rise and better working conditions (Beinin 2009). In 2010, the prospect 
of Mohamed ElBaradei’s presidential candidacy and new forms of online 
activism reinvigorated public political life and brought fresh incomers to 
the wider prodemocracy movement.
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEMATIC
While scholars have followed these wider processes of contentious poli-
tics in the late Mubarak era, and especially since 2011, little ethnographic 
research has been conducted on the young opposition activists’ everyday 
lives and experiences during the period. This study is motivated by an inter-
est in what it meant to be a young opposition activist in the late Mubarak 
era and what public political dissent entailed for the activists themselves. 
What made them resist an authoritarian regime through speech and action 
and put their bodies on the line for democratic struggle, despite prevailing 
social sentiments that such activities were, at best, in vain? While I do not 
pretend to provide overarching explanations for these phenomena, the fol-
lowing research questions are explored:
1. In order to change society, what did the young opposition 
activists regard as meaningful activities? Why?
2. How did being young shape their experiences of politics? 
1.3. POLITICAL ENGAGEMENTS 
For Max Weber, the question of “what is meaningful action” was a life-
long theoretical interest which laid a basis for today’s interpretive sociology 
(Bendix 1977). In this thesis, however, I do not aim for such generalising 
theoretical achievements but, rather, for the specific goal of understanding 
what it was like to be a young opposition activist in the late Mubarak era. I 
have adopted the notion of political engagement as a heuristic device to aid 
discussion of the different themes that emerged during fieldwork and from 
the empirical material. By implication, I suggest it is, if not an alternative, 
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then at least a complementary analytic to political participation. This shift in 
emphasis aims to accomplish two things. First, it takes cue from the debates 
that problematize the concept of political participation, in particular under 
authoritarian settings in the Middle East (Singerman 1997a; Lust-Okar and 
Zerhouni 2008; Alhamad 2008; Bayat 2010). As such, it offers a relatively 
open analytical terrain and a way look beyond public political processes 
and towards the more informal areas of social life. Second, it aims to draw 
attention to the experiential dimension of the activists’ everyday lives and 
serves as a general reference to personal and collective activities that were 
oriented towards public political life but were not necessarily exclusive to 
it. It thus refers to a relatively flexible analytical domain that enables us to 
explore the ways in which young activists experienced opposition politics 
and the things that mattered for them in the context of their everyday lives 
(Jackson 1996; Kleinman 1998).
1.3.1. Beyond public political processes
Since the 1990s, increasing numbers of social scientists have revisited 
the conventional scope of political participation understood as activities 
whereby citizens choose public decision-makers for representative bodies, 
and aim to influence public policy outcomes and their implementation (Bee 
and Guerrina 2014; Barret and Brunton-Smith 2014). The need to revisit 
the scale and forms of political activities conventionally discussed under 
the rubric of political participation is a response to the manifest “democ-
racy deficit” in the global North, measured by declining levels of people’s 
participation in public political processes, such as low levels of voter turn-
out in elections, and membership in associations, trade unions and politi-
cal parties. Some argued that the loosening of social bonds – or reduced 
“social capital” (Putnam 2000) – among citizens results from incrementing 
processes of social fragmentation, individualism and lack of mutual trust 
in society; while others were swift to point out that people do engage in 
different forms of political behaviour but no longer accept the formal politi-
cal institutions of the nation-state as their main loci of redress (Beck 1997; 
Ellison 1997; Norris 2009).10 In this context, the notion of engagement has 
10  For instance, Ulrich Beck (1997: 52) introduced the notion of subpolitics to capture these new 
realities: “Outside the officially classified political sphere – in business, science, technical laborato-
ries, and in private life – there is a great deal of activity, arguing, bargaining, deception, separating, 
uniting, loving, and betrayal, but none of that is […] done according to the legitimate rules of politics; 
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been at times viewed as a more encompassing analytic, drawing attention to 
less visible forms of political participation – or “latent participation” – such 
as general interest in current affairs, voluntary activities, following the news 
and so on (Ekman and Amnå 2012; Norris 2009: 636-638). A review of the 
current social science literature suggests that there is often overlap in terms 
of agency and its attributes between, on the one hand, participation and 
engagement and, on the other, qualitative terms such as civic, political and 
public: it seems any combination of these can be operationalized by way 
of conceptual stretching to fit them to the subject matter at hand (Erik and 
Amnå 2012: 284-287).
While not specifically aiming to compare young Egyptians’ experiences 
with the social processes and histories that inform these debates, this study 
benefits from their analytic import when examining the different kinds of 
activities that evolved beyond public or formal political processes. To say 
the least, my preference for the concept engagement reflects the conditions 
under which my research subjects were born and raised whereby political 
participation (mushāraka siyāsiyya) – such as voting in elections or politi-
cal party membership – were largely viewed as inconsequential for social 
and political change. Singerman emphasizes that: 
The success of narrow-based regimes to control political partici-
pation should not blind scholars to the strength of people’s abil-
ity to adapt, resist, and even prevail. If opposition to a regime is 
too risky and dangerous, and therefore not publicly articulated, it 
does not mean that political activity has disappeared or that people 
are apathetic or apolitical. Rather, it presents a challenge to look 
harder, and certainly to look outside of conventional political 
venues and historical accounts. (Singerman 1997b: 81; op. cit. in 
Alhamad 2008: 34).
It has been suggested that one way to discuss political activities under 
authoritarian and postcolonial settings in the Middle East is to differenti-
ate between formal and informal avenues to public life (Singerman 1997a; 
Alhamad 2008; Albrecht 2008). This formulation acknowledges that along-
side organizational forms of collective action – such as NGOs, trade unions 
and political parties – there are multiple and overlapping modalities of 
collective action and locally rooted conceptions of affiliation (Springborg 
there is no mandate, no party organization, and no dependence on the consent of the governed.”
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1975; Hann and Dunn 1996; Antoun 2000). Alhamad (2008: 35) argues fur-
ther that it is important to “prioritize the reality on the ground rather than to 
find a fit for existing definitions or theories of political participation”:
[I]n environments where the political space is circumspect […] 
the populace often resorts to alternate channels, such as informal 
networks that arise in lieu of, or alongside, the formal institutions.
In Cairo, for instance, landmark ethnographies suggest that although 
most people do not connect to formal organizations or public political pro-
cesses, they can secure access to services through informal social networks 
– through kin, family and neighbours – such as women’s pooling practices 
in popular or working class (sha‘bī) neighbourhoods (Singerman 1997a; 
Hoodfar 1999). On the one hand, these informal networks are often fluid 
and interstitial, and require constant interactions and social and economic 
exchange from their members. On the other, they potentially connect local 
residents to different areas of society and to personalities of social standing, 
including bureaucratic officials and public decision-makers. Indeed, Singer-
man (2006) goes so far as to propose that the family should be viewed as 
the most enduring social unit in Egyptian society against which different 
processes of social, economic and political changes should be analysed, and 
not vice versa. In this study, the attention paid to informal social networks 
and less visible forms of sociality is not intended to belittle the role played 
by civil society organizations in public political life. It, rather, acknowl-
edges that even public political actors, not only local residents in informal 
areas of sociality, can and do resort to informal social networks in order to 
gain access to public life.
More recently, Bayat (2010) has proposed that people living “under the 
threshold”, even without direct connection to one another, may engage in 
collective actions by virtue of their similar practices. He uses an added 
distinction between passive and active networks as a way to explain the 
emergence of social nonmovements: people can connect through passive 
networks as “instantaneous communications between atomized individuals, 
which are established by tacit recognition of their commonalities directly 
in public spaces or indirectly through mass media” (ibid.: 22; Bayat 1998: 
15-21). These commonalities result from their collective social positions 
and shared practices, such as assuming land and illegally wiring electric-
ity among the urban poor, or social tastes and lifestyle choices among the 
young. The significance of passive networks lies in the fact that vast num-
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bers of identical practices are hard to subject to control from above. In con-
trast, active networks emerge through concrete social ties between people 
who are “brought together deliberatively” through commonalities such as 
claims, ideology or association and as such are much more exposed to out-
side pressure and state surveillance. While the latter imply youth activism 
structured around particular public demands, youth nonmovements  emerge 
as passive networks “on street corners, at shopping malls, or in colleges” 
when young people tacitly “identify their collective position by spontane-
ously recognizing similar fashions, hairstyles, and social tastes” (Bayat 
2010b: 22); given sufficient critical mass, this can contribute to cultural and 
social change. In this context, reclaiming “youthfulness” can serve as an 
important source of youth discontent in the Middle East. For Bayat, this 
quality sets youth movements apart from other forms of collective actions 
by the young, such as student movements or youth branches of political 
organizations. Thus defined, the central aspect of youth movements pertains 
to processes whereby young people are collectively promoting youthful habi-
tus, or “defending and extending the conditions that allow the young to assert 
their individuality, creativity, and lightness and free them from anxiety over 
the prospect of their future” (ibid.: 18).
In light of the above analytical avenues, in this study I mainly focus on 
informal and active networks among young opposition activists in Cairo. 
It is to say that they came together and, while acting on the fringes of for-
mal organizations, devised their own initiatives and ways of doing opposi-
tion politics, meeting in different places around the Greater Cairo area, and 
engaging in collective activities in several ways. In Chapter 3, for instance, 
I will discuss the emergence of two youth movements that gained public 
prominence during Mubarak’s late presidency, namely, Youth for Change 
and April 6 Youth Movement and in part ascribe to Bayat’s conceptualiza-
tion of youth movements and its concurrent use of habitus (Bourdieu 1977) 
– as a specific set of dispositions, tastes, and lifestyles – in order to highlight 
aspects of practice that set the young activists apart from their elder peers. 
I will continue this discussion in Chapter 4, following the observation that 
different social cleavages existed among the members of youth movements, 
intersecting in ways that disposed some towards public political life more 
easily than others. These distinctions also played out in everyday interac-
tions among young activists, drawing attention to the variety of personal 
and collective experiences, life trajectories and future prospects among the 
young protagonists themselves. We shall later see that youth movements 
encompassed different forms and modalities of collective action, includ-
ing organizational forms that at least momentarily galvanized the fluidity of 
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personal relations among their members as a way to coordinate their collec-
tive acts of public political dissent. 
1.3.2. Activities that matter
In Arabic, the kinds of public political activities in which young activists 
engaged refer to what is generally termed “political action” (‘amal siyāsī) 
– or even “participation in political action” (mushāraka fī ‘amal siyāsī) – 
comprising, in the main, different forms of political activism (nishāṭ) such 
as demonstrations (muẓāharāt), protests (iḥtijājāt) and blogging (tadwīn). 
As such they gained somewhat ambivalent connotations in the late Mubarak 
era, carrying forceful references to public political life as a contested and 
distant social sphere that was for most Egyptians something to avoid. Being 
oppositional (mu‘āriḍ) in the late Mubarak era came with potential personal 
and professional risks (Singerman 1997a: 4-5), but it involved much more 
than periodic acts of public dissent; it also meant living a precarious life 
while being, doing and experiencing things with others on a daily basis.
This thesis draws inspiration from social phenomenology, suggesting 
that political engagements be viewed as particular experiences of engag-
ing with public political life, and as ways of being and acting in the world 
with the aim of transforming it. It serves to orientate the discussion of what 
young activists regarded as meaningful activities more closely to the con-
text of their everyday lives. For Kleinman (1998: 358-359), experience 
refers to the “felt flow of interpersonal communication and engagements”; 
furthermore,
[i]t involves practices, negotiations, contestations among others 
with whom we are connected. It is a medium in which collec-
tive and subjective processes interfuse. We are born into the flow 
of palpable experience. Within its symbolic meanings and social 
interactions our senses form into a patterned sensibility, our move-
ments meet resistance and find directions, and our subjectivity 
emerges, takes shape, and reflexively shapes our local worlds.
Central to social phenomenological approaches to human experiences as 
“intersubjective mediums of social interactions” is the notion that the con-
ditions for their emergence are both culturally particular and shared by the 
persons who live their lives together in their immediate social environment, 
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be it a local neighbourhood, a village or an interacting network (Kleinman 
and Kleinman 1996: 170-172). Experiences thus entail a certain conscious-
ness of the self and others as being and acting together in the world. In this 
view, human consciousness in itself refers to an intentional act that entails 
there being no such a thing as pure consciousness in isolation from the 
social world; rather, it is embodied and always directed at something: an 
object, a person, a thing in the world as it appears in the lived flow of “pal-
pable experience” (Gallagher 2007).
Experiences in this view are not things acquired from the vantage point 
of particular individuals, but unfold through and with others or, as Jack-
son puts it, “within relationships and between persons” (Jackson 1996: 
26). Although experiences take place in the present, they are immediately 
transformed into things, actions and events that have just passed. They are 
“lived” insofar as they accrue meanings from the self and the world, form-
ing human sensibilities and subjectivities, making us who we are. Subjec-
tivity in this sense, Jackson comments, “entails a reaching beyond the self”:
Insofar as experience includes substantive and transitive, disjunc-
tive and conjunctive modalities, it [subjectivity] covers a sense of 
ourselves as singular individuals as well as belonging to a collec-
tivity (Ibid.)
Lived experiences thus conceived do not consist of contrasting modali-
ties of being but of dialectical moments between the self and the world, and 
they are inherently intersubjective (ibid.: 29). They thus provide ingredients 
for how human beings live their lives from the vantage point of their life-
worlds, which Schutz defines as “the quintessence of a reality that is lived, 
experienced, and endured” while also referring to:
…a reality that is mastered by action and the reality in which 
– and on which – our action fails. Especially for the everyday 
life-world, it holds good that we engage in it by acting and change 
it by our actions. Everyday life is that province of reality in which 
we encounter directly, as the condition of our life, natural and 
social givens as pregiven realities with which we must try to cope. 
(Schutz and Luckmann 1989: 1; Jackson 1996: 18-21)
Social phenomenological (and radical empiricist approaches) to human 
experience are at times criticized for an excessive methodological indi-
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vidualism that risks reproducing first-person perspectives of how the world 
appears to the individual at the expense of paying attention to the social 
conditions that shape lives (e.g. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 9-11). I have 
already suggested that the historical conditions – or the wider processes of 
socioeconomic and cultural change under which Egyptian youth lived their 
lives – did matter, and not the least in terms of the young activists’ opportu-
nities to engage in public political life. 
Thus, this thesis does not advance a phenomenological analysis in the 
strict sense of the term. Considering political engagements in reference to 
the ways in which young activists sought to engage with collective life – or 
being and acting in the world with the aim of transforming it – is, how-
ever, an attempt to understand the meanings they attached to their every-
day activities. It is also an acknowledgement that their experiences while 
seeking new roles and visibilities in public political life evolved beyond 
the contours of instrumental rationality and “means to an end” calculation 
conventionally attached to political participation (Weber 1919; Singerman 
1997a: 5-8). To inquire into the experiential dimension of their everyday 
lives is also to accept that their political engagements were inseparable 
from the other issues, concerns and exigencies connected with coming 
of age in the late Mubarak era. Consequently, this study looks beyond an 
understanding of the modern nation state and its formal political processes 
as the main constitutive framework for meaningful activities towards the 
ontology of life itself. It invites us to explore the issues of everyday socia-
bility and ethical reflection as part and parcel of the young activists’ daily 
experiences, and how their political subjectivities were formed during the 
timeframe examined. In Chapter 5, I will examine these issues through the 
notion of friendship, suggesting that such relations served for many young 
activists as important and intimate informal networks through which politi-
cal experiences were mediated, providing them with an additional social 
layer that connected them to public political life. In Chapter 6, I explore 
more closely their ethical reflection and practical judgments when commit-
ting themselves to public political dissent while negotiating between the 
different exigencies of life.
1.4. WHY RESEARCH YOUTH IN EGYPT?
In light of the 2011 events and the political turmoil that has taken place 
since then in Egypt and regionally, this question seems like an oxymoron. 
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To be sure, the events of 2011 amounted to a popular uprising which did 
not concern the agencies and experiences of young people alone. Descrip-
tive analysis of oppositional youth activism in the run-up period, however, 
sheds light on the making of these historic events, and provides empirically 
grounded insights into the lives and experiences of young people during 
one of the most critical periods in Egypt’s modern history. At the same time, 
in this study I explore the ways in which young Cairenes were involved in 
the risky opposition politics of the late Mubarak era. How did being young 
shape their experiences when engaging in public political life during the 
period? This research question aims to examine how their young age and 
the ways in which they regarded themselves as young shaped their every-
day activities when seeking new roles in public political life. Indeed, a guid-
ing assumption is that there was something about their youth that disposed 
them to experience the world differently to their older peers, including the 
opposition politicians.
As a Muslim-majority society, Egypt witnessed similar demographic 
realities as other postcolonial societies in the Middle East and North Africa, 
such as the apparent “youth bulge” whereby almost a third, or 28%, of the 
total 80 million population were aged between 15 and 29 years in 2007 
(Assaad and Barsoum 2007: 16). This demographic reality, coupled with 
the concerns of youth unemployment, urbanization, social polarization and 
potential radicalization have yielded a wealth of academic and policy-ori-
ented research that has framed youth as a developmental challenge, both as 
a threat and an opportunity for social change and social reproduction (Her-
rera 2006a; Chaaban 2009). The new millennium witnessed the emergence 
of unprecedented numbers of young people not only in Egypt, but globally, 
whereby 1.3 billion people aged between 12 and 24 were living in the Global 
South (Chaaban 2009) but, while the notion of “youth” came to saturate 
mainstream development policies and practices, young people themselves 
remain conspicuously absent in terms of setting the development agenda in 
their own right (Herrera 2009; Huijsmans et al. 2014). At the same time, the 
restricted focus on chronological age or age cohorts (such as those between 
15 and 29) does little justice to the culturally specific experiences of what it 
means to be young (Clark-Kazak 2009).
In this light, “youth” can be seen first and foremost as a social category, 
the scope and content of which are contested and often defined by those 
who do not fall in into the category themselves (Bourdieu 1993: 92-102). 
In this study, I acknowledge that the experiences of being young in many 
ways encompassed youthful lifestyles, tastes and dispositions, but also 
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entailed living through a culturally informed life stage or, as Bayat (2010: 
116) notes, a “distinct social location between childhood and adulthood, 
where the youngster in a relative autonomy is neither totally dependent 
(on adults) nor independent, and is free from being responsible for others” 
(e.g. Meijer 2000). Moreover, the prolonged period of youth can be seen as 
largely machinated by the modern education system that “serves as a key 
factor in producing and prolonging the period of youth, while it cultivates 
status, expectations, and, possibly, critical awareness” (Bayat 2010: 119). 
Being young thus refers to both a position and a process of social becom-
ing, enabling perspectives onto how people perceive themselves as young 
while navigating towards the roles and responsibilities that are consid-
ered part of adulthood (Vigh 2006). In this sense, the experiences of being 
young in the late Mubarak era were also shaped by the pursuit of employ-
ment and, one day, a family of one’s own, although the new millennium had 
witnessed increasing difficulties for young graduates to find work and, for 
men especially, to save for the costs of marriage in order to make these life 
transitions (Singerman 2007; Herrera 2010). Although the life chances and 
livelihood prospects of young Egyptians were in many ways shaped by gen-
der, socioeconomic background and locality, public constructions of youth 
as political actors in Egypt are traditionally gendered and refer mostly to 
well-educated young men from the urban middle classes (Farag 2007).
Moreover, paying attention to youth as a culturally and socially specific 
life stage also acknowledges the issues of youth socialization, social repro-
duction and generational renewal in society (Herrera 2006a, 2009; Huijs-
mans et al. 2014). Egyptian society in the 2000s was largely dominated by 
gerontocratic power relations, whereby men in their 60s and above remained 
at the top of person-centred hierarchies. Most private and public institu-
tions, including the government and private firms, military establishment 
and religious institutions were, and in the main continue to be, ruled by 
elderly men. In addition to party politics, gerontocratic power relations also 
dominated in others areas of public life, including the fields of professional 
journalism (in both print and broadcast media) and artistic production (Win-
egar 2006; El-Bendary 2010). At the turn of the millennium the prospects of 
generational change and social reproduction were topical issues not only in 
Egypt, but in other Middle Eastern states, and included public political life 
at the highest level. In Morocco the crown had already passed from King 
Hassan II to his son Muhammad VI in 1998 and, in Jordan, from Hussein to 
his son Abdullah in 1999. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad became president after 
his father Hafez al-Asad died in 2000. In the new millennium the succes-
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sion scenario that would bring Gamal Mubarak to the presidency was also 
tangible in Egypt, and subject to much public speculation, but one that was 
rejected by wide segments of Egyptians, including the opposition parties 
and movements, and also the young activists studied in this thesis.
1.4.1. Focus: Young activists in the capital city
According to a survey, some 2.3% of Egyptians between 10 and 29 years 
of age engaged in voluntary activities in 2009, and nearly 4% of Egyptians 
between 18 and 24, while two-thirds of these activities consisted of charity 
and religious associations (Population Council 2010: 18; Population Coun-
cil 2011: 139). This study thus examines a very narrow segment of Egyp-
tian youth. It mainly focuses on young people living in the Greater Cairo 
area who were in the main unmarried men in their 20s and belonged to the 
relatively well-educated urban middle classes. The majority had acquired 
higher education in public universities, some “upper class” youth in private 
universities, and still others had acquired diplomas in vocational institutes. 
Some young activists in this study belong to the political classes through 
kin, others to the educated urban middle classes, while others belong to 
more disenfranchised segments of the population. While most activists were 
young men, the youth activism of the 2000s encompassed a relatively large 
number of young women. Living in the capital city of Cairo, the central hub 
of Egypt’s political, economic and cultural life, and a regional capital of 
importance, they were more directly attuned to global flows of ideas, tastes, 
influences, technologies and people – and therefore more cosmopolitan – 
than, say, young Egyptians living in rural areas or impoverished urban dis-
tricts (Ibrahim and Wassef 2000; Schielke 2008).
The young activists in this study largely belong to Egypt’s secular oppo-
sition. By secular in this context I am not referring to their personal reli-
gious convictions, but to their normative preference for a “civil” (madanī), 
if not a ‘secular’ (‘almānī), state rather than a religious state as the ideal 
arrangement of state-society relations in Egypt. In practical terms, this 
means relegating the power of legislation to elected representative bod-
ies, without a heightened role for religious moral authorities in deciding 
on legal matters. Moreover, while 2000s’ youth activism emerged on the 
fringes of political parties that promoted ideological rhetoric and political 
platforms, most young Cairenes in this study found common grounds by 
virtue of sharing, as Shehata (2008: 6) puts it, “a general commitment to the 
values of human rights, pluralism, democracy, and social justice” instead 
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of rigid ideological doctrines. I agree with Shehata’s observation in that 
the majority of the young activists of the period “focused more on consen-
sus building and action, rather than on theoretical ideological squabbles” 
(ibid.). Many would, however, position themselves as members of differ-
ent political trends, often in terms of “ideology” (īdiūlūjiyya) or “current” 
(tayār). Thus, in contrast to Islamists (islāmiyīn), the general trends among 
them included Leftist (yasāriyīn), Liberal (librāliyīn), Arab Nationalist 
(qawmiyīn) or, the Nasser version of Arab Socialism, Nasserist (nāṣiriyīn). 
While important variations exist within and between these standpoints, 
these trends resonate with the wider pattern of the political landscape in 
the post-1967 Arab World (Abu Rabi’ 2004). In this study, I do not regard 
them as fixed identities or affiliations, nor do I focus on studying ideologies 
as such, but consider them – together with other social divisions – as daily 
references as young activists negotiated routes into Egypt’s public political 
life in the late Mubarak era.
1.5. OUTLINE
This thesis is structured in a way that differs from many doctoral theses 
in Development Studies at the University of Helsinki because it does not 
include a separate chapter on theory. I have suggested above that the empir-
ical material compelled me to consider a number of analytical perspectives 
in order to better understand what it was like to be young activist in the late 
Mubarak era, an issue that will be further discussed in Chapter 2, which 
focuses on the ways in which I conducted this research and the method-
ological and ethical choices it involved.
Chapters 3 to 6 present the study’s principal analysis. In Chapter 3, I 
explore the processes whereby young political activists emerged as potent 
members of wider anti-Mubarak mobilization in the 2000s, discussing the 
emergence of new youth movements and the formation of a generational 
consciousness among their members. In Chapter 4, I examine in more detail 
their actual practices directed towards resisting the state grip on public life, 
with further reference to the shaping of the differential opportunities of the 
young to engage in public political life, meanwhile suggesting why coali-
tion building has often been problematic. In Chapter 5, I look more closely 
at the activists’ everyday lives and discuss the roles and values friendship 
relations played in political activism. In Chapter 6, I examine the moral ter-
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rain on which young activists placed themselves and others, and the ethical 
considerations they faced when engaging in public political dissent. Finally, 
in Chapter 7, I provide the concluding remarks for this study, and some sug-
gestions for further inquiry.
Henri.vaitos.final.indd   46 18.5.2015   8.55
47
2 ETHNOGRAPHY AS EXPERIENCE 
As the unimagined happened, and President Mubarak resigned from power 
in February 2011, Egypt’s young revolutionaries were at the centre of 
global attention. Journalists, analysts and academics flooded into Cairo to 
offer their take on the “Arab Spring”, seizing a historic and rare opportunity 
to observe a post-revolution society in flux, although many academics were 
quick to respond to what they saw as widely circulating misrepresentations 
of what had really happened. Rabab El-Mahdi, a political scientist at the 
American University in Cairo, noted that the analysts’ focus on Cairo-based 
“yuppies” – the relatively rich, educated and privileged political activists 
– created a “new imaginary construct of ‘youth’” as the main protagonist 
of the revolution (El-Mahdi 2011). She observed that the primacy given to 
young urbanite elites effectively neglected the varied interests, experiences 
and life trajectories of Egyptians living, for instance, in impoverished urban 
neighbourhoods and rural areas. For El-Mahdi, the narratives confirming 
that Egypt’s revolutionaries are “just like ‘us’” in the West – nonviolent and 
IT-savvy, or modern, liberal and cosmopolitan – served to Orientalize the 
revolution and misrepresent the multiplex and volatile social dynamics that 
led to the popular uprising (Onodera 2011b). Soon after Mubarak’s resigna-
tion in 2011, sociologist Mona Abaza argued that the structural and global 
inequalities in academic research, and in research funding especially, help 
to reproduce (neo)colonial practices of knowledge production. In her view, 
the role of local academics was often reduced to “service providers” for 
European researchers who, at the end of the day, “remain pervasively as the 
‘knowing subjects’ whereas non-Europeans continue to be the ‘objects of 
observations and analyses of European theorists’” (Abaza 2011). 
These concerns strike at the methodological core of this study on the 
political engagements of young activists in the late Mubarak era. Indeed, 
many of them were young, urban, secular and in many ways privileged, 
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but by no means all were in this category. Having lived in Egypt in the 
late 1990s, and conducted ethnographic research in Cairo for twelve months 
between 2007 and 2011, I feel privileged to have witnessed some of the 
makings of the January 2011 events from a rather close perspective. Privi-
leged “access” alone, however, hardly guarantees the quality of my claims 
to understand their lives and experiences. In this chapter, I discuss the ways 
in which this research was conducted, including the methodological and 
ethical choices it involved along the way. In the first section, I examine the 
processes whereby my interest in the topic developed, and how I related to 
participants during the course of fieldwork. My research experience was not 
necessarily a seamless or a cumulative process, although reflecting on my 
own experiences and positioning during fieldwork has been useful in gen-
erating new research questions and when analysing the empirical materials. 
In the second section, I discuss the data and methods of analysis in more 
detail, and explicate on the ethical choices that underpin this study, espe-
cially with regards the issue of safeguarding the activists’ anonymity. 
2.1. FIELDWORK
Ethnographic method holds the promise of seeing beyond the surface of 
public political processes and into the microsocial contexts in which the 
young activists’ lives and experiences unfold (Scott 1990; Auyero and 
Joseph 2007). Immersion in the social worlds of young activists over a pro-
longed period of time, and sharing a number of discussions and experiences 
with them along the way, were crucial in gaining an understanding of their 
political experiences and practical concerns which would have been pains-
taking to reach through “one-off” interviews. On the other hand, ethnogra-
phy as a form of qualitative inquiry was for me less a methodological choice 
than it was a personal way of being, acting and trying to better understand 
the experiences of young Cairenes who were involved in public political 
life in the late Mubarak era. In this vein, the question is not “if” but “how” 
my personal persuasions and dispositions, personal biography, cultural and 
educational background, emotions and opinions shaped the research pro-
cess (Ådahl 2007: 28-33; Stronach et al. 2007; Possick 2009). Indeed, the 
ethnographer’s main research instrument is his or her embodied self which 
is carried through the different stages of the research process – from one’s 
original choice to pursue a certain research topic, through the methods used 
in data collection and analysis, to the final written output itself.
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2.1.1. On the problem of “voice”
At the outset, I had rather personal and normative expectations of this 
thesis. Quite simply, I wished it to give “voice” to Egypt’s prodemocracy 
movements. In 2004, when I first enrolled in a postgraduate program at the 
University of Helsinki, I was working on a part-time basis in a Leftist peace 
and human rights organization in Helsinki. Partly for this reason, I wanted 
to study Egypt’s prodemocracy movements and when I enrolled in a gradu-
ate school in 2007, I decided to focus on what appeared to be one of the 
most vocal civil society formations, the Egyptian Movement for Change. A 
pilot field trip to Egypt in early 2007, however, encouraged me to reorient 
the research focus towards the undertakings of young Cairene activists who, 
while they played dynamic roles in the wider prodemocracy movements, 
at the same time seemed in some ways detached from the formal arena and 
institutions of the political opposition. This was a methodological choice, 
since experienced opposition politicians were often busy with their daily 
tasks, while the young activists had more time to “hang out”, and I had 
also connected with them more at a personal level. Furthermore, at the time 
there was very little ethnographic research on Egypt’s young activists and 
making their voices heard, I believed, would in part raise awareness of their 
democratic struggle.
During my fieldwork in Egypt, I carried the imagery of voice into my 
research activities, producing, at times, somewhat interesting reactions. 
Consider, for instance, an online chat with Fadwa (35) during the main 
fieldwork in 2008, at a point when I was anxious that I had not interviewed 
‘enough’ women activists. 
Me: I think any account of political activism in Egypt falls short 
without the voices of politically active women (non-active as 
well) 
Fadwa: I know you are sincere about the voices; but it sounds 
quite funny
I had met Fadwa during the pilot field trip in 2007, and she had helped 
out with arranging interviews. This small online exchange is telling of 
the ways that I used “voice” even when explaining my research to people 
with whom I became friendly over time, although in the interviews I asked 
respondents to talk about their “experiences” (tagruba, pl. tagārib). It also 
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points to the ways in which my “activist” background was a reoccurring 
dimension in fieldwork, affecting my self-positioning when socializing over 
time with the youth whose experiences I wished to study. Fadwa, like many 
others, knew this side of my personal past: that I had participated in and at 
times helped to organize anti-war demonstrations in Finland, and written 
about the human rights situation in the Middle East for Finnish journals. 
At the same time, the use of voice as a metonym for democratic claims, 
especially by marginalized actors, seems to persist and circulate in aca-
demic, journalistic and policy-oriented development reports. It is so embed-
ded in studies of the marginalized that, at times, it is difficult to disassociate 
it from the globally circulating imageries of authenticity, emancipation or 
deliberative democracy (Göker 2011). On the other hand, my anxiety about 
the lack of young women’s voices corresponded with a strand of postco-
lonial feminist critique, as articulated by Mohanty (1984), which argues 
against those who write, despite good intentions, about “Third World 
Women” but treat them simultaneously as a coherent group with similar 
interests and desires. This line of criticism – against homogenizing and eas-
ily consumed narratives, lumping different positions, opinions, experiences 
and life trajectories under a totalizing rubric – can be extended to discussing 
“Egyptian youth”, or the “young activist”.
Later, I problematized my desire to “give voice” and how it had shaped 
this research. In retrospect this endeavour was based on a number of 
assumptions. They proceeded, by and large, on the imagery of voice as a 
token for authentic experience, or as something that can be heard by outside 
audiences or captured in the first place (Jackson 2003; Mazzei and Jack-
son 2009). The young people I had the chance to meet and talk to in Cairo 
were more than able to speak for themselves, to express their opinions, and 
to analyse their lives and experiences in society and politics on their own 
terms. Retrospective criticism, however, cannot erase the fact that my ini-
tial desire to give voice was the basis for doing this research and that this 
desire has not so much completely vanished as been transformed during the 
process. At the minimum, it oriented me towards a pluralist view of youth 
activism by way of exploring the differential opportunities and uneven 
access the young Cairenes had when becoming involved in public political 
life.
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2.1.2. Being in Egypt once again
Undoubtedly, ethnographers rarely conduct research on topics, people and 
phenomena in which they are not initially interested. Motivations are often 
multi-layered, and for me, in addition to learning about and better under-
standing the young activists’ experiences in authoritarian settings, a further 
incentive to embark on this study was that I had studied Arabic in Alexan-
dria in the late 1990s, and had since aspired to return to live in Egypt again. 
When moving to conduct fieldwork in 2008 with my family, including a tod-
dler, Cairo provided a whole new set of experiences compared with previ-
ous student life on the Mediterranean coast. Today’s Cairo has a population 
of 19.4 million and merges five different municipalities in the largest urban 
conglomeration in the Middle East after Istanbul. It is a truly global city 
that encapsulates the contradictory processes of globalization: the growing 
connectedness with global flows of capital, peoples, ideas and technologies, 
and coinciding processes of social polarization and impoverishment (Sas-
sen 2005; Singerman and Amar 2006; Singerman 2009a). The constant ebb 
and flow of foreigners over the centuries – merchants and traders, colonial 
administrators and armies, tourists, journalists, and researchers alike – have 
made Cairo a historical locus of the Orientalist gaze, of global markets and 
power politics, and of regional news media and cultural production (Vignal 
and Denis 2006; Sadek 2006). In a country where tourism generates impor-
tant flows of foreign capital, being a foreigner provided us with wider free-
doms, opportunities and access to many areas of social life than available to 
most Egyptians (Ong 2006).
During fieldwork in 2008, we lived in the residential area of Doqqi, Giza, 
located on the opposite side of the Nile from downtown Cairo. Conduct-
ing fieldwork with family and a child was simultaneously rich and reassur-
ing, challenging as well as informative. The people we met were in general 
wholeheartedly loving towards toddlers, and my son, bearing an Arabic 
name Nour (“Light”) received a lot of positive attention wherever we went. 
People in the neighbourhood and also some activists would call me abu nūr 
(“Nour’s father”) as a reference to the social status of having a family and 
also being an “earner” (kāsib), both of which represented, for many, impor-
tant life aspirations. Although I conducted much of the research activities 
in and around the downtown part of the city, as a family we formed the 
habit of regularly visiting a number of different areas in and outside Cairo, 
enjoying “weekend tourism” in Alexandria, Aswan, Luxor, Ismailia, Suez, 
Port Said, and Port Fuad. We also visited a number of malls, such as City 
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Stars in Nasr City and First Mall in Giza, and the Carrefour supermarkets 
in Cairo and Alexandria, while I had the opportunity to visit Cairo’s neo-
liberal “satellite cities” including Media City in 6th October City and the 
gated communities of Rehab and Madinati in New Cairo. For comparison, 
we also explored several popular neighbourhoods such as Masr al-Qadima, 
Sayyida Zeinab, Hada’iq al-Qubba, Imbaba, and El-Munib in the Greater 
Cairo area. This form of experiencing different sides of Cairo, and Egypt, 
was highly beneficial in terms of developing a sense of the local matrices 
of privilege and class difference, and getting to grips with the multiple lived 
realities that global Cairo encompasses.
Living with family during the main fieldwork certainly shaped the 
research experience. For instance, in August 2008 I attended an opposi-
tion event at the Journalists’ Syndicate in Cairo. While it was ostensibly a 
memorial service for Dr Abdel Wahhab el-Messiri, the coordinator of the 
Kifaya movement who had recently passed away, it turned into an opposi-
tion event with speeches from the podium. After the memorial service, a 
number of young people held a protest at the Syndicate’s entrance. For me 
it came as a surprise and, judging by the initial absence of Central Security 
Forces, it came as such for the authorities, too. I felt a bit intimidated, espe-
cially when I remembered that I was carrying my notes, two mobile phones, 
and a Visa card that served at the period as the economic “lifeline” for my 
family. I decided to leave and observe the protests along with other city 
commuters from the other side of the street. Back at home, I wrote:
Were I only responsible for myself, I may have stayed there and 
also, on different occasions I may have acted otherwise. […] 
But, on the other hand, I realise that my allegiance and feeling of 
responsibility lies with my family and son, which also feels quite 
comforting. [My spouse] noted that perhaps the demonstrators 
don’t ask their spouses’ permission to participate in demonstra-
tions, or that this doesn’t represent an issue within family as the 
[male] activists take part in any case. This is perhaps an issue 
I need to look at and, for instance, ask about from ‘K’ who is 
married.
On another occasion, in June 2008, I needed a quiet moment to reflect on 
how the research was going, so I took a methodology book (Bernard 2006) 
and went for lunch by myself. After a while I took a respite from the book 
and looked through the window. There were two young girls – one toddler, 
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the other aged 5 at the most – sitting in ragged clothes on the pavement. 
Seemingly siblings, the elder was taking care of the toddler, holding her in 
her arms, cuddling her, combing her hair; while the toddler had an unusu-
ally idle, absent and joyless look in her eyes:
I felt so miserable myself, and so privileged, as I had been so 
desperately skimming though my methodology book and trying to 
over-stuff myself with a rather tasteless lasagne. What I am to do 
with my own research-related problems, while there were children 
like them experiencing everyday life from the level of the street? 
These isolated moments illustrate the ways in which, firstly, this thesis 
has been produced with the help of a number of people, including family, 
relatives, friends, activists and fellow scholars with whom I have had the 
opportunity to discuss this research as it has progressed. Secondly, these 
kinds of personal experiences were at times beneficial in helping me gen-
erate new questions and reflect on analysis of the empirical material. For 
instance, the incident outside the Journalists’ Syndicate sensitized me to 
inquire further – in both interviews and analysis – into the role the family 
played for young activists. I had hitherto discussed the subject with young 
women, and heard stories of how some concealed their activism from their 
families, while others did not, but this experience prompted me to further 
discuss the issue with the men whom I knew who were either engaged or 
married. This, in turn, led into examination of the kinds of differential privi-
leges – or, “class differences” – with regards livelihoods and life chances 
that existed among the activists themselves. 
Indeed, my experiences during the materialization of this thesis have far 
from consisted of a unilinear and progressive process. As Cerwonka and 
Malkki (2007) remind us, ethnographic research usually involves a lot of 
improvisation, unexpected turnings and different sets of emotional rides. 
Although I do not include many auto-ethnographic narratives in this study, 
reflections on my own positioning and practices of knowledge production 
have been informative when analysing the empirical materials. 
2.1.3 Multiple entanglements
My prior knowledge of Arabic was helpful in getting through daily life and 
most interviews. In 2008, I took lessons in the Egyptian dialect so as to 
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become more familiar with the local idiom and expressions although, on 
some occasions, it felt inappropriate to pursue an interview in Arabic as 
some “upper class” youth spoke impeccable English. Knowledge of Arabic 
was, however, vital for connecting with the majority who spoke little Eng-
lish or other foreign languages. 
During the pilot trip in 2007, I attended the Cairo Anti-War Conference, 
an event that had been organized in Cairo since the outbreak of the Iraq war. 
It was a good opportunity to meet young opposition activists, and with some 
I have cultivated personal relations ever since. Furthermore, during the later 
fieldwork periods, they introduced me to others with a “snowball” effect, 
which informed me of the ways and networks in which different activists 
were connected to each other.
In contrast to most daily encounters with Egyptians, the young activ-
ists with whom I spent time rarely inquired first whether I was Christian 
or Muslim but, rather, were more interested in my political and ideological 
affiliations. I, however, did not want to be identified as a strong supporter of 
any particular group or ideology and at first tried to evade these questions. 
I soon realized that – in the moral worlds of political commitment that were 
pregnant with claims to democracy, rights and freedom – it was not possible, 
desirable or ethical to withhold voicing an opinion on issues that were impor-
tant to them. Doing so could also easily have been interpreted as a lack of 
moral values, or that I was not genuinely interested in what they said or did. 
Therefore I usually gave a short biography of my “activist” past in Leftist 
(yasārī) circles and campaigns in Finland, while emphasizing that I was first 
and foremost a humanist (insānī) and did not belong to any political party; I 
would add that I wanted to examine as many and different points of view as 
possible for the purposes of my study. This explanation was in many ways 
accepted as it provided evidence that I was not indifferent to the issues and 
values that were important to them. In addition, there was a tacit understand-
ing that we had been at least partially connected through the global networks 
of solidarity since the turn of the millennium. Discussions on political and 
group affiliations were in many ways informative and helped me to under-
stand group formation and social interactions among the young activists.
Thus, during fieldwork, I was associated with being a former activist, 
humanist and non-partisan Leftist. At the same time, it was methodologi-
cally necessary to try to maintain good or at least “working” relations with 
members of different groups, and most people were understanding about 
my general aim of acquiring as holistic a comprehension as possible of 
youth activism in the more general sense. During the main fieldwork in 
Henri.vaitos.final.indd   54 18.5.2015   8.55
55
2008, when socializing with young activists, I felt it was inappropriate to 
voice my own opinions too strongly in the daily debates on, for instance, 
the role of religion as the source of Egypt’s constitution or the arguments 
over which president had been better for Egypt: Nasser or Sadat. By 2010, I 
had already acquired a rather dynamic view of their interpersonal tensions, 
and relations among some were by then estranged for different reasons. 
As Julia Elyachar (2005: 31-32) reminds us, ethnographers get entangled 
– unwittingly or not – in the very social networks they are poised to exam-
ine. At times I felt socially torn between different expectations and rela-
tionships, but these kinds of situations would, again, provide resources for 
more specific questions and analysis of the relationships among the activists 
themselves. 
In 2008, having conducted a number of interviews, it had also became 
clear that such exchanges were not “neutral” situations for public politi-
cal actors. Several people I interviewed had previous experiences with for-
eign journalists and expressed a wish that I too should publish their names 
(Onodera 2011b). Their media appearances provided prime opportunities 
to get political messages and “their story” across. Anwar, a social-liberal 
activist in his late 20s, told me in November 2010 that “human interest” 
reporting – of foreign journalists in particular – can often be one-sided and 
include factual errors. He referred to an article in a US-based newspaper 
that featured a particular activist, whom we both knew, where it was errone-
ously claimed that he was the founder of April 6 Youth Movement, one of 
the main youth movements that would actively participate in the “January 
25” uprising two months later. Anwar regarded giving interviews as ‘writing 
history’ as each statement bears consequences for future audiences wishing 
to find information on public events. While giving interviews emerged as 
part and parcel of political activism in itself, he preferred academic research 
as it usually provides more impartial narratives. For others, the distinction 
between researchers and journalists was not always so clear, or at least so 
pertinent. In some cases, our conversations were their first experiences of 
being interviewed. At times I was assumed to be a foreign journalist and 
after one interview with Islam, a university student, he asked me: “So, you 
won’t publish our chat in the Egyptian Gazette, will you?” He was referring 
to the government’s English-language daily, despite my prior assurances 
that the interview was for research purposes. 
These above reflections underline ambiguities between the differing 
professional ethics of “safeguarding anonymity” and “protecting sources” 
which the young opposition activists had to negotiate when dealing with 
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researchers and journalists alike. Learning about this kind of sensitiveness 
oriented me, later on, to problematize the interview situations themselves 
and be more sensitive in analysing some of the claims and arguments that 
were made during personal interviews.
2.2. EMPIRICAL MATERIALS AND ANALYSIS
This study is based on 12 months of ethnographic fieldwork which I con-
ducted during four trips to Cairo between 2007 and 2011. As explained 
above, I conducted the preliminary study in March and April 2007 (3 weeks) 
which helped me to narrow down the research focus. I gathered most of the 
empirical material for this study during the main fieldwork between March 
and December 2008 (10 months). During the subsequent trips in November 
and December 2010 (3 weeks) and in January and February 2011 (3 weeks) 
I conducted further participant observation and follow-up interviews. The 
main empirical material consists of field notes and personal interviews, and 
my main analytical tool was thematic analysis.
2.2.1. Primary materials: Field notes and personal interviews
My field notes can be divided roughly into three types: (1) descriptions of 
events, social situations and places; (2) auto-ethnographic reflections on my 
own experiences and the research process; and (3) a series of “concept papers” 
on themes that emerged during fieldwork. In early stages of research, I rather 
frantically transcribed nearly everything that had happened during the day, 
a process that proved too laborious to sustain; later I focused on addressing 
the several issues that were tied to youth activism such as everyday events 
and detailed descriptions of places and situations. I also kept a field log for 
organizing daily life: meetings, phone calls, missed calls, as well as the prices 
of different goods and services (Bernard 2006: 392-394). The log also pro-
vided a place for jottings. I wrote most of the field notes, jottings, and hand-
written interviews onto my laptop in cafeterias, libraries and at home. In both 
the field notes and the log I used abbreviations for specific persons.
My second collection of empirical materials consists of records of per-
sonal interviews. It is in many ways problematic to present the interviews in 
a strictly categorized way, since I met the respondents on a number of occa-
sions and in different situations, and the daily informal discussions with 
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them, as well as with others, were usually much more informative along 
the way. Altogether I interviewed seventy five persons. Fifty five interviews 
were with young activists, students, volunteers and NGO professionals, 
who were members of, or volunteered with, a number of civil society initia-
tives and campaign networks, nine of whom were women.11 The remaining 
twenty interviews I conducted with older opposition politicians, civil soci-
ety professionals and academics.
The personal interviews with the young respondents were predomi-
nantly semi-structured and took between 30 minutes and four hours. I usu-
ally focused on three areas of investigation: how they became involved and 
interested in politics; their past experiences and what they were currently 
doing; and what they hoped would happen in the future. We usually met in 
places chosen by the interviewee, which were mostly public and semi-pub-
lic spaces in the Greater Cairo area such as cafés, restaurants, street corner, 
party premises and NGO offices. Some interviews were set up beforehand, 
others were more impromptu encounters. I began the interviews by intro-
ducing myself and explaining the topic and the purpose of my study, that 
is, PhD research that would later be turned into a book. As it happens, con-
versations often went off in different directions, and the intended three top-
ics were not always equally addressed. We often compared the differences 
between Egypt and Finland (or the “West” or Europe) in terms of politi-
cal freedoms, what it was to be young, and life experiences in general. In 
2007 and the early stages of 2008, I used a digital recorder during inter-
views. It was a practice that I could maintain with some, especially civil 
society professionals and older opposition politicians, but I later decided to 
drop it because, first, many young respondents did not want us to record our 
exchanges and, secondly, it hindered the flow of conversation.
Secondary materials
I have followed a number of news sources both in and outside Egypt 
throughout the research process. During fieldwork, I developed the daily 
practice of buying the private nongovernmental newspapers – such as 
11 Out of the 55 young respondents, those who identified themselves with a political current, inclu-
ded 13 Leftists (11 men, 2 women), 5 Arab Nationalists (3 men, 2 women), 12 Liberals (9 men, 3 
women) and 9 Islamists (7 men, 2 women). This typology is simplified and refers to the time of the 
interview, as do their campaign or group affiliations between 2007 and 2011, including April 6 Youth, 
Busla, Committee for the  Support of the Families of al-Duweiqa, Democratic Left, Egyptian Move-
ment for Change, ElBaradei Campaign, Free Front for Peaceful Change, Front to Defend Egyptian 
Protesters, Gaza Solidarity Network, Nasserist Thought Club, Popular Committee in Defence of the 
Lands of Imbaba, Revolutionary Socialists, Solidarity, and Youth for Change.
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Al-Badīl, Al-Dustūr, and al-Miṣrī al-Yawm – and the establishment-friendly 
Al-Ahram. I also occasionally read English language papers, such as Al-
Ahram Weekly and Daily News, which catered for the expat community 
and were often more direct and open in their coverage of current affairs. 
The social media has also been highly useful in terms of keeping in touch 
with activists and following the online discussions on Facebook groups and 
Twitter. Moreover, I took a number of photographs with my mobile phone 
during fieldwork in Egypt, and it has been at times highly useful to retro-
spectively “go back” to the situations and, for instance in the case of pro-
tests, to determine exactly what the banners said. 
In addition, I have also benefited from earlier trips to Cairo, especially 
a seminar that was organized by the Finnish Institute in the Middle East 
in Cairo in January 2006. We were given talks by a number of Egyptian 
scholars and civil society professionals on current affairs, and I have at 
times returned to these notes. Another similar event was organized by the 
Nordic Society for Middle Eastern Studies in Cairo and Alexandria in June 
2008, which also included a number of topical lectures by leading Egyptian 
scholars and publishers. I have also had formal and informal discussions 
with scholars and Egyptians in Italy, Tunisia, United Kingdom and Finland 
between 2006 and 2013.
2.2.2. Analysis
When analysing the field notes, I first organized them into a Microsoft One-
Note program that allows for a simple lay-out and a search function for 
large sums of textual and visual data, including field notes, transcriptions, 
photographs and screen clips of www-pages. I then adopted an open coding 
practice on different themes, such as daily activities, social contexts and 
dissent practices, developing the habit of listening to the interviews as part 
of my everyday life. Both would yield a number of themes on their own 
which I then balanced by transcribing parts of the interviews, at times fully, 
while looking for differences and similarities in the empirical material. 
This, accompanied by further reading on the emerging themes, helped me 
to cut out certain strands of analysis (Ryan and Bernard 2003). At the same 
time, I have reflected on the ways in which my personal biography and per-
suasions have shaped how I have conducted this research and arrived at cer-
tain analyses (Jackson 1996: 10-15). During the process, I have prioritized 
ethnographic knowledge – gained through interviews, interactions and shared 
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experiences with research participants – over a single analytical framework, 
which has oriented me towards four analytical avenues and their interrelated 
topics, which I will discuss in more detail in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.
2.3. ON RESEARCH ETHICS
When conducting this research, and finalizing its written output, I have used 
as my guidance the ethical guidelines of the American Anthropological 
Association (2009). I have tried to safeguard the wellbeing of the respon-
dents to the best of my ability, acknowledging during the different stages 
of collecting the field notes and personal interviews that they do not only 
amount to rich empirical data but, more importantly, to sensitive informa-
tion about the young people’s lives, experiences and opinions. The material 
I have gathered during field research has been at my disposal only. During 
fieldwork, I secured it on my computer with a finger-mark censor and a 
password. Back in Helsinki, Finland, I have stored it in my personal data-
base at the server of the University of Helsinki and held personal copies at 
home. In today’s academia, it is increasingly common to establish shared 
data bases for the social sciences. In Finland, this task is allocated to the 
Social Science Data Archive at the University of Tampere. For the time 
being, I have no intention of sharing the empirical materials I have gath-
ered, except for the brochures, leaflets and posters collected during public 
events, such as Cairo Anti-War Conferences and the coinciding Cairo Social 
Forums in 2007 and 2008.
In personal interviews, I explained the topic of my study to interviewees 
and that its goal was the attainment of a PhD degree in the Social Sciences 
at the University of Helsinki, Finland. I also explained that I would not use 
their real names, or if I did, I would first ask their permission to do so. I 
expressed clearly that I did not want to pursue topics or issues they did not 
feel comfortable with, which seldom happened. In a few cases some did not 
want to discuss certain topics, and others chose not to be interviewed, pref-
erences which I duly respected. During interviews and everyday encoun-
ters, I did not disclose what others had told me earlier, although I would at 
times mention different views that I had heard as a way to enrich the discus-
sions on particular topics and events. At times, at the beginning of an inter-
view, I was pressured to list others with whom I had exchanged views and, 
in these cases, I would mention famous activists, or the “usual suspects” to 
whom any foreign researchers might wish to talk. In some cases I chose not 
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to pursue a particular research strategy during fieldwork, even if it seemed 
interesting and fruitful, because I was partly responsible for my family’s 
safety during that period of research. I also attended a number of meetings, 
seminars and conferences, as well as private gatherings, but I have opted 
out of describing them in detail in cases where my researcher status was 
unclear. Despite safeguarding their anonymity, I have sent sections of this 
study to be read by those involved when finalizing the manuscript.
2.3.1. On safeguarding anonymity
The post-Mubarak era has witnessed renewed animosities between, on the 
one hand, the state authorities and, on the other, some of the young activists 
and revolutionaries who have continued to protest against the “remnants” 
of the Mubarak regime since 2011, including military rule, further media 
restrictions, detentions, imprisonment and even loss of life. This has left 
many young Cairenes who aspired to attaining greater justice, rights and 
freedoms, and whom I met and talked to during fieldwork, disillusioned and 
still lacking a say in the making of a newly emerging polity at the time of 
writing. In these volatile circumstances that have been rife with unforeseen 
consequences and political turbulence, I have judged it better to follow the 
principle of safeguarding the full anonymity of research participants in this 
thesis, and refer to them with imaginary forenames, and state their age with 
a difference of +/- 2 years. I have also substituted minor biographical details 
(e.g. place of residence) without making a major difference to the respon-
dents’ profiles. This choice is not unproblematic, not the least because dur-
ing fieldwork many expressed the wish that I publish their real identities: 
justifying my choice not to do so perhaps requires further explanation.
During Mubarak’s late presidency, several young Cairenes who engaged 
in opposition politics went to great lengths to hide their identities from State 
Security services (Onodera 2011b) who monitored their daily lives, actions 
and communication, and kept personal files that could potentially haunt them 
for the rest of their lives. Others, especially young women, were equally, 
if not exceptionally, conscientious about concealing their political dissent 
from their families. Some resorted to using a variety of different nicknames 
on the Internet’s social networking sites, or in the family, neighbourhood 
and different friendship circles, and at the university and workplace. For 
others, being as public as possible was a choice from the beginning. Writing 
on weblogs and taking political stances as identifiable persons potentially 
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provided some safety against the risks involved in contentious politics. For 
instance, to be a renowned “activist” – the newly emergent and enigmatic 
figure in Egypt’s public life in the 2000s – could prove beneficial in cases of 
police detention, and help in attracting media coverage and acts of solidar-
ity in Egypt and abroad. Furthermore, acting in one’s own name bordered 
on an act of defiance; it was a statement that one did not admit to doing any-
thing wrong and, hence, had nothing to hide. Thus, “becoming public” often 
marked an important watershed in the activists’ life trajectories. Anonymity 
was, however, rarely an either/or issue but a daily practice of selective self-
exposure at the carefully managed boundaries of one’s public self, and an 
act of self-positioning in the local moral worlds of courage, resistance and 
sacrifice.
As an inter-related issue, the anonymity of research subjects is hard to 
maintain in a limited social setting and, at times, has countered my aspi-
rations to discuss certain themes at a sufficient level of detail. In the late 
Mubarak era, the circles of young prodemocracy activists in Cairo were, 
after all, a rather close-knit community, albeit one that was expanding and 
also prone to internal conflicts. That almost “everybody knew everybody” 
– including friends and foes – bore testimony to the limited space allowed 
for political opposition under Mubarak’s authoritarian rule. However, an 
ethnographic study aiming at empirical accuracy and “thick description” of 
the minutiae of daily life faces difficulties without disclosing at least a mini-
mum of biographical detail such as age, gender, marital status, education, 
profession, family background or membership in a specific political group. 
These details have been important in placing and validating the analysis 
in its rightful context. However, when discussing the formation of small 
youth-based groups and, for instance, the young activists’ life trajectories, 
even a small combination of biographical detail could make him or her 
recognizable. In sum, the issue of anonymity is in many ways problematic 
when studying public actors in the context of ongoing contentious politics, 
and places conditions on validating analysis that is based on observations 
in limited social settings. I have however followed this course, despite the 
risks of reproducing the silences of specific persons and groups about which 
El-Mahdi and Abaza, in their own ways, have cautioned us, as discussed 
above. 
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3 THE MAKING OF GENERATIONAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS
On November 28, 2010, I followed the unfolding of the first day of parlia-
mentary elections at the Huda Sha‘rawi Elementary School in Doqqi, Giza. 
Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and the liberal Wafd Party had gath-
ered at the main entrance. Some had waited vainly for three hours to get to 
the ballot box. The gates remained shut. “The liars will have their pay on 
the Day of Resurrection!” shouted an elderly woman veiled in khimār, like 
most of the Muslim Brotherhood’s female supporters, wagging her finger 
at members of the electoral committee on the other side of a high concrete 
wall. In contrast, Wafd supporters were less audacious and mainly men of 
different ages, wearing uniform T-shirts and caps printed with the party 
logo. During the period I spent at the scene, it became evident that opposi-
tion candidates were not being given a chance at this particular ballot box 
which belonged to the NDP candidate Amal Uthman, the longstanding Min-
ister of Social Affairs in Mubarak’s government who took charge of civil 
society activities in the 1980s and 1990s (Kassem 2004b: 66-69).
As the crowd swelled outside the gates, a grey-haired teacher came to 
the fore in a fierce show of frustration and bravery. He held his daughter’s 
hand and shouted: “How dare you! Now that my daughter has come of age, 
I wanted to take her to vote, to practice her constitutional rights for the first 
time in her life, but look at you, you closed the doors in front of us!” As 
soon as he had thundered away, a middle-aged woman approached me and 
explained that the gates remained shut for regrettable but legitimate bureau-
cratic reasons. I sensed she saw in me a foreign journalist, or an electoral 
observer of some kind, but before we had even entered into conversation, a 
young veiled woman pulled me away by the shoulder and whispered deci-
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sively: “Don’t talk to her. Don’t you see she’s working for them!” I recog-
nized her as Mona (24), an April 6 Youth activist, whom I had met before 
on a few occasions. On voting day she had crossed Cairo with her group of 
friends to an area far from her home neighbourhood in North-Eastern Cairo, 
where where her official voting area was.
For Mona, voting was out of the question in the present circumstances: 
parliamentary politics belonged to a distant and fundamentally corrupt 
sphere, and she did not share with the teacher any expectations that casting 
a vote would have impact. Indeed, she anticipated that the results would 
be rigged, as elections had been all her life. For Mona and her friends it 
appeared more worthwhile to act as self-organized observers, along with 
most young prodemocracy activists on that day, and to challenge the vir-
tual ban on journalists and news media in voting places. In Doqqi, they 
presented themselves as locals or as curious passers-by who had casually 
paused in their activities to see what was going on. In the case of irregulari-
ties or, rather, the normalcy of electoral “fraud” – as there was at this poll-
ing station – they passed the news on through available channels, mainly 
their mobile phones. Several civil society initiatives, in turn, compiled such 
information from diverse parts of the country, issuing it as press releases, 
reports and online mapping graphics.12
Effectively, this continuous stream of information from individual 
observers on polling stations amounted to the main alternative coverage 
of the contested parliamentary elections of 2010. It documented numerous 
cases of voters and press being denied entry to the voting premises, of vot-
ers being bribed or intimidated, and of violent clashes between rival candi-
dates’ supporters in contested constituencies. The NDP gained over 90% of 
the seats in the People’s Assembly after the prodemocracy movements and 
opposition parties had either boycotted the elections or rejected, like Wafd 
and the Muslim Brotherhood, the few seats they gained after the first voting 
round. Thus was constructed the NDP-majority parliament in anticipation 
of the 2011 presidential elections that never took place due to the historic 
turbulences that followed less than two months later. 
The personal and political roles Mona and her friends adopted in Novem-
ber 2010 were not inconsequential. These were young women in their early 
20s, observing the electoral process in the guise of local passers-by: in 
short, political dissidents attempting to search for and produce alternative 
12  The largest civil society formations to compile this information were the Egyptian Alliance for 
Electoral Monitoring and the Independent Coalition for Electoral Monitoring. 
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information as a way to evaluate the legitimacy of the election results. Their 
political engagements were contingent upon a decade-long process whereby 
young people became the most dynamic members of the prodemocracy 
movements in Egypt.
*   *   *
In this chapter, I argue that generation and generational consciousness are 
useful categories for understanding the emergence of youth movements in 
the 2000s.13 Thus, I largely ascribe to the claims that, even prior to the oust-
ing of Mubarak from power, a certain generational consciousness was in the 
making among young Egyptians (Bayat and Herrera 2010b: 24; Lei Sparre 
2013). The youth movements that had emerged by the mid-2000s, mostly 
on the fringes of larger processes of contentious politics, were important 
precedents in this respect. They created new modes of being political, and 
found ways to resist socialization into the conventions and formal, per-
son-centred bureaucracies of the established political opposition. A closer 
inspection of these processes, however, reveals intergenerational dynamics 
– both conflicts and solidarities – in public political life. In this light, the 
so-called “1970s generation” of former student activists and segments of 
Egypt’s human rights movement provided important precedents and prac-
tical support for the young protagonists of the 2000s, although the degree 
of autonomy the latter created for themselves was not easily attained but, 
rather, involved constant acts of legitimizing and making one’s self in pub-
lic life. In this vein, a phenomenological approach to consciousness as an 
intentional act (in that it always refers to things, events and objects in the 
world) helps to unravel the fact that both “generation” (jīl) and “youth” 
(shabāb) are not only analytical concepts but also locally used emic notions 
that inform the ways in which the young make sense of their place in the 
world. “Generation” provided them with the shared sense of destiny or, 
rather, the lack thereof, while “youth” provided a semantic vehicle on which 
they strove to load reinvigorated and subversive content. 
Consequently, in the first section I discuss the concept of generation and 
the sense of an absence of future prospects that was shared by young Egyp-
13  Parts of this chapter draw on my article “The kifaya generation: Politics of change among youth 
in Egypt” published in Suomen Antropologi: The Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society 
34(4): 44-64 (Onodera 2009) and “Raise your head high, you’re an Egyptian!” Youth, politics, and 
citizen journalism in Egypt” published in Sociologica: Italian Journal of Sociology 5(2): 1-22 (Ono-
dera 2011a). 
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tians at the period – including both those who were involved in politics and 
those who never participated in public dissent. Then, in the second section, I 
discuss the emergence of oppositional youth movements through two of its 
most vocal formations in the 2000s, namely, Youth for Change and April 6 
Youth. In the third section, I examine the ways in which their members saw 
their place in the generational dynamic, and strove for greater autonomy in 
order to do and experience politics on their own terms.
3.1. GENERATIONAL APPROACH
Generation has been suggested since the 1990s as a neglected analytic for 
discussing the intersection of social cleavages such as social class and gen-
der, thereby serving as a basis for collective identity formation and a source 
of social change (Edmunds and Turner 2002a, 2002b; Bayat and Herrera 
2010b). My interest in the issue emerged from encounters with political activ-
ists themselves, both young and old, men and women. The ‘youth question’ 
was increasingly debated in Egypt’s public life in the 2000s and, in this con-
text, the concept of generation, or gīl (pl. agyāl) in Egyptian Arabic, played 
a constitutive role. Young activists rose to public prominence as active mem-
bers of the wider prodemocracy movement in the mid-2000s and, at the lat-
est, in the aftermath of the opposition movement’s call for a general strike on 
April 6, 2008. Several analysts and public commentators commented on the 
rise of the “Internet generation” or “Facebook youth”, sometimes ridiculing 
the latter as irrelevant and, at other times, attributing to them a greater socio-
political role than even the protagonists themselves necessarily conceived 
of having. Importantly, many young activists referred habitually to “we, the 
youth” (iḥnā shabāb) and “our generation” (gīlnā) in their everyday talk and 
political rhetoric, thereby indicating both a distinct and in many ways dis-
enfranchised social location in the present as well as willing subjects with a 
legitimate right to influence the future on their own terms.
3.1.1. Generations and social change 
The sociological study of generations is largely attributed to the work of the 
German sociologist Karl Mannheim (Pilcher 1994: 482-484; Turner 2002). 
In his essay “The Problem of Generations”, Mannheim suggests that genera-
tions should not be regarded merely as age cohorts but more as a function of 
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the prevailing mood in society, encapsulating certain attitudes, actions and 
worldview at a particular point in history (Mannheim 1952: 276-319), and 
produced by the sharing of formative experiences of rapid systemic change 
and political turmoil like war, famine and economic depression (Edmunds 
and Turner 2002a). For Mannheim, mere historical contemporaneity does 
not, however, suffice to transform generations into sources and actors of 
historical change. In addressing this problem, he distinguished between 
“generation as location” and “generation as actuality”, and argues that the 
former, which largely consists of an age cohort, “only contains potentiali-
ties which may materialize, or be suppressed, or become embedded in other 
social forces and manifest themselves in modified form” (ibid.: 303). In 
contrast, the “generation as actuality”, which Turner (2002) terms active 
generation, has the potential to develop into an engine of social change, as 
individuals are bound together through concrete social ties and shared expe-
riences, and collectively participate in the making of their common destiny 
through existing social, political and intellectual currents (Mannheim 1952: 
303-304).
In other words, rapid systemic changes and traumatic events in soci-
ety produce formative experiences for age groups, whose members share 
a generational consciousness of their situation and resist socialization and 
acculturation into the given dominant cultural and social conventions. The 
members of active generations are not necessarily homogenous; indeed, 
they are more likely to be internally divided into different subgroups, which 
Mannheim terms “generation units”, bound together by response to their 
generational location. Thus, there can be any number of such units within 
a generation that can be, and often are, antagonistic towards one another 
(ibid.: 304-312). In studying the political cultures of different generations, 
Turner (2002) makes an additional analytic division between active and 
strategic generations. While both can make contributions to social change, 
strategic generations gain moral or hegemonic leadership in society and 
monopolize social and cultural resources, and thus restrict the opportunities 
and life chances of members of  following generations (e.g. Edmunds and 
Turner 2002a: 16-18).
In recent years, Middle East scholars have increasingly underscored the 
analytic of generations as a beneficial vantage point to locate agency in the 
processes of social, political, and cultural change (Erlich 2000; Whidden 
2005; Herrera 2009; Lei Sparre 2013). Haggai Erlich, in his study of the 
student movements of the mid-1930s, goes so far as to argue that “tensions 
and conflicts between ‘political generations’ provided a main sociopolitical 
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dimension in the making [of] the 20th century Arab and Islamic history” 
(Erlich 2000: 48). During the colonial period, young Egyptians were at the 
forefront of nationalist struggles for independence, including the popular 
uprising against the British in 1919 (Whidden 2005). They also engaged 
in new anti-colonial movements, such as the Young Men’s Muslim Asso-
ciation, Young Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood and the Communist-oriented 
Egyptian Movement for National Liberation, so as to channel their griev-
ances against monarchic rule and British colonial domination (Botman 
1991: 116-128). According to Erlich, the nationalist student movements of 
the mid-1930s generated a political generation on the basis of shared forma-
tive experiences in the face of rapid social changes and political upheav-
als: in the case he studied, the Great Depression and the fury of educated 
middle classes at the failures of local parliamentarism to advance the proj-
ect of anti-imperialist struggle and national liberation. During the interwar 
period urban and educated middle-class youth would also form the basis for 
Egypt’s modernist cultured classes that were actively involved in the fields 
of cultural production, public life and state administration (Ryzova 2005). 
Moreover, the Free Officers in 1952, including the future presidents Gamal 
Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat, were recent graduates from the Military 
Academy, and emerged as a strategic generation and the post-independence 
ruling elite (Migdal 2001: 76). 
Before the 2000s, the largest youth mobilization took place in Egypt’s 
universities in the 1970s where student politics were already vitalized by 
the national defeat in the Six-Day War with Israel in 1967. It prompted 
wide-scale student mobilization against the Israeli occupation of Sinai and 
the Gaza strip, hitherto under Egyptian supervision, as well as the West 
Bank and Golan Heights. Ahmed Abdalla, a student union leader in the 
early 1970s, explains that the “1967 generation” was constituted of those 
who came of age under Nasser’s presidency and emerged after the national 
defeat at the hands of Israel as a result of young Egyptians’ disillusionment 
with the “world view and the ideas and concepts they had been brought up 
on and had cherished” (Abdalla 2000: 71). In the period between the Six-
Day War of 1967 and the October War of 1973 with Israel, student poli-
tics were dominated by Marxist and Arab Nationalist tendencies but when 
Anwar Sadat became president in 1970 he released thousands of young 
Islamists from prison to counter the Leftist dominance at universities (Wick-
ham 2002: 95-97; MERIP 1973). Sadat’s infitāḥ policies of economic liber-
alization demonstrated a major shift from the Nasser-era goal of national 
self-reliance and a substantial public economy towards the principles of a 
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free market economy. The gradual pursuit of foreign capital, accompanied 
by simultaneous cuts in state subsidies and rising prices in staples such as 
flour, rice, sugar, petrol and cooking gas, worsened the living standards of 
most Egyptians, culminating in the “Bread Intifada” (intifāḍat al-khubz) in 
January 1977 when students joined protesters from Cairo’s popular (sha‘bī) 
neighbourhoods on Tahrir Square, as similar demonstrations took place in 
other cities (Farag 2007). This sequence of events ended in scores of people 
being killed and injured by military forces. Two years later, in 1979, Sadat 
signed the Camp David accords, widely contested by Egyptians as a “sell 
out” which effectively cut diplomatic ties with other Arab countries until 
1989. Before being assassinated by Islamic Jihad on October 6, 1981, Sadat 
ordered the arrest of some 1,500 of his political opponents, ranging from 
Communists through Nasserists to Islamists, whom Mubarak released upon 
becoming president; many of these later assumed important roles in Egypt’s 
public political life.
Indeed, during Mubarak’s presidency, the so-called “1970s generation” 
(jīl al-sab‘īnāt) of former student activists gradually dispersed into vari-
ous areas of public life, including publishing, trade union politics, opposi-
tion parties as well as vocal civil society formations such as Egypt’s human 
rights advocacy groups, and, since the turn of the millennium, the Egyptian 
Popular Committee for Solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI) 
and the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kifaya) (Browers 2007). Thus, 
although an important dynamism developed between the 1970s generation 
and the young activists – an issue I shall examine more closely below – it is 
important to bear in mind that the young Egyptians of the first decade of the 
2000s grew into maturity in different historical circumstances.
3.1.2. “Silent but with much to say”
At the very outset of my fieldwork, I became painstakingly aware of the 
marginalised – if not deviant – positions the young prodemocracy activ-
ists took in terms of the sentiments of acquiescence that prevailed in public 
life. Meeting with and befriending a number of “normal” young Egyptians, 
who distanced themselves from anything “political” (siyāsī), helped me 
to understand the practices of public dissent and the dissident sensibilities 
which the young activists promoted in public life. While sharing the latter’s 
level of education, social backgrounds and anti-regime attitudes, the major-
ity of young Egyptians I met during fieldwork in Cairo, Alexandria and 
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elsewhere, could never imagine themselves participating in acts of public 
political dissent. Layla (25) – a young female professional with no experi-
ence in politics – presented perhaps the most extreme views of the perils and 
the lack of future prospects she felt that she and her generation were expe-
riencing. By summer 2008, when I met her on a number of occasions, she 
had graduated from the University of Ain Shams in Cairo. After university, 
she had a few short-term job contracts, but eventually found “clean” office 
employment in the private sector with a relatively high salary of 600 L.E. 
per month. She was, however, not satisfied with her job and took a number 
of “self-study” courses, especially in IT and human resources, which were 
vital additions in a CV to compete in the private labour market.
Her daily life revolved around work and the home. Being unmarried, 
she lived with her family in a middle-class, yet crowded, neighbourhood 
in Giza, saving for the future. The rare occasions when she went out for 
reasons other than work comprised meetings with friends and colleagues 
in a café, looking for an apartment for her soon-to-be married sibling, or 
watching a blockbuster movie with friends in shopping-malls like the luxu-
rious City Stars in Nasr City. Much of her “free” time was spent helping 
her mother with domestic chores – cleaning, cooking, washing, etc. – in 
which her brother never participated. She complained that “today’s genera-
tion” – referring to young men in their late teens and early 20s, including 
her brother – have major flaws in that they have not learned to take respon-
sibility for themselves or for others, they do not have role models and nor 
do they have real goals in their lives. Her vision of society in the future was 
extremely grim, to the point that she had stopped watching the news and 
stopped a once daily practice of buying the al-Dustūr newspaper. Alongside 
pursuing a career, she found escape in reading a huge number of novels.
Despite the privilege of having a well-paying job, Layla told me that, 
during her lifetime, the future prospects for young Egyptians such as herself 
had gone “from bad to worse” – to the point of “non-existence”:
There is no youth condition to start with (ḥālat al-shabāb khalāṣ)! 
We have lost our rights, and our dreams have been stolen. Our 
generation blames the generation that preceded us (gīl illī ’ablinā) 
for remaining silent although the country was getting worse by 
the day, the government is now more oppressive, and the country, 
even its lands, is sold to businessmen and foreign companies. The 
generation before us destroyed it but keeps on holding on their 
high positions. 
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Her grim views of her generational location, if not destiny, were not dis-
similar to the many young activists I spoke with during fieldwork. Tariq 
(26), who had been an active member in the Kifaya movement, bemoaned 
to me in July 2008 about the dire conditions through which Egypt’s youth 
were navigating, only to discover that the trajectories of social mobility and 
life to which they aspired were beyond reach: 
Egyptian youth are under enormous pressure. For 20, 25 years 
now the generations of youth have minded their own business and 
kept away from public activities (lam yitḥakkū li-l-‘amal al-‘ām). 
What they all dream about is that they graduate from university 
and get a job... [even] a low-paid one, just anywhere, and try to 
live their lives. But very soon they discover that they are unable to 
work, that they are unable to live. 
Islam (23), a student at al-Azhar University, explicated similar stories 
of his generation’s predicament. An aspiring author, he had expressed his 
views, mainly in the form of sarcastic short stories, on his personal weblog 
online and by August 2008, when I interviewed him, he had gathered a 
small but devoted following. As a literary person, he resorted to the Rubayat 
of Salah Jahin – one of Egypt’s foremost colloquial poets – to describe the 
current state of today’s youth in Egypt, as he experienced it:
anā shāb lākin ‘umrī  walā ’alf ‘ām  
I am a thousand years, yet I am young
waḥīd walākin bayna ḍulū‘ī zaḥām  
Alone, yet in my heart lives a throng
khāyif walākin khawfi minnī anā 
Afraid and knowing it’s myself I fear
akhrus walākin qalbī malyān kalām 
Silent but with much to say14
14  Translation by Nehad Salem (Jahin 1996: 11).
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Despite their different personal trajectories, Layla, Tariq and Islam had 
very similar views of the state of their generation, pointing to the shared 
sense of the impossibility of living the lives they wish to live and the blind 
alley down which they saw no reasonable alternatives. Layla and Tariq 
touch on an important dimension of their shared generational conscious-
ness: Egyptian youth were experiencing a deep contradiction between, on 
the one hand, life aspirations that stem from middle class sensibilities in 
relation to what they feel they are due and their expectations as to lifestyle, 
livelihood and the prospect of being happy, and, on the other, narrowing 
prospects for attaining them. Their views echo what several observers have 
suggested through survey-based studies and in-depth interviews with young 
Egyptians of the period. For instance, Herrera (2006b) observes a similar 
sense of powerlessness and transference among youth from the urban mid-
dle classes which, she notes, “theoretically constitutes the backbone of the 
modern nation”:
They want to feel useful, to earn a livelihood, find love, have a 
home and build a family. While seemingly simple desires, these 
goals for the most part are hopelessly out of reach. There is an 
overwhelming sentiment of “being stuck,” of not knowing how to 
get to the future, of facing insurmountable obstacles.
Herrera (ibid.) further observes that these young people exhibit strong 
feelings of social injustice and hampered future lives:
Many respondents allude to the fact that, while they are alive, they 
do not feel they are living; they do not possess what they con-
sider a life. Living would require certain conditions of freedom, 
justice, opportunity and respect which they find largely absent in 
their lives. These young people express simple desires for indi-
vidual fulfilment: those of stability, love, family, employment, and 
housing and, to a lesser extent professional satisfaction. Life then 
begins with justice and the ability to live a dignified present that 
can lead to a stable future. For from justice will follow opportuni-
ties and the genesis of change.
In a similar vein, Assaad and Barsoum (2007: 29) suggest that the major-
ity of young Egyptians in the 2000s refrained from public “high-level” 
politics. Students feel themselves excluded from decision making processes 
Henri.vaitos.final.indd   72 18.5.2015   8.55
73
that affect their lives and, thus, many have “become cynical and unwilling 
to participate in what they perceive to be a closed system”. Young gradu-
ates also have highly negative attitudes towards the state and its paramount 
security services:
Social disparities, widening gaps between rich and poor, a sense 
of limited future prospects given high unemployment rates among 
graduates, and the difficulties in forming families create a gen-
eral sense that the system is corrupt and caters only to privileged 
elite. Besides, for many youths, the main contact with the state is 
through the police, who are widely considered to be hostile and 
needlessly violent. (Ibid.)
Still at university, Layla witnessed a number of student protests that were 
mostly organized by young Muslim Brothers during the 2nd Palestinian inti-
fada (2000-2001) and the US-led war in Iraq (2003). At times the protesters 
directed attention to Egypt’s internal predicaments and, in particular, to the 
presence of State Security that had dominated different aspects of student 
life at Egypt’s universities since the turbulent 1970s (Shehata 2008: 3-4). 
She and her friends had considered the student protesters and, later, the 
anti-Mubarak protesters on Cairo’s streets “crazy people” (magānīn); the 
real and only result of their actions was to beg trouble from the authorities: 
“They are just shouting at the wall, their voices do not carry (ṣawṭhum mish 
biyawṣal). Actually, I hope that their voices are not heard [by the authori-
ties], because if they were, it would make the situation even worse!”
The difference between Layla, on the one hand, and Tariq and Islam, on 
the other, is that the latter participated in youth movements that emerged in 
Egypt’s public life during the 2000s. Tariq, coming from an already politi-
cized family, would be further politicized during the 2005 presidential elec-
tions in the ranks of Youth for Change. In 2008, Islam, for his part, would 
become an occasional participation in a then nascent movement called April 
6 Youth.
3.2. EMERGENCE OF YOUTH MOVEMENTS IN THE 2000S
In the 2000s, the youth movements emerged on the fringes of larger pro-
cesses of contentious politics. As I have already discussed in the Introduc-
tion, a new “culture of protesting” began to emerge based on the experiences 
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of the popular mobilizations in support of the 2nd Palestinian intifada in 
2000-01 and, in 2003, against the US-led Iraq war. Although these instances 
provided many young Egyptians, including school children, with their first 
experiences of public protesting, it was not until 2005 that the young orga-
nized themselves along generational lines in the prodemocracy movement, 
beyond the contours of party politics or university campuses. In this sec-
tion, I will consider two youth movements which were important predeces-
sors in this respect, namely, Youth for Change and April 6 Youth.
3.2.1. Kifaya youth: setting a precedent
During fieldwork in 2007 and 2008, the majority of young opposition activ-
ists identified with the innovation that characterizes Youth for Change 
(shabāb min ajl al-taghyīr) (Onodera 2009). While functioning as the 
semi-official “youth wing” of the Kifaya movement, despite close ties and 
constant negotiations it remained in the main an independent group. It was 
initiated in 2005 under the auspices of the Socialist Research Centre in Giza 
but soon encompassed a variety of partisan and nonpartisan members from 
across the political spectrum with direct links to both formal and unlicensed 
political parties associated with Kifaya, namely the liberal Ghad (Tomor-
row), neo-Nasserist Karama (Dignity), and leftist Islamist Amal (Labour) 
parties and, to a lesser degree, centrist Islamist Wasat (Centre) and Nas-
serist parties and the Trotskyist Revolutionary Socialists. The majority of 
members were so-called independents (mustaqilliyīn), including university 
students, young professionals and the unemployed. Their claims to “inde-
pendence” were relative in the sense that while they rejected association 
with existing formal organizations, such as political parties, they ascribed, 
to varying degrees, to ideological trends: Leftist, Liberal, Arab Nationalist, 
and a few Islamists. While exact numbers are difficult to ascertain, Youth 
for Change activists themselves estimate that membership was about 500, 
with 50-100 core activists in Cairo. Members were mostly well-educated, 
unmarried men in their early 20s with family backgrounds in the urbanized 
middle classes. Despite prevailing social norms that discourage the par-
ticipation of young women in public protests, Youth for Change attracted 
a considerable number who came from wealthier and more liberal family 
backgrounds than their male peers.
Youth for Change gained public prominence after May 25, 2005, the date 
of the referendum on Mubarak’s constitutional amendment (Article 76) that, 
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in principle, would allow multiple candidates in the coming presidential 
elections. Several opposition movements, including the Kifaya movement, 
called for a boycott of the referendum, a day that came to be called “Black 
Wednesday” due to the violent attacks mounted on protesters and passers-
by by the police and plain-clothes “thugs” (balṭagiyya) who also sexually 
harassed three women at the Journalists’ Syndicate in Cairo. Youth for 
Change swiftly initiated a string of protests around the Greater Cairo area. 
On June 15, 2005, its members, especially the blogger-activists, played key 
roles in organizing a successful protest in front of the shrine of Sayyida 
Zeinab which reveres the memory of Zeinab, Prophet Muhammad’s grand-
daughter and patron saint of Cairo where they appropriated the popular 
belief that by dusting the shrine’s premises one can demand justice against a 
wrongdoer. A week after the “brooming event”, the young activists joined a 
similar candle-lit vigil by St. Mary’s Church in Old Cairo. They sometimes 
coordinated these kinds of street performances with the Kifaya movement 
and other movements “for change”, as well as parallel initiatives such as 
The Street is Ours and Shayfeenkum (“We are watching you”).
Youth for Change also promoted the innovation of “rapid protests” in 
the run-up to the presidential elections. They assembled in popular areas of 
Cairo – such as Nahya on August 21, and Rod al-Farag on August 26, 2005 
– for a mere 5-30 minutes at a time. “It was like guerrilla tactics in urban 
warfare,” a former member and secular-leftist blogger Hafiz (28) remem-
bers, since public assembly of more than five persons was prohibited: “pio-
neer activists” first made sure that the area was safe from security control, 
and “minders” watched their actions from a distance. The exact location 
was kept a secret until the last moment when organizers escorted others 
there personally or through mobile phones. At times, the protesters aimed to 
talk to local residents and passers-by about their daily hardships and encour-
age them to join the wider pro-reform campaign. Youth for Change activists 
especially argued for connecting the somewhat abstract, Kifaya-movement 
demands for constitutional democracy, freedom and human rights with 
pressing socioeconomic issues such as unemployment, high prices, poor 
housing and deteriorating services.15
15  These tactics refer to what is called in social movement theory “frame bridging” since, as Gun-
ning and Baron put it, “Youth for Change activists recognised that the masses would not be mobili-
zed unless they saw the link between their daily concerns and the toppling of Mubarak” (Gunning 
and Baron 2013: 56). For example, the slogans of Youth for Change in the popular quarter of Nahya, 
Giza, in August 2005, are indicative of this form of articulating political demands with socioecono-
mic needs. They included: “O Mubarak, in the name of seven million unemployed, your candidacy 
is invalid!”; “Down with Mubarak!”; “Boycott the elections!”; “Mubarak’s rule is invalid!”, and; 
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Compared with the elder opposition politicians and movement elites, 
Youth for Change members operated more through interpersonal networks, 
meeting in a variety of places (e.g. coffee houses, parties and NGO offices) 
and communicating through emails and blogs. Indeed, they were more 
attuned to the use of the latest communication technologies which proved 
to be important tools in organizing popular opposition to the National Dem-
ocratic Party and President Mubarak in the summer of 2005. The young 
activists distributed protest calls via SMS messages, web-banners and email 
lists, as well as streaming video clips from demonstrations and confronta-
tions with the police (occasionally captured by national private press) to 
international human rights organizations and media outlets such as Human 
Rights Watch and the Washington Post. They also drew on vernacular cul-
tural resources as well as locally rooted grievances to create new strate-
gies of political action, deliberately using the Egyptian dialect in banners, 
leaflets and web-based communications. They distanced themselves from 
literary Classical Arabic – the official language of the state as well as reli-
gion, giving the air of formality to everyday conversations – which many 
Egyptians regard as an obstacle to their participation in the political realm 
(Haeri 2003: 151).
Said (34), a Revolutionary Socialist, who for a period acted as Youth for 
Change’s general coordinator and, consequently, represented the group in 
the Kifaya movement’s Coordination Committee, recalls that mobilization 
tactics of direct street action remained a contested issue between the young 
members and some of the Kifaya movement’s older leadership. His argu-
ment, which echoed that of many of his peers, was that: 
…you have to go to popular areas (manāṭiq sha‘biyya) and mobi-
lize citizens there, and engage yourselves in their daily struggles 
(ma‘ārikhum al-yawmiyya)… that you, really, engage yourself in 
their battle (tashtabik fī mawqa‘athum). Then, follow them up so 
that they will one day participate in the struggle of your own. 
In late March 2007, Said had just been released from detention due to 
campaigning for a national boycott of the referendum on constitutional 
amendments – drafted by the ruling NDP – a week after it was passed 
in Parliament. Although Youth for Change had by then been largely dis-
“Enough! Rising prices… Water pollution… Dictatorship… Bread queues…  ”  Source: http://www.
norayounis.com/2005/8/23 <Accessed 23.6.2008> 
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banded, he defended the same stance of direct action and drew on the com-
mon euphemism of the “street” (shāri‘) in reference to popular sentiments: 
The street will join us only when it knows that we participate in 
its struggle and its economic and social demands such as the local 
residents’ daily struggle over a loaf of bread (lu’mat al-‘īsh) and 
pay (murattab), or getting the needed clothing and books for their 
children at school. 
Said maintained that the “political events” (iḥtifālāt siyāsiyya) under 
the rhetoric of “towards democracy” or the periodic protests calling for the 
downfall of Mubarak in downtown Cairo would not suffice to build trust 
between the prodemocracy movements and their wider publics. While 
his stance on public mobilization tactics was poignantly Trotskyist in its 
basis in Marxist analysis of social change, his frustration at the conven-
tions of opposition politics – such as indoor seminars, confined protests in 
downtown Cairo, and the use of established news media channels – was a 
view I encountered with most former members of Youth for Change. This 
view also echoed the lesson many activists had learned from their per-
sonal engagements in the 2000s: in order to build up a critical mass against 
Mubarak it was vital to relocate unlicensed protests away from the con-
ventional protest sites at the city centre. Although Kifaya movement lead-
ers at times disagreed with direct street actions, they would join in Youth 
for Change activities once they had proved successful. Before voting day 
on September 7, 2005, the youth wanted to organize a number of localized 
protests which would then march and join one another on Tahrir Square. As 
one member remembered:
We wanted to make a big demonstration but Kifaya refused, and 
said it’s too risky, because we kept having reports from the Minis-
try of Interior that anyone trying to this will be collected and put 
in trucks and into detention, and it seemed like it’s totally going to 
be the case. But still we insisted, went out to the streets, and had 
one of the biggest demonstrations. 
The voting day marked the peak of protest activities, while an esti-
mated 10,000 protesters joined the anti-Mubarak rally: a “big number” by 
Egyptian standards. Several secular opposition parties boycotted the elec-
tions along with the Kifaya movement, and the Muslim Brotherhood won 
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an unprecedented 88 parliamentary seats (19%). Nonetheless, the State of 
Emergency was renewed, once again, in May of the following year, while 
the government was preparing widely contested anti-terrorism laws to even-
tually replace the emergency legislation. New constitutional amendments 
that helped to secure the NDP victory in 2010 parliamentary elections were 
passed through the People’s Assembly, and then a referendum was held in 
March 2007, when several opposition parties and groups boycotted the bal-
lots, and when Said and some of his activist friends were briefly detained.
In the late 2000s, the experiences of Youth for Change circulated as 
individually and collectively memorized narratives of collective action, 
resistance and consequent disillusionment. The 2005 elections reinstated 
Mubarak as president for his fifth six-year term in office, and the NDP 
retained its overwhelming majority in Parliament. In the aftermath of the 
2005 Egyptian elections and the Islamist Hamas’ victory in Palestinian gen-
eral elections in early 2006, the foreign press and strategic allies like the US 
State Department gave less attention to democratic reform in Egypt, while 
the Ministry of Interior increased restrictions on public protesting. Dur-
ing the “Judges’ Crisis” (azmat al-quḍā) in spring 2006, Youth for Change 
activists mounted their final wave of public actions in response to allega-
tions by two judges that the parliamentary elections were fundamentally 
“flawed” (El-Mahdi 2009: 99-100; Said 2007; Bernard-Maugiron 2009). As 
the government took action against the judges, public debate expanded to 
encompass the judges’ right to supervise elections which had been in place 
since 2000 and, more broadly, the independence of the judiciary in the face 
of encroaching executive powers. In April and May 2006, Youth for Change 
staged solidarity protests in front of the Judges Club in Cairo. The police 
arrested some 60 of its members for periods ranging from a couple of days 
to several months although many of the detainees did not belong to politi-
cal parties and were simply disillusioned by the lack of moral and practical 
support from older opposition leaders. 
The spring of 2006 was busy with collective protest actions, but the 
period also restructured, in an important way, social networks among the 
young activists themselves. For some, the extended detentions in shared 
cells fostered new ties of friendship and solidarity between, for instance, 
secular-leftist activists and Muslim Brothers. They shared food, mobile 
phones, books and other utilities and, in short, endured a collective experi-
ence of imprisonment. For others, the imprisonment came to represent an 
overpowering personal crisis, especially when it involved experiences of 
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physical and psychological violence during interrogations. Some walked 
out extremely disappointed in their fellow activists who, at a time of crisis 
when solidarity is of prime value, chose to disown them on grounds of polit-
ical and personal differences. At these particular junctures, the only persons 
to be trusted were their closest friends, family and human rights lawyers.
After the Judges’ Crisis, Youth for Change members grew disillusioned 
with the purpose of protest activity and lost heart due to the strengthened 
security constraints over street activities. The group’s internal organization 
had also become a contested issue between partisan and nonpartisan young 
people as the latter remained somewhat uninterested in ideological strife 
and competition for various committee positions within the group itself. 
After the group’s disintegration, the partisan sector refocused its efforts on 
various arenas provided by established networks and personal contacts dur-
ing their involvement in the prodemocracy movement. Some have joined, 
or returned to, existing political parties and groups such as the Karama 
Party, Amal Party, Democratic Front Party and Revolutionary Socialists. 
The nonpartisan started working in private firms, newspapers and civil soci-
ety organizations or focused on their own campaign initiatives; others dis-
tanced themselves from public politics altogether, choosing to pursue their 
studies and careers or prioritizing their new responsibilities as parents. The 
majority of occasional participants, as one activist recalled in 2008, “sim-
ply vanished”. Another disengaged former member also mentioned that his 
personal involvement in protest actions effectively cost him his small trade 
and created difficulties in renting an apartment due to records kept by the 
security services.
Thus, by the time of my fieldwork in Egypt in 2007 and 2008, it was 
clear that the main fronts of political and social struggle operated beyond 
the streets and public spaces of Cairo. Thousands of textile workers had 
mounted massive and successful strikes against the Misr Spinning and 
Weaving-company in the Delta city of al-Mahalla al-Kubra (Beinin and 
Hamalawy 2007); similar strike movements had emerged to demand pay 
rises and allowances in other industrial cities, such as Tanta and Helwan; 
farmers were mobilized in protest movements against large landowners and 
local authorities in the Nile Delta (Bush 2009); local residents, for instance 
in Alexandria, Cairo, and Giza, had resisted their forced evictions; and 
university professors and students were organizing their own initiatives 
(Dessouki and Galal 2007; Geer 2013). In the summer of 2007, various 
locally-based action movements arose to demand clean water and sanitation 
services from the authorities while, in December 2007, real estate tax col-
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lectors staged a successful ten-day strike – the first strike by public sector 
workers since Egypt’s independence.
3.2.2. The strike day as “a turning point”
The single most important event that rekindled the interest of young activ-
ists in public politics was the popular uprising by textile workers and local 
residents in al-Mahalla al-Kubra on April 6-7, 2008. It was preceded by 
public calls by various opposition groups for a simultaneous general strike 
and nationwide solidarity actions, against a backdrop of worsening socio-
economic conditions and the ongoing “bread crisis” that, for many, dem-
onstrated Egypt’s failure to adjust to fluctuations in the globalized market 
economy. The prices of wheat and other daily commodities had skyrocketed 
during the preceding months, and people by the dozen were either injured 
or killed in daily clashes in front of subsidized bakeries. The political oppo-
sition and private press evoked memories of the Bread Intifada of 1977. 
Importantly, the strike event also encouraged former Youth for Change 
members as well as previously demobilized youth into public political 
dissidence.
On April 6, 2008, as the Central Security Forces filled central Cairo with 
troops and wagons, Huda (18) – a veiled university student – was sitting in 
an ahwa (pl. ahāwī, a popular coffee shop) with her new Facebook friends. 
Like many of her peers, she had no prior experience of political activities 
but was deeply touched by the bread crisis and stories of women and chil-
dren fighting over a loaf. She had come to witness a popular uprising on 
Cairo’s streets but her experiences fell short of expectations. Police offi-
cers forced her and her companions into a wagon and subsequently inter-
rogated her for fifteen hours at a local police station. After the initial shock, 
she simply could not believe the extent of control and injustice inflicted 
upon them. Her immediate response was to pray for God “to take me out”. 
Upon her release, she returned home a new person: “It opened my eyes, and 
I loved Egypt more than ever before, everything about it, even the traffic 
jams (zaḥma).” She did not subscribe to a political ideology or party: “I am 
just an Egyptian girl who loves Egypt, the greatest country in the world – 
and who believes that change is possible even if one does it alone.” 
According to prevalent norms within society, young and unmarried 
women were – and are – expected to participate in domestic work and, to 
say the least, stay away from public anti-government actions. Huda, there-
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fore, considered herself privileged: her parents allowed her to participate 
in protest actions. Despite her detention, the family let her stay out late 
in the evening which allowed her to take part in campaigns, protests and 
informal discussions in downtown Cairo which political activists would fre-
quent on a daily basis. Such family endorsement was rare and deflected the 
normative gaze and rumours that late home-comings of a young unmarried 
woman could easily generate in the neighbourhood and the extended fam-
ily. Many of Huda’s female peers hid their political activities from their 
families for fear of disciplinary action and home arrest. On the other hand, 
young women activists from wealthier and more liberal family backgrounds 
seemed virtually unaffected by these normative sanctions. Following her 
arrest on April 6, Huda joined the April 6 Youth Movement (shabāb 6 abrīl) 
in an attempt to fight prevailing social injustices.
The April 6 Youth was formally established on June 28, 2008, at the 
Journalists’ Syndicate in Cairo. As indicated by its name, its members paid 
tribute to the largest popular uprising and the first general strike attempt 
in recent Egyptian memory. Initially they mobilized around a Facebook 
group – established by Ahmed Maher, a former Ghad member and Youth 
for Change activist – that attracted over 70,000 members in the few weeks 
before and after the strike day. The online group offered an arena for heated 
debates, action calls and statements to its members. Although the group’s 
membership rose gradually in the late 2000s, its initial membership base 
was much more modest. During my time in Cairo in 2008, the active mem-
bers who participated in street campaigns and protests numbered about 
fifty in Cairo, although local groups began emerging in other cities such as 
Alexandria, Tanta and El-Fayoum. At the outset, its core members included 
a number of former Youth for Change activists with pre-existing ties with 
opposition parties, such as Ghad and Labour, while the majority were new 
to politics – university students, young professionals and a few unemployed 
– who joined in the group via Facebook or mutual friends.
Despite salient links with existing opposition groups, April 6 Youth 
asserted its autonomy from political parties and rigid ideologies. Its mem-
bers claimed to be united, much in line with Huda’s account, in their patri-
otic love for Egypt. They generally felt that Egypt no longer belonged to 
them (maṣr mish bitā‘itnā!) and that Mubarak’s regime was based on, as 
Fahmy (2002: 242) calls it, “an alliance between the state, the military, and 
selected segments of the bourgeoisie who have established direct links with 
foreign business interests”. They also rejected Egypt’s natural gas deal with 
Israel. They also criticized the government’s dependence on US economic 
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and military aid and its intemperate attempts to attract foreign direct invest-
ment into the country. 
After the group was officially established, its members joined various 
campaigns in support, for instance, of journalists who face libel charges, 
such as Ibrahim Eissa, and they also organized “solidarity visits” to Tus-
sun (Alexandria) and Abu Regeila (Cairo) where local residents were fac-
ing forced evictions. They protested for the release of detained bloggers in 
Cairo, local farmers in Serando – a small village in the Nile Delta – as well 
as the 49 persons who were arrested in al-Mahalla al-Kubra in April 2008. 
Beyond public protests April 6 Youth members engaged in daily commu-
nications and debates in Facebook groups, email lists and other electronic 
fora. They also launched parallel, web-based conferences with articles 
and speeches by several opposition leaders and activists during the NDP’s 
annual conferences in 2008 and 2009. Compared with response to their 
Internet-based dissidence, the Central Security Forces were quick to deter 
any street actions. 
The appearance of April 6 Youth inspired mixed opinion within the polit-
ical opposition. On the one hand, older Kifaya and other opposition leaders 
welcomed the group as a follow-up to Youth for Change that brought new 
vitality to street protesting. However, some partisan youth – Leftists and Nas-
serists in particular – did not see the group as a meaningful actor and argued 
that urban “Facebook youth” cannot make real impact without a wider sup-
port from, for instance, the workers’ strike movements. Some young Nas-
serists also complained to me that the new group did not provide concrete 
alternatives to, or a future vision of, changes and policies for a post-Mubarak 
society. Moreover, analysts at the time doubted the long-term survival of the 
group, arguing that Internet-based activism can wane as easily it coalesces, 
and has meagre resonance with the wider offline publics (Faris 2008). 
April 6 Youth activists were, however, highly reflexive about this con-
straint from the outset. Hamdi (26), a former Ghad and then April 6 Youth 
activist, told me that transforming digital contentions into concrete actions 
presented the main challenge for the group, a problem that was constantly 
discussed among its members. On the other hand, he argued against the 
need to promote a rigid political ideology or political platform with pol-
icy proposals and the like. In 2008, when I first met him, he expressed the 
hope that localized protest movements and the numerous opposition forces 
in Egypt would unite into a subversive and critical mass that would lead 
to the downfall of Mubarak’s regime through non-violent popular uprising. 
This scenario represented a common aspiration among secular opposition 
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groups, including the Kifaya movement, prior to the 2011 presidential elec-
tions. In 2008, Hamdi envisioned, should Mubarak’s regime fall, a provi-
sional government could rule the country for a transitional period of two 
years before organizing a free referendum based on a new constitution rep-
resenting a negotiated consensus of all the political forces in Egypt. As with 
many of his peers, Hamdi favoured a combination of elements from dif-
ferent political ideologies: from the Left, he adopted the principle of pri-
oritizing the poor (al-inḥiyāz ma‘a al-fuqarā’); from the Islamists he took 
the social values (qiyam al-mugtama‘a) and moral codes; from the liber-
alists he appropriated the central principle of freedom (ḥurriyya); while 
from Arab Nationalists (qawmiyīn) he borrowed the value of loyalty and 
allegiance to Egypt (al-intimā’ li-maṣr) and the Third World or, currently, 
the “global South”. During the 2005 elections, Hamdi was at university but 
never joined Youth for Change; he did, however, publicly declare himself 
a member of Kifaya. After he joined the April 6 Youth in 2008, the police 
detained him several times. Before meeting me, his last visit to prison lost 
him his job.
3.2.3. The 2000s: Diverse trajectories
In the run-up to 2011, April 6 Youth emerged as arguably the most endur-
ing youth movement in the late Mubarak era. Both Youth for Change and 
April 6 Youth were, however, important predecessors to later youth activ-
ism. Firstly, they both sensitized previously disengaged youth to public 
political dissent, many of whom continued their efforts through their own 
initiatives or as new members of existing opposition groups, political par-
ties and campaign networks. Secondly, they provided the young with shared 
experiences, narratives and social memories which forged concrete social 
ties not only among young Cairenes but also with more established opposi-
tion politicians, journalists and civil society professionals. The acquisition 
of these personal contacts and networks enabled some to find full or part-
time employment in the publishing industry and civil society organizations, 
thereby providing them with the privileged position of continuing their 
activism as part of their job description. Moreover, some worked or volun-
teered with a number of civil society formations such as public campaign 
initiatives, offering their technical “know-how” to establish and maintain 
campaign www-sites and servers. 
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Towards the end of 2000s, however, there were two further political 
processes that mobilized youth, both the already politicized and those who 
were new to politics, into public political dissent.
ElBaradei’s bid to presidency
The first coincided with the appearance of Mohamed ElBaradei, the former 
head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in Egypt’s public life in 
2010. His arrival on the political scene mobilized a number of young people 
and liberal activists, including April 6 Youth, the Democratic Front Party 
youth and the “Nour wing” of the Ghad Party, as well as former Muslim 
Brothers who were frustrated with their conservative leadership. All cam-
paigned in support of ElBaradei’s demands for constitutional change and 
his bid as a challenger of the regime in the presidential elections that were 
planned to take place in 2011. Reports of Mubarak’s ailing health increased 
common belief in the “succession scenario” (tawrīth) – Gamal Mubarak’s 
“grooming” as next president – while the political opposition was devoid of 
leading national figures that could gain undivided support from the various 
oppositional parties and movements and, importantly, the wider Egyptian 
public. 
ElBaradei’s presidency became a rallying point for diverse opposition 
groups and prominent public figures, among them Alaa al-Aswany, the 
acclaimed author of Yacoubian Building, Hamdeen Sabbahi, the leader of 
Karama party, and George Ishaq, the Kifaya movement’s former coordi-
nator. Current and former members of April 6 Youth would also take part 
in organizing a successful “welcoming rally” near Cairo International 
Airport on the day of ElBaradei’s arrival. Soon after his return, ElBara-
dei established the National Association for Change (NAC) (al-jam‘iyya 
al-waṭaniyya li-l-taghyīr) that began to rally around amending Articles 76, 
77 and 88 of the Constitution so as to assure more open competition for 
the presidency. Consequently, the NAC launched a “one million signatures” 
call that also campaigned for the support of ElBaradei’s presidency and 
wide political reforms such as an end to the State of Emergency, the judicial 
oversight of the upcoming parliamentary elections, and the limit of presi-
dency to two terms. One of ElBaradei’s campaign coordinators estimated in 
November 2010 that three out of four volunteers were under 35 years of age 
and were predominantly educated youth from urban middle classes. The 
NAC’s campaign’s strategy had, from the outset, been to reach out to “aver-
age Egyptians” and they preferred, much in line with Youth for Change 
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and April 6 Youth, to stage surprise protests and to collect signatures in the 
popular neighbourhoods. In late 2010, however, ElBaradei declared that 
his demands for constitutional changes were not being met and he resigned 
from the presidential race, much to the dismay of his supporters.
“We are all Khaled Said”
The second event that injected new dynamism back into street protests and 
youth activism before the contested 2010 parliamentary elections – when 
Mona and her friends acted as independent observers – was the death of 
Khaled Said, a 28-year-old Alexandrian man, at the hands of police on June 
6. He was taken from an internet café and beaten violently on the street 
before being taken to a local police station. Officials initially explained 
that he had choked on the marijuana he was allegedly carrying, a claim 
that was later refuted by photographs from the morgue, showing his frac-
tured skull and disfigured face; meanwhile it was speculated that Said had 
been persecuted by the local police because he had distributed a video clip 
showing police officers distributing drugs among themselves to sell (Her-
rera 2014a: 48-50).
Said’s case went viral online, and the initial protests in Alexandria broad-
ened to a wider public debate on the police violence and torture that were 
part and parcel of control practices in Mubarak’s security state. The Face-
book group called “We are all Khaled Said” (kullinā khālid sa‘īd) played 
a crucial role in instigating repeated anti-torture protests and campaign-
ing. Two days after its launching on June 10, 2010, the group had attracted 
50,000 members, a number which rose to over 200,000 in less than two 
weeks, and offered a constant feed of dissident messages and images of 
social justice, and an expanding virtual space for online debate. Importantly, 
the group partly resolved Hamdi’s concern with the challenges of bridg-
ing online activism and offline actions by initiating a campaign of “silent 
stands” to commemorate Said’s death in Alexandria, Cairo and other cities 
along the Nile and the Mediterranean coast. Each person would take a book, 
usually the Quran, and read it in silence on the waterfront, at a safe distance 
from others, as a tribute to Khaled Said and other victims of police violence 
in Egypt. This was a conscious tactic to circumvent the ban on public meet-
ings involving more than five persons. It proved successful, as hundreds of 
people, predominantly but not all young, would line up with total strangers 
on the pavements across the cities, in an individuated yet collective act of 
public dissent. Eventually, the police began to disperse these silent protest-
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ers, thus making their contested role as enforcers of emergency powers and 
the status quo further evident to the public. 
In 2010, the group’s administrators were operating in the safety of ano-
nymity. After the “January 25” uprising, it was revealed that they were 
two young Egyptians, Wael Ghoneim, a Google executive based in Dubai, 
and Abdelrahman Mansour, an activist. Ghoneim had previous experience 
in administering the Facebook group of the ElBaradei campaign (Herrera 
2014a: 64). The two young administrators of the Khaled Said group devel-
oped highly sophisticated communication strategies, using the latest online 
marketing ideas and tools in order to get the timing and content of their 
messages “right” (ibid.: 47-69). According to Herrera, the group iconized 
Khaled Said as a martyr (shahīd) as both an “aggregate portrait of an ideal-
ized Egyptian youth” and a “heroic champion of justice, a cyberactivist who 
was killed trying to fight the security forces” (ibid.: 150).
Ad hoc activities
An additional asset at the disposal of young Cairenes was, quite simply, 
that they had more time to volunteer in opposition campaigns and differ-
ent acts of public dissent. While organized groups such as political parties 
and NGOs, often took some time to agree on appropriate lines of action, 
draft press releases, organize seminars and so on, young activists – espe-
cially young men who had few family obligations and could socialize in 
male-dominated places in the evenings – were prepared to engage in public 
events that needed a quick response.
On September 14, 2008, I witnessed a sit-in protest in front of the City 
Municipality in central Cairo. Some fifty protesters, mainly women and 
children, were demanding alternative housing after the military forced them 
to leave provisional shelters in al-Duweiqa, one of the city’s most impov-
erished informal districts (‘ashwā’iyyāt). A major landslide had destroyed 
their homes there a week earlier and resulted in more than one hundred 
reported deaths among their relatives, friends and neighbours; informal 
estimates held the numbers closer to five hundred. The police periodically 
encroached on the lawns of Abdeen Square where the protesters had set-
tled themselves but faced energetic abuse, especially from young mothers 
who blamed the police and the city authorities for mismanaging the crisis. 
Bloggers and journalists mingled at the scene, along with young activists 
– some mobilized in an ad hoc Committee for the Support for the Fami-
lies of al-Duweiqa. The activists had promised to stand by the families in 
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case the police suddenly decided to evict them. Some provided the families 
with basic necessities – food, drink and blankets – so that they could con-
tinue with the protest activity. Others arrived to photograph and interview 
the protesters and hurried to publish the news online. Sitting on the lawn, I 
felt somewhat intimidated by the police presence and the fact that we were 
being cordoned off with metal fences. I expressed to Ahmed (23), a young 
blogger and occasional April 6 Youth member, how bewildered I was by 
the courage and perseverance these women demonstrated in the face of the 
police. Ahmed replied that they reminded him of a song by System of a 
Down, an American rock band he truly adores:
I’ve got nothing, to gain, to lose 
All the world I’ve seen, before me passing by 
You don’t care about how I feel, I don’t feel it any more
The final line in particular had stayed in his mind, providing meaning to 
the scenario unfolding before our eyes: “They don’t have anything to lose, 
no home, their children and relatives have died, so why should they care 
about what the police do?” Later on, when next we met, he played with 
these words in English – “I feel that I don’t feel; I don’t feel that I feel...” 
– although we normally conversed in the Egyptian dialect. He used this 
wordplay to explain something that I could not quite capture at the time. 
I understood, however, that it expressed his inner state and feelings, or the 
lack thereof, and the way he connected to the world.
3.3. THE QUEST FOR AUTONOMOUS POLITICAL ACTION
Edmunds and Turner (2005) suggest that the media spectacle that surrounded 
the 9/11 attacks in New York in 2001, coupled with the unprecedented num-
bers of young people globally, gave rise to a global generation, whose gen-
erational consciousness was no longer tied to sharing direct experiences; 
increasingly, their formative experiences have been mediated through glo-
balized information flows, the mass media, satellite channels and the Inter-
net. In Egypt, the US-led global “war on terror” in Iraq, coupled with the 
continued Israeli occupation of Palestine, instigated unprecedented waves 
of public mobilization in Egypt that provided young Egyptians with shared 
formative experiences and social memories of civil disobedience and self-
organized public mobilization. In addition, the continued public protests by 
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the workers’ movements, farmers and local residents across the country car-
ried forceful reminders of ongoing social polarization in neoliberal Egypt, 
which was aggravated by the global financial crisis (2007-2008).
In this context, it is useful to retain a twofold analytical view of youth 
as a position and a process which, as Vigh (2006: 34) argues, enables us to 
view the making of generational consciousness by young people as “bound 
together by formative experience and interpretive horizons, constituted by 
their historical becoming as a specific generation growing up in specific cir-
cumstances as well as defined by their mutual position in the intergenera-
tional order”.16 For the members of Youth for Change and April 6 Youth, 
an integral dimension of their collective experiences was to construct a 
generational boundary between themselves and older political generations. 
They managed, at least momentarily, to carve out alternative social spaces 
– mainly via unlicensed public protest and the social media – that allowed 
them to gain new visibility and roles in public political life. But it required 
their constant efforts to establish their presence and legitimacy as political 
actors and to experiment with direct street tactics, public rhetoric, political 
tools, online dissent and, simply, alternative ways of being political. As far 
as the new youth movements are concerned, these efforts involved, first, a 
collective escape from the institutional action alternatives provided by orga-
nizational hierarchies, such as political parties, trade unions and certain seg-
ments of professionalized civil society. Secondly, their members sought to 
create less bureaucratic forms of hierarchic power relations, and to engage 
simultaneously in various ad hoc campaigns, networks and more individu-
ated forms of direct action that conjoined virtual and physical spaces.
3.3.1. Generational consciousness
Against this background, I suggest that the generational consciousness 
forged by the young opposition activists of the period was structured on 
three interrelated registers of meaning. Firstly, they habitually referred to 
“our generation” (gīlnā) as a distinct social position and realm of experi-
ence that they regarded as largely disenfranchised and neglected in prevail-
ing society. These views echoed the grim generational prognoses of Layla 
– the young female professional who considered political activists “crazy”. 
16  Vigh makes use of Mannheim’s original thesis to arrive at this synthesis, the aim of which is to 
fuse analytical approaches to youth as a “demarcated site for construction of ideas and praxis” and as 
a “period of liminality, a life stage or status” (ibid.). 
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Theirs was a generation that was born under Mubarak’s rule and raised in 
the hope that life had the potential to provide, if not luxury, at least the 
chances of being content. Its members were disenfranchised in public life, 
and their rights and freedoms were neglected by the police state appara-
tus; a generation whose members saw their life chances diminishing day by 
day while the status quo profited the political and economic elite, a small 
segment of Egyptians for whom the future provides the promise of further 
comfort, security and privilege (Wardany 2012). For activists, especially the 
more privileged, the aspiration was not always for socioeconomic well-being, 
but also for the chance to experience freedoms and enjoy rights they feel they 
are due, and to acquire a sense of being heard and represented by the state 
authorities. Thus, on the face of it, these young Cairenes targeted the ruling 
elite, including President Mubarak and the NDP, as well as the military and 
business-related ruling elites. Clearly, they claimed the share in public politics 
and decision-making that they felt they were due. At the same time, however, 
youth movements challenged the wider gerontocratic and person-centred 
hierarchies that prevailed in Egyptian society at large, including in the politi-
cal opposition. The majority of political parties, trade unions and civil society 
organizations were ruled by men in their 60s and older. In the new millen-
nium, generational tensions were a public concern not only in Egypt. In Syria, 
Jordan and Morocco, father-to-son successions had already taken place, and 
nepotistic generational turnover was expected to take place in myriad forms 
in public and private institutions, not only at the apex of state power.
Secondly, young activists found it poignant that they had gradually 
acquired a certain “political awareness” (wā‘ī siyāsī) during their lives: 
seeing Egyptian society as “it is” and as a source of imagining an alter-
native future. For some, the family had played an important role in their 
political awakening, while for others it was university, friends and exposure 
to the Internet which had provided them with alternative information and 
interpretive schemes – such as the online lyrics of a favourite band. Since 
the mid-2000s, youthful critique did not only take place within the secular-
oriented opposition but also manifested itself in the emergence of a young 
generation of Muslim Brothers, including bloggers (Lynch 2007), who 
rejected the conservative values promoted by their gerontocratic leadership. 
Towards the end of the decade, the Internet and the social media would 
open up new avenues to global influences and provide increasing numbers 
of young Egyptians – or the “wired generation” (Herrera 2014b) – addi-
tional opportunities for networking and acquiring alternative knowledge of 
current affairs. This is an issue I shall return to in Chapter 4.
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Thirdly, despite important differences in their personal life trajectories, 
young activists’ generational consciousness invested politically reinvigorat-
ing and subversive meaning in youth (shabāb) itself. They resisted being 
socialized into the given conventions of opposition politics, such as restrict-
ing their political engagements to indoor seminars and policy-formulation 
and other “paper work”. They largely viewed the latter as afflicted with a 
myriad of internal problems, ranging from stagnancy and lack of action to, 
as some put it, “traditions” (taqālīd) and weakness (ḍa‘f) that had not thus 
far been overcome. Importantly, the subversive meanings they attached to 
their life-stage of being young not only targeted the political opposition, 
but were created against the backdrop of prevailing narratives of “youth 
apathy” and “youth idleness” in Egypt’s public life (El-Sharnouby 2012). 
Against these depictions, they attributed the qualities of energy (ṭāqa), vital-
ity (ḥayawiyya), enthusiasm (ḥamās) and activism (nishāṭ) to the category 
of youth. In comparison to their contemporaries, those who participated in 
prodemocracy movements cultivated qualitatively different and more hope-
ful aspirations connected to the fact that they were young. They were in the 
main convinced that “we, the youth” (ihnā ish-shabāb) can and should play 
central roles in public political life as its inheritors.
3.3.2. Intergenerational dynamics
Despite the tensions between activist youth and the previous generations, 
an important dynamic of intergenerational solidarities emerged during the 
2000s. There were several ongoing processes, movements and social net-
works which helped to lay the bases – ideational, discursive and material 
– for the emergence of youth-based movements in the 2000s.
1970s generation
A study of prodemocracy mobilization in the 2000s in Egypt would fall 
short without acknowledging the key roles played by members of the 1970s’ 
generation, introduced above (e.g. Shorbagy 2007: 179-182). Born in the 
post-independence era, they were politicized through student union politics 
in the turbulent 1970s, some sharing the experiences of imprisonment dur-
ing Sadat’s period in office. During the 1980s and 1990s, some assumed 
active roles in Egypt’s public life, including the publishing industry and 
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civil society organizations.17 Others became prominent in professional syn-
dicates that represented one of the few available avenues for opposition pol-
itics at the time (Wickham 2002).18 An important number of 1970ers also 
joined political parties and have played, since the 1990s, integral roles – as 
members of the “middle generation” (gīl al-wasaṭ) between older leader-
ship and younger cadres – in establishing new off-shoot initiatives, such as 
the Karama Party from the Nasserist Party, the centrist-Islamist El-Wasat 
Party from the Muslim Brotherhood, both in 1996, and the liberal Ghad 
Party from New Wafd Party in 2001.19 These party offshoots demonstrate 
that earlier intergenerational strife was an additional dimension of ideologi-
cal discords and personal politics within the political opposition and party 
life before the 2000s. They also bear witness to the importance of political 
generations as a source of dynamism and social change in Egypt’s political 
life, as indicated earlier (Erlich 2000). 
If the student movements had withered away due to State Security con-
trol of campus life since Sadat’s presidency, interpersonal relations among 
former members of student movements were retained as “abeyance” net-
works (Taylor 1989; Duboc 2011), the strength of which was reconfirmed 
at the turn of the millennium. The 1970ers were involved in establishing a 
number of political coalitions that were part and parcel of the burgeoning 
“new culture of protesting” after the turn of the millennium. During the 2nd 
Palestinian Intifada, they played integral roles in forming the Egyptian Pop-
ular Committee for Solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada. Subsequently, 
these interpersonal networks in Cairo and the governorates laid the social 
basis for anti-war mobilizations during the war against Iraq in 2003 and 
the prodemocracy movements in the mid-2000s. Although similar “cross-
ideological initiatives” took place in the 1990s, the pro-Intifada and anti-
Iraq war movements represented important moments of public mobilization 
whereby members from different ideological groups forged public political 
17  These include, among others, Ahmed Abdalla, who was a prominent student union leader in the 
early 1970s, establishing his own youth association El-Geel (Generation). Leftists Ahmed Seif al-
Islam and Aida Seif al-Dawla engaged in prominent human rights groups, or the Hisham Mubarak 
Law Centre and El-Nadeem Centre, respectively.
18  These include, among others, the cofounder of the El-Wasat Party, Abu El-Ela Madi, and Socia-
list Kamal Khalil, who were involved in the Syndicate of Engineers, while MB’s Muhammad Abu 
el-Quddous was part of the Syndicate of Journalists. Kamal Abu Eita from the Karama Party would 
later spearhead the movement for the independent labour union of Tax Collectors in late 2007.
19  Amin Iskandar was a cofounder of the Karama Party, and Abu El-Ela Madi cofounder of the 
Wasat Party. Ayman Nour, who established the Ghad Party, was a student union leader in the early 
1980s. Under Mubarak’s leadership, the Karama and Wasat Parties never acquired a party license 
from the PPC, while the Ghad Party acquired a formal license in 2004.
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coalitions and worked together (Abdelrahman 2009; El-Hamalawy 2007; 
Browers 2007).
Moreover, the 1970ers played key roles in initiating the Egyptian Move-
ment for Change (Kifaya) in the run-up to the presidential elections in 2005. 
The Kifaya movement’s older leaders, who held offices and had access to 
resources, helped Youth for Change members access personal office space, 
resources for printing, meeting venues and so on. In late 2004, as the move-
ment’s founding document, the Declaration to the Nation (Biyān ilā al-
umma), was in preparation, another initiative – the Popular Campaign for 
Change (or Ḥurriyya al-’ān, “Freedom Now”) – was simultaneously taking 
shape as an alternative platform with more Leftist and Marxist orientations 
and membership base. By the time of the Kifaya movement’s first demon-
stration in December 2004, the two initiatives had been virtually merged 
under the same slogan and demands, although an internal tension between 
different ideological currents continued to evolve within the movement.20 
Politicized parents
For the young who were born and raised under Mubarak’s presidency, hav-
ing family and parents who were already politicized was a crucial asset. 
Many of those who could continue their political dissent and who became 
prominent activists in their own right had family members, often parents, 
from the 1970s’ generation. Tariq’s father, for instance, was a prominent 
figure in the Karama Party and Tariq had been socialized into opposition 
politics from an early age. Those like him had joined oppositional events 
since childhood, enabling their acculturation into an oppositional ethos, 
rather than the prevailing popular sentiments that necessitated and required 
youth to avoid politics. As Huda’s political experiences suggested, family 
endorsement of public dissent was even more crucial for young women than 
for their male peers. In general, many prominent young activists – who often 
played the roles of “trendsetters” in Egypt’s youth activism – were, through 
their personal biographies and family endorsement, disposed to contentious 
politics. Some of their parents belonged to the 1970s generation, others 
20  Towards the late 2000s, the internal division among the 1970ers would run parallel with the 
emergence of a number of opposition initiatives. In 2010, George Ishaq, Mustafa Galil, and other 
former Kifaya leaders aligned themselves with ElBaradei’s National Alliance for Change, while the 
old structures of the Egyptian Movement for Change were, by November, relocated from Ishaq’s 
office to Abdel Halim Qandil, a Nasserist journalist and co-founder of Kifaya movement. In turn, the 
Left-oriented members of the 1970s generation joined in establishing a new movement in July 2010, 
calling it the Popular Democratic Movement for Change.
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played active roles in civil society campaigning and trade unions while 
still others belonged to the “cultured class” (muthaqqāfīn) of journalists, 
authors, artists and academics. Thus, different forms of economic and cul-
tural – and, by extension, symbolic – capital were important assets for some 
young Cairenes in terms of continuing their public political dissent over a 
prolonged period of time. 
Human rights advocates
In addition to the 1970s’ generation, the important role of Egypt’s human 
rights movement should be acknowledged as an additional support network 
and predecessor to today’s political activism. Many of the student activ-
ists of the 1970s played active roles in Egypt’s human rights organizations 
and advocacy groups. Ahmed Seif al-Islam, for instance, was a prominent 
human rights lawyer in the 2000s, and was involved in several high-pro-
file cases in support of detainees and workers’ right advocates. Aida Seif 
al-Dawla cofounded the El-Nadeem Centre for Victims of Torture which 
offered psychological services to torture victims, mostly “average citi-
zens” rather than political activists. Egypt’s human rights advocacy groups 
also provided channels of public influence for those who came of age in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Although limited in numbers, Egyptian human rights 
NGOs advanced vocal criticism against the practices of Mubarak’s police 
state and reported on continued human rights violations in the country. 
Advocacy groups such as the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights 
became the target of public slander levelled both by the government and 
other civil society activists, facing accusations that ranged from damaging 
Egypt’s image abroad to accepting foreign funding for Western agendas, 
(Abdelrahman 2004: 136-138; Pratt 2006). The famous case of Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim, the founder of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, 
was but one in which public figures with human rights rhetoric and connec-
tions to foreign organizations were put in jail or intimidated.
In the run-up to 2011, an additional “safety network” emerged to support 
individuated protesters and activists, namely, the Front for the Defence of 
Egypt’s Protesters (jabḥat al-difā‘ ‘an mutaẓāhirī miṣr) (FDEP). It was a 
loose network that comprised a number of human rights groups and individ-
ual actors, including bloggers and journalists. Moreover, the FDEP involved 
a number of young lawyers, journalists, and civil society professionals who 
were socialized into opposition politics on the basis of their vocation. It was 
formally established in 2010 as a network of 34 civil society organizations 
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and advocacy groups in the context of a legal campaign led by the Center 
for Economic and Social Rights that demanded a minimum wage of 1,200 
L.E. per month. The FDEP emerged on the basis of a network of civil soci-
ety groups and activists in the late 2000s that provided legal and logistical 
aid to al-Mahalla al-Kubra detainees and their families in 2008. Before major 
events, such as April 6, 2008, or the 2010 parliamentary elections, the EFDP 
would publish a list of “emergency phone numbers”, circulated by activists 
online, which included those of rights lawyers who could be contacted in 
cases of arrest or detention. During demonstrations, the FDEP members col-
lected information about arrested persons, and then allocated a lawyer to fol-
low up the case not only in Cairo but also in other parts of the country such as 
Alexandria and Aswan. Seif al-Islam, who then worked as the HMLC’s direc-
tor, told me in June 2008 that this had been one of the most important and con-
crete ways in which the HMLC had supported the prodemocracy movements 
and the workers’ strike movements since the turn of the new millennium. He 
noted that times had indeed changed since no such services existed when he 
was jailed in the 1980s. He had a direct comparison: his son Alaa Abdelfattah, 
a prominent blogger-activist, had been detained during the Judges’ Crisis in 
2006 but had rapidly acquired an online campaign calling for his release by 
fellow activists in Egypt and abroad.
3.3.3. Activist habitus
I once asked a secular political blogger, Mahmud (27), who was detained 
for a prolonged period during the al-Mahalla al-Kubra uprising, whether he 
was a member of any opposition group or political party. I sensed that he 
was somewhat offended by the framing of my question, and he went on to 
explain:
You have to understand that I am an activist, not a member in any 
group or party. To be an activist, you have to understand this: it 
means that if you see any kind of injustice anywhere, at any time, 
you have to go there and try to help. If it’s the political prison-
ers, you go and protest. If it’s the university students against 
rising fees, you go and join them. If it’s the poor people, you go 
and support them. Sometimes you can’t do much, but even small 
things can be very important. Sometimes the only thing you can 
do is to be present, like with the families of al-Duweiqa. If there 
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are enough activists and journalists around, the police may not get 
violent. Sometimes, the only thing you can do is to take a photo 
and send it onwards; to write on your blog so as to make things 
exist. Otherwise no one hears anything about what’s happening in 
this country.
Since his release, Mahmud has continued blogging, and deliberately cov-
ers the workers’ strike movements and cases of police brutality in Egypt. 
While both younger and older opposition activists shared many political 
demands and grievances with regards social illnesses in Mubarak’s Egypt, 
the former asserted their presence within the opposition not only through 
assuming a degree of autonomy for youth-based political dissent but, 
importantly, through the ways in which they were, and not only through 
what they did (Bayat 2010: 120). In comparison with older opposition 
politicians, young activists were more oriented to direct street actions and 
preferred to socialize and plan future campaigns on the fringes of public 
opposition events – in staircase corridors, on lounge sofas and the like – 
rather than following official programs and listening to premeditated politi-
cal speeches. They communicated in Egyptian dialect online and offline, 
used slang words and expressions, and wore trendy loose jeans and T-shirts 
rather than collared shirts and trousers. They used the new ICTs while some 
of the older politicians scarcely used computers. They drew on global youth 
cultures and were as likely to listen to, for instance, American rock bands 
or Bob Marley as Sheikh Imam – the revolutionary singer who inspired the 
students’ protest movements in the 1970s. Thus, while the members of the 
new youth movements seemed to draw inspiration from the experiences of 
earlier political generations, they were in the process of reinventing “youth” 
as self-claimed agents of social change.
Indeed, the emergence of youth activism in the 2000s accompanied the 
appearance of a certain activist habitus (Bourdieu 1977; Bayat 2010) that 
carried a new composition of dispositions, tastes, sensibilities and politi-
cal practices that construed a generational boundary, thereby enabling 
horizontal solidarities to emerge among young people. Conceived in this 
way, the young Cairenes’ activist habitus and outward self-comportment 
often distinguished them from the members of previous political genera-
tions. But the same cannot be said of the daily situations when mixing with 
their non-activist peers, or other young Cairenes, who filled the very same 
urban spaces, listened to same music, and frequented the same shops, cafés 
and street corners of Cairo’s city centre. In the 2000s, there were few out-
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ward markers of “activism”, unlike in the post-2011 period during which 
certain “revolutionary outfits” – such as the Palestinian white-and-black 
scarf (kūfiyya) – have proliferated in the cityscape to the point of becom-
ing trendy. In the Mubarak era, young opposition activists rarely expressed 
their political dissent or opinions through clothing, in contrast to youth sub-
cultures in European and Northern American societies (e.g. Brake 1985: 
11-15). A young artist explained to me in 2008 that “Egyptians do not need 
things like T-shirts” to make their point, as they are verbally so expressive. 
On the other hand, I would presume that the outward markers of political 
dissent – such as an anti-Mubarak T-shirt at the time – would most likely 
have attracted “unwelcome” attention from the police officers on the street. 
However, although the young activists’ outward costume rarely hinted at 
their dissenting views, talking to them sooner or later made it fully apparent: 
their daily lives were filled with “talking politics” in ways which amounted 
to subversive acts in themselves. It is true that many young Cairenes would 
commonly voice their dissatisfaction with the incumbent authorities and 
political power, finding expression in multiple ways from daily expressions 
of frustration and complaint to running jokes and ridicule. In contrast, how-
ever, the conversations among activists were often pregnant with anecdotes 
of their political experiences and past events, such as recent seminars or 
street protests, encounters with the police or balṭagiyya, shared experiences 
in detention, and their subversive analyses of contemporary society and its 
powerholders. Importantly, they talked politics in terms of future action. 
Their conversations ranged into the future tense towards what might be pos-
sible, often going beyond the mere rhetorical level of a simple but very cru-
cial question: “What can we do?” (hana‘mil ayh?).
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter I have described the processes whereby Egyptian youth 
movements of the 2000s emerged on the fringes of larger processes of con-
tentious politics, most notably wider prodemocracy mobilization and the 
workers’ protracted strike movements, but gradually managed to assume 
new roles in public political life. Both Youth for Change and April 6 Youth 
were important instances in this respect, merging, at least temporarily, 
young Egyptians from different backgrounds and affiliations into collec-
tive actions: forging alliances, largely beyond the formal political institu-
tions. Both youth movements had local chapters in the governorates outside 
the capital and invited hitherto demobilized youth into opposition politics 
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by expressing a generational consciousness which in part helped to lay the 
social basis – as shared formative experiences, social memory and interper-
sonal networks – for later waves of youth activism towards the end of the 
decade, including the young volunteers in the ElBaradei campaign. In doing 
so, the new youth movements promoted the collective sense of belonging to 
“our generation” (gīlnā) as a disenfranchised social location in the intergen-
erational order, while also providing reinvigorated meanings to “youth” as 
a subversive political category, and in some ways a privileged experiential 
realm, ready to conduct public political dissent on its own terms. Although 
the young activists benefited from being connected to earlier political gen-
erations, most notably the 1970ers and human rights advocates, the ways in 
which they assumed new roles in the wider prodemocracy movement coin-
cided with their acquiring a certain activist habitus that carried a new com-
position of dispositions, tastes and practices. Collectively they both rejected 
apathy and refused to be assigned to the accustomed avenues, spaces and 
forms of political participation that did not serve their ideas and preferences 
for meaningful political action. In the next chapter, I will probe this issue 
more closely, specifically exploring the different modes of political agency 
propagated by the young.
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4 YOUTHFUL RESISTANCE
On the evening of 4 November, 2008, a dozen members of April 6 Youth, both 
men and women, decided to organize a street action of their own that was, as 
I was told earlier, “something completely different” (ḥāga tāniyya tamāman). 
They wanted to celebrate the Egyptian Day of Love (‘īd al-ḥubb) – a national 
alternative to Valentine’s Day that was claimed to be more attuned to Egyp-
tian culture, social values and patriotism. By the time I joined them on Tahrir 
Square, the State Security forces had prevented them from congregating a few 
blocks away on Nile Corniche. Surrounded by plain-clothes police, they were 
seemingly excited but by no means desperate, and engaged in a lively debate as 
to what they should do next. An officer who was, presumably, judging by his 
authoritative gestures, in charge of the police operation, told the young activists 
repeatedly not to go on with their plan. Finding it impossible to continue, some 
of them stayed downtown while others jumped on taxis and busses, and hurried 
to Al-Azhar Park where the police eventually arrested and questioned them, and 
confiscated their belongings: a few cardboard banners and dozens of red plastic 
hearts that they had intended to distribute to passers-by.
However inconsequential this street action might have seemed, it had required 
considerable prior preparation. Some of the organizers had come up with the idea 
and devised an online call. Others had searched for YouTube links and the lyrics 
of several patriotic songs they intended to sing in public and, again, published 
these online. Some had collected money from peers and bought the gifts they 
intended to distribute to Cairo’s commuters, while still others had produced pieces 
of cardboard with the day’s greetings and the movement’s name written on them. 
Their aim was to greet passers-by with “Happy Day of Love” and to talk about 
their recent initiative: the April 6 Youth, “the youth who love Egypt”.
During my time in Egypt, I witnessed and heard of several street actions 
that were planned by young Cairenes but that never actually took off. By 
“taking off” I mean that, since the authorities’ careful tolerance of public 
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protest during the electoral period in 2005, the security apparatuses, as a 
rule, did not allow these collective actions to enter urban space as public 
events. Some of the “Day of Love” protagonists had already been arrested 
in Alexandria on July 23, 2008, the national holiday commemorating the 
1952 July Revolution. They had congregated on a public beach to try and fly 
a kite resembling the Egyptian flag, and to sing the national anthem among 
other holiday-makers. In September 2008, a week after the landslide in al-
Duweiqa, the police prevented a small protest by young Communists and 
other Leftists on Talat Harb Square in downtown Cairo, which was aimed at 
raising city commuters’ awareness of the ways in which the public authori-
ties had mismanaged the on-going “humanitarian crisis”. The Central Secu-
rity Forces and plain-clothes officers incarcerated them, which resulted in 
a few bruises and an ID check, and the police forcibly confiscated camera-
phones from passers-by who happened to take photos from the other side of 
the street. On 28 September, 2008, young Leftists were compelled to cancel 
some street theatre at the last minute on a busy street in Imbaba, a popular 
(sha‘bī) neighbourhood in Giza, due to police pressure. The street action, 
organized by a network-based Popular Committee in Defence of the Land 
of Imbaba, aimed to portray the injustices being experienced by thousands 
of local residents who faced the risk of being evicted from their homes to 
make way for a road leading to the future Giza Airport, and neo-liberal proj-
ects of “beautification” and “development” on the banks of Nile.21 Local 
NDP figures, including the head of the municipality, appeared at the scene 
to make a simple statement: “This is forbidden!” (Mamnū‘!).
In the late Mubarak era, state reactions to these stunts seem some-
what “oversized” for what they were supposed to control: periodic stunts 
by young people on the street. But they are highly illustrative of the nar-
row line between what was allowed, and what not, in the urban spaces of 
Greater Cairo.  On the Day of Love, Ahmed – the strident fan of System of 
a Down – decided not to go to Al-Azhar Park with the others. He disagreed 
with their sudden change of plans: the places where the event was to take 
place had been published online, and he did not want to go out of his way 
to beg further trouble from the authorities. Instead, we went to one of his 
favourite ahāwī, the popular coffee shops in the quarters and alleyways of 
21  Since 1990s, the (re)building of new housing and business districts in Cairo have evolved in 
tandem with the evictions, with relatively low incentives, of local residents in popular (sha‘bī) neigh-
bourhoods and informal districts (‘ashwā’iyyāt) (Bell 2009). In Imbaba, residents were offered new 
homes in 6th October City, a satellite city west of Cairo. One local Committee member told me that 
the offer was unappealing because it would uproot families from the vicinity of their relatives, neigh-
bours, jobs or, quite simply, their homes.
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the downtown area, a few steps away from its main commercial streets. He 
later told me it gave him a relative sense of safety: its clientele, including 
many young activists, at least knew “who’s who” and which waiters were 
potentially government informants (‘umalā’ al-ḥukūma). He characterized 
downtown Cairo as his “space of freedom” (misāḥat al-ḥurriyya) in con-
trast to the impoverished neighbourhood on the northern outskirts of the 
city where he lived with his parents, and where he would not publicly dis-
close his real interests and political activities. 
As I befriended Ahmed in 2008, his stories of the everyday presence of 
the police (shurṭa) revealed the multiple and refined boundaries that young 
opposition activists were constantly obliged to bear in mind. They were 
almost certain that, sooner or later, State Security would secretly listen 
to their phone conversations and keep records of their activities. Engag-
ing in public dissidence, such as unlicensed protests, holding banners and 
distributing leaflets in public spaces, carried the risk of detention, violent 
interrogations and imprisonment, and their future lives – for instance, when 
looking for a job or an apartment – could be hampered due to personal files 
in the Ministry’s archives.
Indeed, the state security apparatuses went to great lengths to deter any 
contact between political dissenters and those who were their immediate 
audiences and targets for public mobilization: discontented Egyptians. 
Indeed, beyond the marginal elite who lived with impunity in relative free-
dom and abundance, most Egyptians were impoverished, a condition that 
cultivated a widespread sense of subordination, injustice and indignation: a 
popular anger directed towards the incumbent authorities that was coupled 
with fear of retaliation should they publicly voice their dissent. Many of the 
young activists whom I have discussed thus far were at the forefront of test-
ing and transgressing these social barriers, often putting their bodies on the 
line, and trying to find cracks and narrow opportunities as best they could. 
It was exactly this social interface with the people (sha‘b) which provided 
the young activists of the 2000s with their prime challenge and opportunity 
and, in consequence, the main arena for acting out their youthful under-
standings of meaningful political action.
*   *   *
Youthful dissent in Egypt’s public life in the 2000s, including that of youth 
movements, exhibits many of the traits, qualities and characteristics of the 
transnational activism that emerged at the turn of the millennium (Della 
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Porta and Tarrow 2005; Bennet 2005; Zahran 2007; Juris and Pleyers 2009). 
Many young Cairenes resorted to similarly innovative uses of direct street 
action, the new Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and 
horizontal organizational forms which were also recurring features and ide-
als in the context of the wider anti-Mubarak movements (Shehata 2011). 
The emergence of today’s transnational activist practices – which Juris and 
Pleyers (2009) call “alter-activism” – has also encompassed the subver-
sive practices of taking over public spaces, to establish “activist camps” in 
public parks and squares for instance, as a way to create alternative social 
spaces for discontent, communion and resistance
In this chapter, I discuss many of these features of youth activism but 
differ from the model in one crucial aspect: living, acting, and coming of 
age in Mubarak’s Egypt was in many ways predicated on the social fact that 
discontent was not to be expressed in public space. Transgressions of this 
social norm were met with the might of Mubarak’s regime, including meth-
ods of intimidation, detention and physical violence. In order to explore 
the ways in which young activists could, therefore, negotiate and, at times, 
transgress these boundaries of conspicuous conformity I will, in what fol-
lows, expand the analytical scope from the contours of political opposition 
and its intergenerational dynamics toward the wider social environments 
and communicative spaces (or public sphere) in which they lived.22 In the 
first section, I discuss the young activists’ political practices in more detail, 
arguing that in many ways they represented “tactical” efforts (de Certeau 
1980, 1984) to find alternative modes of being political in terms of both 
political conventions and state control over public contention. The second 
section builds on the premise that, ultimately, not all young people were 
equally positioned to acquire or to act upon an activist habitus; rather, their 
opportunities for political dissent were, importantly, structured along social 
cleavages such as class, gender and cosmopolitanism. The third section is 
based on the observations that the emergence of youth movements in the 
2000s was by no means self-evident; further, that they provided their mem-
bers, insofar as coalition politics is concerned, with both tiresome experi-
ences and a learning curve of how to “do politics” with others. Meanwhile, 
along with the persistence of internal strife akin to that afflicting the estab-
lished political opposition, the processes of internal division, coupled with 
22  Parts of this chapter draw on my article “Raise your head high, you’re an Egyptian!” Youth, poli-
tics, and citizen journalism in Egypt”, published in Sociologica: Italian Journal of Sociology online 
5(3): 1-22 (Onodera 2011a). 
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the expanding audiences and social media users online, created a certain 
heterogeneity in responses, offering young Egyptians alternative avenues 
for political dissent towards the end of the decade.
4.1. TACTICAL TRANSGRESSIONS
Acquiescence in the face of police directives represented a prevailing social 
norm against which young activists positioned themselves in Egypt’s public 
life. In comparison with other countries in the Middle East, such as Iran, 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, Egyptian youth enjoyed relative free-
dom in terms of conservative religious moral authorities (Bayat 2010: 130). 
The government allowed them to engage, up to a point, in diverse activities 
such as sport, leisure, music and charity work as long as they did not inter-
fere with politics (Lei Sparre 2013). Layla, the young professional whom I 
introduced in the previous chapter, observed that the parents of her genera-
tion had raised their offspring to “walk beside the wall” – noting not only 
that the children should keep away from the hazards of Cairo traffic, but 
also that they should mind their own business and not engage with whatever 
happens on the “street”. In the 2000s, Layla mentioned, parents would fur-
ther instruct them to enter the wall itself so as “not to see, not to hear, not to 
feel anything”. In my observation, the metaphor of the wall (al-ḥīṭa) was a 
recurring reference to the public authorities. For Ahmed, who had learned 
to cope with the immediacy of state surveillance, the metaphor of the wall 
carried yet another lesson: “The walls have ears”. It was part of his practical 
knowledge that “if they [the police] want to arrest you, they can do it any-
where, at any time”.
Under these circumstances, how could the young activists challenge the 
barriers to public political life? As I have discussed above, many strove to 
do things on their own, and to experiment with alternative ways of being 
political in relation to the gerontocratic practices within the political oppo-
sition. In the wider framing of Egypt’s prodemocracy movement, the people 
(sha‘b) – with the “average Egyptian” (al-muwāṭin ‘ādī) as its individu-
ated core – were their prime target for public mobilization. Evoking the 
metaphor of “the wall” in a different context to that of state power, young 
activists were particularly concerned with finding cracks and frictions as 
best they could so as to get closer to the people themselves. In many ways 
they were at the forefront of challenging the panoptic gaze (Foucault 1977) 
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which the state security apparatuses practiced in the public sphere. It is in 
this sense that some of the practices which aimed to transgress the prevail-
ing norm of conspicuous conformity can be termed “tactical” (de Certeau 
1980, 1984).
4.1.1. On the use of tactics
De Certeau’s notion of “everyday tactics” (1980, 1984) offers a useful 
frame for discussing the young activists’ experimental and resourceful 
political practices in the late Mubarak era. In an attempt to overcome the 
age-old social scientific dilemma between structure and agency, de Certeau 
introduces a corresponding dialectic between strategies and tactics: strate-
gies comprise the sustained efforts of “the powerful” to separate itself from 
its social environment and to consolidate its panoptic position as a mecha-
nism of othering and surveillance (ibid.; Mitchell 2007: 99-100); while tac-
tics refer to everyday forms of resistance by those – “the weak” – who are 
subjected to the authority of the powerful and its hegemonic strategies. By 
their very nature tactics never turn into strategies, but they do help to cre-
ate autonomous spaces for the subjected others in the wider discursive field 
framed by the powerful. As such, tactical practices involve innovative ways 
of exploiting the symbolic, material and temporal resources at hand and, 
as such, are “always on the watch for opportunities that must be seized ‘on 
the wing’” (de Certeau 1984: xix). Because tactics are intrinsically experi-
mental, de Certeau argues, their effects cannot be ascertained. Their force, 
however, depends on invisibility (or “disguise”) and the right combination 
of what he terms the “opportune moment” (kairos) and the symbolic reserve 
of “memory” (de Certeau 1980). In this sense, tactics result in multiple out-
comes and unintended trajectories, including new articulations of meaning.
De Certeau’s interest lies in the use of ruse and trickery: deceptive and 
cunning practices (or metis) which the ordinary people (or “the weak”) 
exploit and thus resist the given in their lives. Tactics in this sense also refer 
to the ways in which people strive to feel more “at home” and to adjust their 
immediate social surroundings accordingly.23 De Certeau’s was a hopeful 
23  Perruque is among the most known tactics de Certeau introduced, referring to situations in which 
employers, while working, “steal” time for their “own things” – which could today concern the likes 
of surfing on the Internet’s social networking sites at the office while pretending to work. In this way, 
perruque does not only deflect the panoptic gaze of superiors but also challenges capitalist relations 
of power and production, namely, the logic of surplus value (de Certeau 1984: 24-28).
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commentary against the social determinism he saw in much of the social 
sciences of his time. He was especially critical of Foucault (1977) and 
Bourdieu (1977) for projecting totalizing narratives across the social world 
and, in particular, over human agency, that were difficult to overcome from 
within their own social science “discourse” (de Certeau 1984: 46-60). His 
focus rests on the practices of “ordinary people” and everyday life as the 
main site of resistance. Although young activists were by no means “ordi-
nary” Egyptians, his notion of tactics casts useful light on their attempts 
to avoid being socialized into the conventions of political opposition and 
the predetermined lines of action that, for instance, their middle-class back-
ground would encourage them to adopt. 
Thus the notion of tactics helps in appreciating the ways in which Egypt’s 
young activists were forced to find very subtle and opportunistic, yet highly 
precarious, ways to assume urban space even for a brief moment. During 
the 2010 parliamentary elections, when participating in wider NGO-led 
campaigns, it was the independent observers themselves, such as Mona and 
her friends in Doqqi, Giza, who put their bodies and social tact into play 
when hanging around polling stations as “curious local passers-by” while in 
fact on the look-out for alternative information about what was taking place. 
Furthermore, as I have already mentioned, Youth for Change entered popu-
lar quarters in Greater Cairo where the tactics of “urban guerrilla warfare” 
– as one activist put it – proved crucial in relocating public street protests 
beyond the narrow contours of its accustomed arenas in downtown Cairo.24 
In this way they not only challenged prevailing conventions in the political 
opposition but also the narrow margins allowed for public dissent by the 
state power; decentralising public dissent was consciously geared towards 
expanding the audiences of the wider prodemocracy movement beyond the 
place and class-specificities of downtown commuters. 
The early youth movements were also prone to use the available cultural, 
material and symbolic materials at hand (de Certeau 1980). Let us return to 
the initial successes of Youth for Change whereby the protesters appropri-
ated a popular belief that by dusting a shrine’s premises one can demand 
justice against a wrongdoer. According to Fahmi (2009: 97) the “Kans al-
Sayyida” is a popular religious practice among Cairenes:
Sweeping the mosque entrance with straw brooms is considered 
both a literal act of paying respect to the mosque and a symbolic 
24  These are practically housed within the same quarter, roughly one kilometre north of Tahrir 
Square.
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call for aid and blessing from the beloved Zeinab’s spirit. Seek-
ing spiritual assistance against all manner of injustice is a Sufi-
inflected mode of popular resistance that Egyptians have invoked 
historically against tyrants and police brutality.
Participants brought along brooms and wished for the sudden depar-
ture of the NDP elite, including Prime Minister Habib el-Adly and Sawfat 
Sherif, the Speaker of the Parliament and the main candidate in the Sayyida 
Zeinab constituency; even the Ghad Party’s presidential candidate Ayman 
Nour paid a visit and media attention was assured.
In late July 2008, April 6 Youth activists organized a trip to Alexan-
dria with a seminar at the local Ghad Party office and a visit to Tussun, 
a neighbourhood that faced forced eviction by the police. While enjoying 
a national holiday on the popular Sidi Bishr beach, they prepared to fly a 
kite in the colours of the Egyptian flag; on the occasion of the July 1952 
Revolution that had effectively brought the 70-year-old colonial presence to 
its end. In the view of the security officials, who had hitherto followed the 
youth from a distance, this act exceeded the boundaries of what is accept-
able in public places. In what followed, they expelled the youths from the 
beach, ultimately forcing fifteen of them into police wagons to be taken 
away. Fourteen others were arrested the following day, and the subsequent 
charges included blocking the traffic. While the goal of flying a kite was in 
itself a marginal event, it was also an attempt to reclaim a strip of public 
beach for collective expression. Importantly, it would have gained its power 
from its symbolic meaning: the determination to reclaim the Egyptian flag, 
the prime state symbol toward which all Egyptian pupils bow and swear 
allegiance every morning at school, and memories of an Egyptian nation 
that once united against foreign rule and oppressors.
Over the course of the 2000s, these forms of surprise protest became part 
and parcel of later waves of youth mobilization, as exhibited in the actions 
of April 6 Youth as well as in the context of the signatures campaign, orga-
nized by the National Association for Change, the pro-ElBaradei coalition 
that was calling for extensive political reforms such as the end to the State 
of Emergency, judicial oversight of the coming parliamentary elections, and 
the limitation of presidential office to two terms. Undoubtedly, middle-class 
and relatively well educated youth would at times face suspicion from local 
residents. But, according to some, this was often overcome through simply 
talking and listening; they faced little antagonism with regards their views 
of the present predicaments in society. In addition, in the early experiments 
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of Youth for Change, one of the protesters normally lived in the neighbour-
hood and was known to its residents as a “son of the neighbourhood”, and, 
importantly, had the practical knowledge of how to negotiate its alleyways 
and quarters in case the police moved in. 
Although the youthful attempts to assume public spaces in 2008 were 
curtailed, stories about them soon circulated in the social media in the form 
of personal testimonies and photographs taken at the scene, including, in 
July, from the police wagon itself. These events were further reported in the 
private press, and narrated and re-narrated among the youth, as yet addi-
tional stories of resistance and injustice evolving beneath the “public tran-
scripts” of how Egyptians had generally learned to behave in the face of 
the state powers such as the police, and in public life (Ewick and Silbey 
2003; Scott 1990). In this sense, although youthful dissent was suppressed 
in public spaces it gave expression to the subversive attitudes, frustration 
and popular anger – especially against the police and corrupt officials – that 
were tangible realities in Mubarak’s Egypt. As such, it revealed “low-pro-
file forms of resistance” (Scott 1990: 19) that can be rife among the popu-
lace but rarely expressed or performed in public (e.g. Bayat 2010: 51-55). 
Rather, Scott argues, these comprise a widespread popular subculture, or 
“hidden transcript”, that takes many forms and constantly simmers beneath 
the conspicuously settled surface of public quiescence:
Most of the political life of subordinate groups is to be found nei-
ther in over collective defiance of the powerholder nor in complete 
hegemonic compliance, but in the vast territory between these two 
polar opposites (Scott 1990: 136)
But, as already noted, the new protest movements in Egypt did not 
emerge in isolation from global events and processes. In other words, youth-
ful resistance was also drawing influences from globally circulating activist 
cultures. It is, for instance, well known that April 6 Youth drew influences 
from Otpor (Resistance), a Serbian youth movement that played incremen-
tal roles in mobilizing a critical mass against President Slobodan Milosevic 
in 2000 (Gunning and Baron 2013: 84; Alexander 2011: 35). At the out-
set, the group did not have direct contacts with Otpor but, as one member 
explained to me, they studied its experiences and tactics of nonviolent civil 
disobedience from online sources, such as Wikipedia, and watched docu-
mentary films about it, such A Force More Powerful. Others, such as the 
more cosmopolitan, upper-class youth, had been connected to global activ-
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ist networks since the Palestinian Intifada and the war in Iraq. In this con-
text, the internet provided the prime medium for acquiring knowledge about 
past experiences of youth activism outside Egypt, of their tactics and suc-
cesses, as well as of social networking. A few activists later developed links 
with global youth movements, including Otpor, learning new tactics from 
them directly, which generated internal tensions within the movement, as I 
shall discuss further below.
In sum, the young urban activists had come of age in an era of finan-
cial globalization and global flows of ideas, technologies and commodities 
(Appadurai 1996). In comparison with their elders, they were also more 
intimately connected to the globalized media ecology.25 At the same time, 
they argued and wrote politics in the Egyptian dialect and articulated new 
political meanings on the basis of popular religion (e.g. Youth for Change’s 
event at Sayyida Zeinab) and rather conventional forms of patriotism (e.g. 
April 6 Youth’s celebrations of the 1952 Revolution and the Egyptian Day 
of Love). Some of their tactical practices reflected what Bayat (2010: 134) 
terms “accommodating innovation”, attempts to use available cultural 
resources in order to redefine and reinvent “prevailing norms and traditional 
means to accommodate their youthful claims”. Indeed, they seemed highly 
reflexive as to the constraints and opportunities of their actions as they 
responded to a fragmenting and increasingly complex public sphere. In this 
sense, they were entangled in a “general process, driven by social, political 
and economic change, by which social actors, confronted with the erosion, 
or transformation, of established patterns of belonging, readjust existing 
notions of rights and membership to new conceptions of identity, solidarity 
and the institutional foci of redress” (Ellison 1997: 711).
4.1.2. Politics of truth
In this light, an important aspect of being an opposition activist in Mubarak’s 
Egypt was to try to keep track of what was going on in the world; in other 
words, reconciling official “truths” with their own experiences of it repre-
sented yet another dimension of everyday life. Mark Allen Peterson (forth-
coming) asserts that social scientific inquiry into the making of truthfulness 
25  I refer here to Mark Peterson’s definition of media ecology as “the dynamic, complex system in 
which media technologies interact with each other and with other social and cultural systems within 
a particular social field, and the ways these interrelationships shape the production, circulation, trans-
formation and consumption of images, texts and information within this system” (Peterson 2011: 11). 
Henri.vaitos.final.indd   108 18.5.2015   8.55
109
in news reporting should go beyond professional claims about the “corre-
spondence between the facts reported and a corresponding objective real-
ity”, adding that:
Truth, in the social practice of news making, is less about facts 
than it is the correspondence of some arrangement of facts to what 
some group of people believe about the world. For journalists, 
truth thus generally involves representing the world in a way that 
creates agreement among many of those among whom these rep-
resentations circulates; news consumers, in turn, usually judge the 
reliability of news on the basis of how well it fits with what they 
already believe to be true about the world.
In this regard, the ICTs and new media – mobile phones, the Internet 
and satellite television – became increasingly important sources of infor-
mation at the turn of the millennium. In the early 2000s, the prodemocracy 
movements and coalitions, including the Kifaya movement and anti-torture 
campaigns, were among the first to tap into these opportunities for political 
communication and public mobilization. In the main, it was the young who 
designed and maintained websites, wrote on personal weblogs and email-
lists, and on the Internet’s new social networking sites. Alongside dissident 
street actions, social media emerged as their main arena for experiencing 
politics. They shared the goal of mobilizing Egyptians to take transforma-
tive action and sought to promote “political awareness” (wā‘ī siyāsī) – not 
only to sensitize Egyptians to “what goes on” in society, but also to their 
legal rights and entitlements as citizens – which the young activists gen-
erally considered lacking in contemporary society, thereby hindering the 
building of a critical mass against Mubarak’s rule and the NDP elite.
Indeed, the early adoption of social media as political tools, including 
blogs, YouTube and later Facebook, can be seen as crucial tactical practices 
making use of the available technical tools for purposes that were origi-
nally alien to them. Ethan Zuckerman (2008), who has closely observed the 
appropriation of the Internet by prodemocracy activists in Egypt and, more 
generally, under repressive regimes in the global South, coined the “cute cat 
theory” in order to explain this phenomenon: online publishing tools were 
initially created for Internet users who wanted to share “harmless” informa-
tion with friends, such as pictures of their cute cats (Shapiro 2009). People 
who live in authoritarian countries appropriate these tools in order to expose 
human rights violations, political corruption and other injustices perpetrated 
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by public authorities. As an unintended effect, the online publishing tools 
would become alternative sources of news, online debates and networking. 
Although Egypt entered the digital era in earnest at the turn of the mil-
lennium, by the electoral year 2005 the number of daily Internet users only 
amounted to 12.8%; and in 2008 some 18% of the population (World Bank 
2015).26 The earlier generations had relied on state-owned print and broad-
cast media which, since the Nasser era, had played important roles in state 
building, public mobilization and maintaining the hegemony of professional 
journalists and the governmental press over news reporting (Sakr 2013). 
During Mubarak’s presidency, Press Law Nr 148 of 1980 required the jour-
nalists to safeguard the “interests of the country and its citizens” (maṣāliḥ 
al-waṭan wa al-muwāṭinīn) which, coupled with the State of Emergency, 
instigated practices of self-censorship within the journalistic profession 
(Kienle 2001: 40). For activists, the national digital gap in Egypt at the 
time presented a real challenge, coupled with the state’s new PR campaigns 
and media machinery that continued, despite growing social polarization, 
to argue for the Mubarak-era social contract and Prime Minister Ahmed 
Nazif’s government’s commitment to neoliberal reforms. 
Consider, for instance, how public authorities responded to the popular 
uprising in al-Mahalla al-Kubra on 6 April, 2008. Less than a month later, 
President Mubarak gave a televised speech on Labour Day, 1 May, 2008, 
that was filled with neoliberal arguments for better addressing the chal-
lenges of the global financial crisis (Ministry of Interior 2008). The main 
concession he made was the promise of a pay-rise for workers, which was, 
indeed, a mark of victory for the emergent workers’ strike movements that 
been challenging the functioning of the economy during Mubarak’s fifth 
term in office. The ways in which Mubarak addressed the youth, however, 
were much less concessional. He promised them a decent future but admit-
ted that it was pregnant with challenges, emphasizing that it was the duty of 
the Egyptian government to tackle them. The central message for Egyptian 
youth was, however, that it was their responsibility to be educated and to 
find work, and not to remain “idle” and, especially, not to engage in “old 
ways” of thinking:  
I say to our young people that the world around us is changing 
and we have to keep pace with it. The labor market now has new 
requirements as well as increasing needs for qualified manpower. 
26 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2/countries/EG?display=graph 
<Accessed 15.4.2015>.
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I say to those graduated some years ago that we cannot deal with 
today’s challenges with a mentality of the past. Embark daunt-
lessly and unhesitatingly onto the labor market with its new 
specialization in demand and go ahead making your own and the 
nation’s future, with determination, confidence and new thinking.
Since the early 2000s, the NDP made repeated efforts to polish and 
modernize its public image and, in this context, the public notion of “new 
thinking” (al-fikr al-jadīd) had been epitomized by Gamal Mubarak, the 
alleged heir to the presidency, and his inner circle of “young NDP reform-
ists” who claimed they were bringing the ruling party, and Egypt along with 
it, “into the 21st century” (e.g. Rabie 2004: 78-81).27 As a new catchword 
it had direct connection with Gamal’s rising public profile as well as the 
NDP’s Policies Secretariat over which he presided. The Policies Secre-
tariat included many of his closest associates and effectively functioned as 
a think-thank for Egypt’s neoliberal reform policies, and in many respects 
appeared as the next strategic generation of political leaders, ready to take 
over the reins from the aging political elites. Gamal, a former investment 
banker in London, also headed a charity that was called the Future Genera-
tion Foundation that aimed at empowering the next generations of entre-
preneurs and business leaders in the country. In 2005, his associates were 
involved in designing the PR campaign for Hosni Mubarak’s presidential 
campaign, framing Mubarak as both a leader and a citizen, as “one of us” 
(Schemm 2005). In a parallel development, the Policies Committee began 
producing a number of “citizenship documents” (e.g. NDP 2004a, 2004b, 
2006), which, in contrast to the lived experiences of wide segments of Egyp-
tians, claimed to promote citizen participation in public affairs as a “national 
duty”, and to strengthen the trust of the average citizen in the state apparatus. 
The timing of Mubarak’s speech in terms of its proximity to the events 
on 6-7 April in al-Mahalla al-Kubra, which amounted to a major public 
outcry of discontent during Mubarak’s presidency, cannot be overlooked. 
While the youth movement that later bore the name of this date was still 
taking shape, private newspapers, satellite television channels and social 
media were filled with subversive imageries of popular resistance and 
discontent. Images of protesters tearing down and then stumbling over 
Mubarak’s poster on the central square of al-Mahalla al-Kubra were espe-
27 The slogan of “New Thinking” was introduced during the NDP’s 2nd Annual Conference in 
September 2002 (Rabie 2004).
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cially powerful, and hitherto unwitnessed, expressions of popular anger and 
defiance against the president. The Facebook youth were also quick to call 
for another day of civil disobedience a month later on 4 May. 
On Labour Day, Mubarak closed his speech with a direct response to his 
dissenters, referring to the “old ways” of thinking as follows:
Ours are a conscious people that know that increase in income is 
generated by exertion, sweat, hard work and struggle rather than 
by bygone slogans or instigative and provocative attempts that 
take lightly slogans of our homeland and people, profiteering in 
people’s suffering and failing to provide choices, alternatives or 
solutions. The destiny of homelands and peoples cannot be the 
subject of recriminations or overbidding. 
We are more concerned over the rights of workers or other compa-
triots than those who profiteer from them and those who cover up 
under their slogans. So wide is the difference between democracy 
and anarchy, between the expression of opinion and the targeting 
of the homeland. We will respond, with the power and decisive-
ness of law, to those who target the homeland security and stabil-
ity and the march of our compatriots. We will stand against those 
who propagate the call for skepticism, despair and frustration and 
will encircle those who manipulate prices and people’s livelihood.
We will forge our way towards a better future, with an economy, 
where the potential for growth is rising year after year, with 
workers, whose giving continues for the sake of the homeland, 
with a private sector that cares for its workers and attends to its 
social responsibility and with a people that make their present and 
future. 
In addition to the hegemonic position Mubarak took as the defender of 
Egypt’s national interests, the public critique of its opponents in terms of 
“no alternatives” was a forceful argument which I noticed was also used by 
many Egyptians as a way to criticize the political opposition and the “loud 
protesters” on the streets. Coincidentally, the government under Prime Min-
ister Ahmed Nazif maintained that neoliberal economic reform – with fur-
ther privatization of state assets, deregulation of the financial sector and the 
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pursuit of foreign direct investment – was the only alternative and the way 
forward.
The NDP’s PR campaigns and the state’s neoliberal rhetoric appeared in 
the context of contested neoliberal reforms, which impoverished rather than 
benefited the population as a whole, and were partly intended to impress 
outside audiences, including the international financial institutions, the 
European Union and, especially, the policymakers in Washington (Kienle 
2001; Springborg 2009). In the late Mubarak era, these state discourses 
represented an apparent move towards the logic of “hybrid regimes” that 
consolidated their hegemonic power in public life on the condition that 
“cognitive dissonance between the realities and trappings of participatory 
politics” were obscured therein (Sakr 2013a: 21). According to Tripp (2010: 
1), the leaders of hybrid regimes,
…adopt the trappings of democracy, yet they pervert democracy 
– sometimes through patronage and largess, other times through 
violence and repression – for the sole purpose of remaining in 
power. This creates a catch-22. Because leaders have sought 
power through violence and patronage, they cannot leave power; 
the personal consequences would be too great. Because there is 
no easy exit, they must continue using violence and patronage to 
remain in power.
In this light, the blog posts on the sexual harassment of young women 
published after the protests in May 2005 and during ‘īd celebrations in 2006 
(Klaus 2007), the video clips of humiliation and torture at police stations, 
and the online reporting on forced evictions of local residents in impover-
ished neighbourhoods, represented a cumulative set of counter-narratives 
that undermined official depictions of the social world in the 2000s. They 
represented important wedges into the “scriptural economy” of the ruling 
elite, insofar as national and international media, human rights organiza-
tions and other pressure groups act on them. The activists’ main audiences 
and targets of mobilization were, however, closer to home. In this sense, 
the tactical practices of exposing “what goes on” in society, coupled with 
online campaigns, such as “We are all Khaled Said” group on Facebook, 
amounted to a sustained campaign of exposing reality – the corruption and 
brute practices of police violence – to the eyes of average Egyptians. For 
the latter, however, the video clips, photographs and online testimonies 
that were diffused in the late Mubarak era did not necessarily make “news” 
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as such. Rather, they confirmed what had already circulated among close 
circles of families and friends. Rife in society were stories of the misuse of 
power by the police and public authorities who were also subject to ridicule 
well as horror stories, yet this was rarely voiced in the face of the authorities.
In the late 2000s, the expanding use of ICTs and social media challenged 
the traditional power structures in the making of news and also marked a 
gradual transformation of who had the right to consume and to produce 
imageries that represent what many consider to be true on the basis of 
their everyday experience. For the young activists online, producing and 
disseminating counterhegemonic imageries were subversive activities in 
themselves. Their online and offline political engagements were part and 
parcel of their daily lives, and these realms could not separated, but rather 
contributed to an everyday experience of “connected presence” in both 
(Licoppe 2004). To use Herrera’s terms (2014b), they were members of the 
growing “wired generation” of young Egyptians, who collectively played 
important roles in the making of the “January 25” events and beyond. In the 
early stages, however, social media provided unconventional sites for forg-
ing new political subjectivities and modalities of political action, whereby the 
social boundaries of public conformity, carefully managed as they were by 
Mubarak’s regime, were negotiated in front of PC screens in homes and “on 
the move” by those who could afford smart phones with Internet connections 
(e.g. Lynn 2012). 
The online dissent became political by the very circumstances of author-
itarian rule in which it emerged, and, at least initially, required courage 
from the Internet users who consumed, and contributed to, dissident infor-
mation online. In 2008, Amin, an occasional member of the April 6 Youth 
Movement told me that he had, from the outset, written on his weblog and 
Facebook account anonymously, but that a recent post on Facebook had dis-
closed his real identity. He no longer cared, however, and was ready to face 
potential repercussions for his anti-Mubarak stance. Other activists chose 
to act as openly as possible in personal defiance of any claims that they 
were doing something wrong. On the other hand, some Egyptian youth, 
who were not involved in politics, disclosed that the power of social media 
lies in numbers, as they did not expect the police to detain the thousands of 
individuals who join certain Facebook groups and like or share contentious 
images online (Herrera 2014b: 32).
For Scott, those who voice what is already known disclose the individu-
ated yet simultaneously shared experiences of rectifying the cognitive dis-
sonance in their everyday lives:
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...the open declaration of the hidden transcript in the teeth of 
power is typically experienced, both by the speaker and by those 
who share his or her condition, as a moment in which truth is 
finally spoken in the place of equivocation and lies […] those who 
take this bold step experience it as a moment of truth and as a 
personal authentication. (Scott 1990: 208) 
While Scott uses the term “truth” with high reservation, Hannah Arendt 
is less economical: At stake are the constant efforts to expose the “modern 
political lie” that aims at concealing “things that are no secrets at all but 
are known to practically everybody” (Arendt 2006: 247).  For Arendt, the 
relationship between truth and political power lies in the processes whereby 
factual truths are represented and mediated in public life (ibid.: 223-259). 
In this context, “factual truths” refer to empirical reality, such as historical 
moments and events, or things someone has said or done, and, as such, dif-
fer from opinions and “philosophical truths” that can be the subject of delib-
eration, acceptance and rejection. Interestingly, a number of experienced 
blogger-activists told me that, in comparison to a textual format, they highly 
valued the use of audiovisual material such as photographs and video clips 
in their political communications. The textual format can always be refuted, 
while the audiovisual evidence of “what actually happens” can be either 
verified or concealed. The latter conveyed lived realities more directly and 
was more accessible to illiterate audiences and, importantly, evaded engage-
ment in ideological debates when exposing the living conditions of average 
Egyptians, including the continued humiliation and violence, and the way 
in which human dignity has been stripped from the people by the powerful. 
4.1.3 Transformations in Egypt’s media ecology
Soon after the 2010 parliamentary elections, a seminar at the Journalists’ 
Syndicate contended that today’s “citizen journalists” were the most active 
news sources at the polling stations, which the NDP had put under a virtual 
news blockade on polling day (Onodera 2011a). Despite the active roles 
the youth played in dissident forms of knowledge management, however, 
it is important to remember that their practices to produce and disseminate 
alternative information on Egypt’s societal affairs built on the ongoing pro-
cesses of structural transformation in Egypt’s public sphere. Here, notions 
of social authority and affiliation had already been challenged by the human 
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rights advocates’ earlier campaigns and the popular consumption of “small” 
and “new” media, such as cassette-tapes and wall graffiti in urban spaces 
(Starret 1995; Norton 2003; Hirschkind 2006) or satellite television chan-
nels, and the Internet (Eickelman and Anderson 2003; Turner 2007). 
Since the 1990s, the satellite channels have become more widely avail-
able as relatively low-cost dishes have proliferated in the market, and new 
Arabic-language channels, such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, have diver-
sified the news coverage of current affairs at national, regional and global 
levels. In the 2000s, the new satellite channels such as ONTV and Dream 
TV, and particularly their political talk shows, played important roles in 
gauging public opinion and diversifying public debate on a daily or weekly 
basis, often involving exchanges with in-callers about current affairs (Sakr 
2013a: 26-31).28 The administrators of the “We are all Khaled Said” on 
Facebook also encouraged its members to call in to these programs (Herrera 
2014a: 67). Since the mid-2000s, the gradual privatization of the publishing 
industry has also given rise to a new and vocal press. Privately owned dai-
lies, such as al-Miṣrī al-Yawm, Al-Badīl, al-Dustūr and al-Shurūq, played 
important roles in covering the burgeoning protest movements across the 
country and diversified news coverage beyond those close to the ruling 
elite and political parties: the governmental and oppositional press, or the 
mouthpieces of existing opposition parties. 
In addition, significant changes took place in the 2000s in the realm of 
popular culture. Social criticism, in particular, expanded as a popular genre 
in both cinema and literature in tandem with anti-Mubarak mobilization, 
narrating highly affective stories of ordinary people suffering from police 
violence, local corruption and urban poverty. Several authors, like Alaa al-
Aswany and Ahmed Khaled al-Tawfiq, along with the publications of the 
Dar Merit publishing house and others, fed in different ways into the popu-
lar imagination, and direct experience, of social injustice. Omar Afifi, a for-
mer police officer, created a minor scandal in 2008 by publishing a book 
whose title, in colloquial Egyptian, is best translated as, “So that you don’t 
get slapped on the back of your neck”, informing average Egyptians of 
their legal and constitutional rights when dealing with police officers on the 
street (Afifi 2008). In Egypt, a slap on the back of another person’s neck is 
a highly offensive gesture of public humiliation, a direct insult to one’s hon-
our and, incidentally, a frequent scene in the video clips that were leaked 
28 These shows included Ākhir Kalām (“Last Word”) on ONTV, Ibrahim Eissa’s ‘Alā al-Qahwa (“At 
the café”) on Dream TV, Al-‘Āshira Masā’an (“10 PM”) and Al-Qāhira al-Yawm (“Cairo Today”) on 
Dream 2 (Sakr 2013).
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from police stations to be seen openly by Egyptian publics at the time. As a 
consequence, the book was soon banned and Afifi took refuge in the United 
States, but copies were circulated among opposition activists in both printed 
and online versions.
At the same time, the Internet and social media became a daily source 
of information for growing numbers of Egyptians towards the end of the 
decade. If Internet users only amounted to 18 percent of Egyptians in 2008, 
by 2010 their numbers had grown to 31.4 and to 39.8 in 2011 (World Bank 
2015). Meanwhile, Egyptian Facebook members numbered 822,560 in 
March 2008, and in February 2011, when Mubarak resigned, some 5.6 mil-
lion, with the influx of two million additional members by April 2011; three 
out of four members were between 15 and 29 years of age (Herrera 2014b: 
31). According to Herrera, the growing wired generation of young Egyp-
tians relied increasingly on the Internet and social media as their source 
of information, networking and deliberation, providing users with alterna-
tive and preferred sites for learning outside the formal educational system, 
and shaping users’ “cognitive make-up, which changes their relationship 
to political and social systems and their notion of themselves as citizens” 
(ibid.: 20). Importantly, the new opportunities provided by the Internet cut 
across social differences such as gender, geography and religion, although 
during my fieldwork in 2008, being connected to the global information 
flows as an aspect of democratic citizenship was still a question of access to 
resources, needed know-how and, for instance, foreign language skills. 
The advent of neoliberal reforms and, especially, the privatization of the 
news and publishing industry were curiously working against the consoli-
dation of power by Mubarak’s hybrid regime. Egypt’s entry into the infor-
mation age and the exponential growth in the number of mobile phone and 
Internet users, added to the small but vocal private press, made state attempts 
to monopolize Egypt’s public arena increasingly difficult. This is not to say 
that the Egyptian government gave up its attempts to control media output. 
The State of Emergency authorized security services under the Ministry of 
Interior to monitor and censor different forms of communication. From the 
mid-2000s onwards, public prosecutors arrested several journalists, includ-
ing Ibrahim Eissa, one of Mubarak’s most vocal critics, and young bloggers 
on the basis of their writings. At the same time, private newspapers, such 
as Al-Badīl and al-Dustūr, were forced to reduce their publishing activities 
for economic reasons, amidst public speculation about behind-the-scenes 
political manipulation (al-Aswany 2011: 189-192). During the 2000s, the 
Internet in Egypt was relatively free in comparison with other countries 
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of the Middle East, such as Tunisia or Syria, although, in 2008, the NDP 
planned to create the National Agency for Regulation of Audio and Visual 
Broadcast to control any audiovisual material in print, and broadcast and 
digital media that damaged “social peace”, “national unity”, “public order” 
and “public values”.29 The state organized occasional filtering and certain 
webpages were blocked during major events, such as on April 6, 2008, and 
during the parliamentary elections in 2010. The closing-down of the Inter-
net during the “January 25” uprising in 2011 made it clear that the Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) in Egypt operated under state tutelage, namely, the 
National Telecommunication Regulation Authority (NTRA) in cooperation 
with the State Security services (Onodera 2011a).
Shortly after Mubarak’s resignation in 2011, various opposing groups, 
including pro-Mubarak sympathizers, the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists, 
and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, which took on the role of over-
seeing the transitional process, were eager to use new ICTs to cauge public 
opinion and establish their influence. In the post-Mubarak era, the SCAF’s 
“amateur military journalists” (Iskandar 2012) and the Muslim Brother-
hood’s “e-militias” (Herrera 2014a) adopted ICTs and the practices of citizen 
journalism, seeking hegemonic positions in cyberspace, thus confirming the 
early warnings of pioneering bloggers that the power of social media lies in 
their content and not in the mere adoption of technological tools (Hasan and 
Abdelfattah 2008). Indeed, although the young activist promoted the wider 
goals of the political opposition, such as the principles of freedom, justice, 
democracy, human rights and the civil state, the subversive effects of social 
media practices carried the potential of transcending this normative surface. 
Activists’ appropriation of ICTs concerned premeditated struggles to know, 
and to make known, the deplorable context in which Egyptians lived their 
everyday lives. However, the tactic of exposing “factual truths” did not nec-
essarily promote predefined visions of an ideal social order, but rather the 
ordinary people’s “right to have rights”, or their right to make ends meet 
and to live with dignity. These notions can hardly be described as universal 
and, consequently, it is not a given that the appropriation of social media as 
political tools necessarily leads to democratization.
In this light, although de Certeau’s stand on “tactics” can be used to 
analyse specific forms of youthful dissent, it can be also criticized, as Jon 
Mitchell (2007: 101-103) suggests, for promoting a certain theology, if not 
29 The draft law was leaked to al-Miṣrī al-Yawm on July 9, 2008 and consequently covered in Al-
Jazeera International. Source: http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2008/08/20088791952617974.html.
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a teleology, of human action, in that it suggests that the unleashing of some 
kind of innate powers in the human being leads to prosperity and emanci-
pation. Be that as it may, the appropriation of new media as political tools 
– spearheaded as it was by Egyptian bloggers – took place at a strategic 
historical period of the mid-2000s when the wider anti-Mubarak mobili-
zation was taking shape in public life (Radsch 2008; Hirschkind 2011). If 
Mubarak’s security state had yielded a panoptic position over public life 
and urban space, the gradual reversal of the gaze or, indeed, any synoptic 
intrusions onto the practices of state authorities, enabled them to be viewed 
by the general public (Mathiesen 1997).30 In Egypt, the tactical use of ICTs 
enabled audiences to view the very spaces of state power, whether they were 
voting places, local police stations or patrol wagons, and enabled people 
to mediate their up-to-date experiences to expanding audiences. Although 
these tactical practices were at the outset pioneered by the small circles 
of “cyber-dissidents” (Fahmi 2009), the gradual expansion of online dis-
sent would lead to increasing numbers of those who produced, distributed 
and consumed counter-hegemonic ideas and imageries as members of the 
emerging wired generation.
4.2. FIELDS OF POSSIBILITY
I have thus far suggested that, in the 2000s, youthful resistance took many 
forms along a variety of different avenues. Towards the end of the decade, 
some were more oriented toward youth movements, others more into party 
politics or civil society organizations, while newcomers could also be 
mobilized online; yet all were part of the wider prodemocracy mobiliza-
tion (Albrecht 2013). While dissident practices of knowledge management 
did not only concern young people, their new roles and visibilities built on 
pre-existing transformations in neoliberal Egypt, including the expansion 
of privately owned media, the earlier campaigns of Egyptian human rights 
advocates, and the anti-Mubarak mobilization in the 2000s. In this context, 
their political engagements evolved and operated at the precarious inter-
section of knowledge, mobilization and power (Leach and Scoones 2007) 
through practices that are at times termed as “tactical media” (Garcia and 
30 I draw here on Mathiesen (1997) who introduced the notion “Synopticon” as a way to explain the 
reverse situation of panoptic processes whereby citizens have become increasingly able to oversee 
public personalities and public personalities with the help of the mass media, television in particular. 
For an extended discussion of synopticism, see Elmer (2012).
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Lovink 1997; Dieter 2011) or “citizen journalism” (Khiabany and Sreberny 
2009; Onodera 2011a) which were, alongside dissident street actions, the 
main arena of engagement in which young activists established their pres-
ence and made their influence felt. 
To give some sociological coherence to their diverse forms of individual 
and collective actions, it can be useful to view youth activism as a spe-
cific field of political practices in which young activists sought autonomy 
on the basis of their generational consciousness and tactical practices aimed 
at resisting the given socialization and acculturation processes within the 
political opposition (Edmunds and Turner 2002a: 13-16). As such, youth 
activism also built on uneven processes of habituation or acquiring cer-
tain skills, practical norms and social standing as public political actors. 
In other words, the activist habitus that some acquired was not so easily 
appropriated by others, and youthful resistance encompassed various entry 
points, personal life trajectories, and differentiated means and chances to 
participate in public political life. In this sense, youth activism should not 
be regarded merely as a monolithic field with rigid boundaries but as one 
characterized by internal heterogeneity, social hierarchies and struggles for 
resources, legitimacy and influence between different social actors.
4.2.1. Multiple trajectories
Indeed, some young Cairenes appeared “more activist” than others in the 
late 2000s. Not everyone was equally knowledgeable in new media tech-
nologies, or versatile in political theory or public mobilization tactics, nor 
did all have similar resources for the acquisition of camera phones, digital 
cameras, laptops and other state-of-the-art technical tools in order to enact 
their new agentic capacities. Some did not have a camera or the Internet on 
their mobile phones and could not participate in quick-witted debates on the 
latest news. Some wore ill-fitting jeans and baggy T-shirts, and others, in 
the hope of upward social mobility, would be more attracted by the finan-
cial incentives and opportunities offered by opposition politics. Unless born 
and bred into oppositional culture, or connected with the needed support 
networks, the possibilities of embracing the political life of the opposition 
activist were more limited. I have already suggested in Chapter 3 that the 
family background and gender of young Cairenes shaped and conditioned 
their opportunities to engage in public political dissent. Here I wish to con-
tinue this discussion by examining other distinctions such as social class, 
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education and cosmopolitan connectedness, and the ways these intersected 
and shaped experiences of possible action.
Let us consider Umar (23) who lived with his parents in an agricultural 
village on the outskirts of Greater Cairo, and had only limited access to his 
favourite pastime: sitting in the evenings with friends in downtown cafés. 
Umar was a staunch Arab Socialist and valorised Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
visions of state-led development, a large public sector, and greater unity 
between Arab countries in which Egypt should take a leading role. Sim-
ilar to many Nasserist and Leftist youth, Umar was highly sceptic about 
the recent emergence of April 6 Youth movement, claiming that the latter’s 
claim to “non-ideology” offered no future vision (ru’yā) or practical solu-
tions to Egypt’s social, economic and political problems. In 2008, he was a 
student at Cairo University and resisted party affiliations although he had 
participated occasionally in student demonstrations, especially on the Pal-
estinian issue, and a few meetings of the Nasserist Thought Club, affiliated 
with the Karama Party. He soon resigned from the latter and, later devel-
oped the habit of attending a small study circle with other young people 
who shared his interest in Nasserist and Arab Nationalist ideology; about a 
dozen, both men and women, met once a week to debate matters related to, 
for instance, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, global capitalism and Egypt’s 
role in regional politics. 
On weekdays, Umar usually travelled to attend classes at Cairo Univer-
sity but, often without telling his parents, he also went to meet his friends 
downtown. In order to travel to the city centre, he had to take three separate 
minibuses, taking him some 1.5 hours and costing him around 5 L.E. each 
way. There were periods when he stayed in the village with family and local 
friends who were not involved in political groups. Sometimes he helped his 
father tend the land, a small plot on which his family partially depended for 
subsistence. At other times he was pressured into studying for university 
exams and, in the summer, for repeat exams due to failing some in the first 
round.31 When I first befriended Umar, his family did not own a computer 
and, consequently, he was detached from Internet-based debates and online 
news that were, for most of his downtown friends, the content of everyday 
conversations. To get to grips with topics of public debate, he occasionally 
31  In Egypt, university students enter different faculties on the basis of their results in the final 
exams in high school. Umar studied at the Faculty of Commerce which is one the largest faculties at 
Cairo university but, at the same time, one of the socially less ‘glorious’ due to its entrants having had 
relatively poor results. In general, the academic year reached its most active peak in April and May, 
when the “end of the year” exams took place, while those who failed were given the opportunity of 
repeating exams during the summer.
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bought Al-‘Arabī, (costing then 3 L.E.), the weekly mouth-piece of the Nas-
serist Party. “I don’t like reading that much,” he said about his reluctance to 
spend money on newspapers, adding: “All I need to know I will hear from 
my friends.” Umar’s life aspirations and social standing, and those of many 
others, stood in stark contrast to those young activists who were educated 
in private universities, were fluent in one or more foreign languages, and 
led cosmopolitan life-styles with a relative abundance of money, social net-
works and “cosmopolitan capital” (de Koning 2009). 
Or consider Asmaa (28), a young liberal NGO professional whom I 
interviewed in a café called Cilantro in October 2008. Unlike Umar, she 
belonged to Cairo’s “upper-middle classes”, spoke fluent English and held 
a degree from the American University of Cairo, one of the most exclusive 
private universities in Egypt. She lived alone, far from her family, which 
ran counter to the prevailing norms and expectations of a young unmar-
ried woman, and spent much of her leisure time in the popular (sha‘bī) 
ahāwī and Western-style cafés such as Cilantro near her old university next 
to Tahrir Square. Asmaa personally considered street demonstrations to be 
mostly futile and unproductive ventures, although she had participated in 
periodic protests after the sexual harassment of women on “Black Wednes-
day”, May 25, 2005. She considered herself an activist but foremost a femi-
nist, preferring to work within the contours of professionalized civil society 
and, in particular, as part of Egypt’s women’s rights movement. The lat-
ter addressed, in her view, the most crucial predicament afflicting Egyp-
tian society, namely, the patriarchal power relations and conservative public 
moralities that helped to reproduce social injustices at all levels, from fam-
ily life to high-level politics.
After graduation, she and her friends established a feminist advocacy 
group, with headquarters in an affluent part of Cairo, with the aim of 
empowering local women and of sensitizing them to deal with patriarchal 
and conservative practices – such as domestic violence – within the family. 
Her active public role as an advocate of women’s rights in Egypt yielded 
occasional invitations to lecture overseas, and helped her to secure fund-
ing from international development agencies, such as USAID. Being versed 
in political science and feminist scholarship, Asmaa was highly reflective 
about her uses of “gender equality” and “women’s empowerment” as both 
value statements and current “catch words” in development. She acknowl-
edged that the normative terrain on which she and her associates position 
themselves relates, first, to the Egyptian women’s movement and, second, 
the global “human rights regime” including its international conventions 
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and rights-based rhetoric (e.g. al-Ali 2000). She was particularly proud of 
the Egyptian women’s movement for pushing traditional “taboos” such as 
the long-standing practices of female genital mutilation into public debate 
which, eventually, had produced changes in the legislation. 
Class and gender 
Egypt is a highly class-conscious society in which levels of education, fam-
ily background, wealth, and also acquired knowledge of political, cultural 
and global affairs position young people in different social spheres and con-
sequently shape their political opportunities as well as their social interac-
tions (de Koning 2009). Only a handful of young urbanites could actually 
launch their own NGOs, secure funding, and take as active a part in “civil 
society debates” as Asmaa did, and the personal trajectories of Umar and 
Asmaa illustrate the highly differentiated experiences which young Cai-
renes had of their role in socio-political change in the 2000s. The major-
ity of young activists I got to know through my fieldwork were socially 
positioned somewhere between these two personal trajectories. In other 
words, they were educated in public universities in the Greater Cairo area, 
such as the Universities of Cairo, Helwan and Ain Shams, or, alternatively, 
had moved to Cairo from the governorates, including Alexandria, Tanta 
and Mansoura. By and large, they considered themselves members of the 
middle class (ṭabaqa mutawassiṭa) or the “content class” (ṭabaqa mastūra), 
who lived relatively privileged lives but whose future prospects were being 
narrowed down. 
In other words, inasmuch as youth activism attracted members mainly 
from the urban and educated middle classes, not everyone had similar 
opportunities, resources and chances to participate in protracted political 
dissent. At least at the beginning of their activist careers, most youth had 
few of the required connections (or wāsṭa) that could provide them with 
satisfying avenues into the labour market. Many aspired to work in journal-
ism, civil society organizations and other forms of employment that would 
resolve the deeply felt contradictions between the exigencies of earning a 
living and continuing political dissent. Moreover, the majority spoke little 
English, or any other foreign language, beyond the customary salutations. 
Language skills represented a persisting division among youth activists, 
especially between the “content class” and those more affluent, part of the 
reason why the latter were so predominantly interviewed in foreign press. 
Moreover, foreign language skills are increasingly important for gaining 
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access to employment and also to civil society professions. Finally, in addi-
tion to providing entry to global information flows, they represent a marker 
of cosmopolitanism and a bearer of social status among peers. 
Such social distinctions among young dissenters help us to recognize 
how their fields of possible action were differentiated. As the cases of Umar 
and Asmaa suggest, these were often influenced by socioeconomic stand-
ing more than gender, despite the fact that Egypt’s public political life was 
and is in general dominated by patriarchal norms. The appropriation of 
ICTs as political tools was also most readily adopted by relatively afflu-
ent, educated and cosmopolitan youth. Some belonged to Cairo’s “rooted 
cosmopolitans” – or, as Abdelrahman puts it, domestic activists who “help 
mediate new ideas about power structures, political strategies and modes of 
political activism within their local context” – who played important roles 
in linking Egypt’s activist networks to those abroad (Abdelrahman 2011: 
408).32 In part due to the contacts and social networks forged during the 
prodemocracy campaigns, some had managed to find work in NGOs, news-
papers and the private sector, including publishing and IT consultancy. Oth-
ers, especially those whose parents were already cultural or public figures, 
had found ways into political parties and civil society groups which, if not 
always as lucrative, at least provided them with livelihoods and a chance 
to engage in public political life as part of their job description. Some of 
them frequented the same spaces as Umar and Ahmed, namely the down-
town ahāwī, while also having the means to blend in with the clientele of 
the more up-market Western style cafés that catered to the well-to-do young 
professionals (de Koning 2009).
Cosmopolitan youth, both men and women, could also accommodate 
themselves to the ways of being and doing that prevailed in the transna-
tional activist cultures – including its tastes, political practices and pat-
terns of consumption. In these social circuits, globally circulating genres 
and sensibilities – such as the political satire linked to South Park – pro-
vided a source of subversive jokes and humour, but also social distinction. 
Many global commodities, such as online movies and articles, require some 
knowledge of foreign languages, especially English, which served as yet 
another point of differentiation. Furthermore, the rooted cosmopolitans 
32  These include global networks such as the Egyptian Anti-Globalization Movement and Global 
Justice Movement (Abdelrahman 2011). One important instance of forging these linkages was the 
Cairo Anti-War Conference that has been organized in Cairo annually since the outbreak of the Iraq 
war. I attended the event in 2007 and 2008, which also coincided with the Cairo Social Forum in the 
same premises.
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could afford imported luxuries like trendy imported jeans and T-shirts. 
Some young men, and especially those who affiliated themselves with par-
ties and NGOs, would occasionally wear the “official look” of suits and col-
lared shirts which, in turn, would be ridiculed as an act of “giving in” to the 
conventions of formal politics by those who could afford (in the symbolic 
and economic senses) this form of irony.
Cosmopolitan and more affluent youth were generally better placed to 
claim autonomy from the formal hierarchies of civil society formations and 
political parties. They had the means to travel around and set up meetings in 
the Greater Cairo area, and to maintain dissent actions through their social 
networks, while using costly ICT tools “on the move” as part and parcel of 
their daily political practices. For those who were less equipped to do so, 
cultivating personal ties with, for instance, the staff and volunteers of politi-
cal parties and NGOs were in this respect more beneficial. They provided 
vital access to office spaces in, for example, party headquarters, NGOs and 
private newspapers, which saved them the money they might otherwise 
have spent in cafeterias, for instance. These premises could at times be used 
for organizing meetings, using computers and printing facilities and more 
mundane acts such as having a rest or going to the toilet. However, ben-
efiting from these facilities potentially involves entanglement in the over-
lapping relations of power and patronage within these formal organizations 
and, as such, socialization into their conventions and oppositional practices.
Despite the multiple differences among young activists with regard to, 
for instance, their class, political ideology, public piety and even religion, 
young men were seemingly pressured to conform to the popular notions of 
manhood (rugūla) and, especially, to the ideal traits of gad‘ān, including 
toughness, courage, and righteousness. Similar qualities were also expected 
of young female activists but at times of crisis and upheaval, such as when 
protesting or dealing with the police or political rivals, young men were 
under more pressure to prove their manhood through the display of power-
ful ideals of personal commitment, integrity and self-sacrifice. As I shall 
discuss in more detail in Chapter 6, these idealized forms of personhood 
were part and parcel of the normative landscape of opposition politics in 
which the young activists were embedded.
In this sense, young women activists had at their disposal a more varied rep-
ertoire of outward appearances and self-comportment than their male peers. 
Operating in Cairo’s masculine urban spaces, young women faced more per-
sonal risks from political activism, as I have already mentioned (see Chapter 
3). Huda, who was briefly detained on April 6, 2008, pointed out that deten-
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tion is always a graver experience for a young woman than it is for a man. 
Although, based on my observation, both young men and women seemed to 
gain respect and credibility within activist circles from being detained, Huda 
suggested that for young women detention usually implied – at least in the 
public eye – possible exposure to sexual or other forms of harassment. Even 
brief detention in prison was directly connected with a woman’s honour and 
family reputation and could endanger the long-term marriage arrangements 
that constitute important economic endeavours for most Egyptian families 
(Singerman 1997a: 109-131). In the 2000s, some women activists were fac-
ing yet another challenge, as police officers had threatened that they would 
involve the “vice police” – the state guardians of public morality; any associ-
ation with this branch of the police would be highly damaging to one’s repu-
tation, even if there were no grounds for accusations.
Moreover, some young women faced additional challenges to be taken 
“seriously” in public political life. Some, especially those from affluent 
families, were conscious of the gendered attitudes they had to overcome 
in order to legitimize their social status and credibility as activists even 
among their peers. Fadwa, due to her wealthy family background, had 
faced suspicions that she and her female friends – with “all” the options in 
life – engaged in oppositional activities for the sake of excitement, if not 
escapism. Others told me that they were compelled to deal with unwelcome 
attention from males; one said that she had resigned from an opposition 
party partly because one of the elderly leaders told her he loved her, mak-
ing her situation uncomfortable. Moreover, a disengaged Youth for Change 
activist once complained to me about the ways some “upper class” women 
dressed – in tight jeans and shirts, without the veil – during street protests. 
In his view, they should have presented themselves in a more appropriate 
and “respectful” (muḥtarama) manner in the course of protesters’ attempts 
to gain support from average Egyptians on the street. At times, however, 
some women could actually negotiate their way around – and even play 
with – these kinds of prevailing masculine expectations and attitudes, as 
they were “freer” to do things that most likely would have got their male 
peers in trouble. For instance, I heard a story about how a young female 
Youth for Change activist had directed a fierce verbal critique against a 
policeman during a street protest, only to learn later that he was one of the 
highest-ranking police officers in the Cairo municipality. On another occa-
sion, she had been allowed to take food and groceries to a friend in jail on 
the basis of a “cute smile” to the prison guard: a tactical move that benefited 
from the masculine attitudes of the officer.
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4.2.2. Gaining practical knowledge
Elyachar (2011) notes that Cairenes learn from an early age a certain polit-
ical economy of gestures, movements and behaviour in public spaces. In 
these everyday situations, one’s ways of talking, walking and self-comport-
ment carry the traits of one’s social standing, socioeconomic background, 
level of education and public piety and are thus far from neutral acts but 
subject to contested debate. In this sense, the politics of habitus and bodily 
hexis – or outward appearances and self-comportment – becomes a site 
of contested ideologies, such as women’s donning the veil, or the ways in 
which Muslims transgress social norms in specific circumstances like reli-
gious feasts (Elyachar 2011). While Elyachar’s focus rests on how urban 
residents negotiate their way around Cairo’s fragmented urban spaces, these 
insights are useful for framing our discussion on the practical and everyday 
dimensions of being a young political activist in the late Mubarak era. 
Although the young activists’ opportunities and dispositions with regard 
to public political dissent were differentiated, they were not necessarily 
predestined to stasis in their given social backgrounds and life trajectories. 
Oppositional activism in itself involved continual social interactions with 
others, such as colleagues, fellow activists, and elder politicians, thereby 
establishing social networks that provided prime social sites for learning 
and internalising practical knowledge and skills that proved necessary when 
taking a public stance against the incumbent authorities. Thus, even if an 
individual was not born and bred into a politicized family, he or she could 
still tap into the “hidden transcripts” and certain processes of enskilment 
and acculturation within the political opposition, which were not always 
available through virtual spaces.
In this sense, getting to know the little alleyways and learning to spot 
government agents from afar provided highly valuable tacit knowledge that 
was needed at times needed. Learning to talk on the phone in a certain man-
ner with friends, or in public seminars with unknown persons, also devel-
oped similar skills with which to circumvent state surveillance, skills which 
were, undoubtedly, diffused differentially within the political opposition. 
Compared to the majority, rooted cosmopolitans were highly equipped to 
counter the state grip over digital communication. Some were committed 
to Egyptian and global Open-Source movements that resisted, in particular, 
the monopoly of Microsoft in the operating system and software markets. 
One thus globally linked young NGO professional told me that as soon as 
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the government finds its way into their computers or profiles, the online 
Open-Source community will provide them with new digital security tools. 
In the 2000s, the technologically “savvy” activists provided their services 
to campaign networks and human rights organizations, at times instruct-
ing their younger peers in workshops or through instructional online posts, 
thus transmitting their technical know-how and political experiences to new 
activist generations. At the street level, those who bore the markers of being 
“upper class” – through clothing, lingua and gestures – often enjoyed rela-
tive safety from the excesses of police violence.33 This observation natu-
rally may be compared with the position of “average” Egyptians who could 
did not benefit from either the social status or capital of being connected 
to journalists, public personalities, lawyers or human rights advocates in 
Egypt and possibly abroad. 
For those like Ahmed, who in 2008 did not fit the appearance of an 
“upper-class youth” and did not have the needed connections, dealing with 
the police sometimes ended in humiliating experiences. Through political 
activism itself, he had acquired certain practical knowledge and “practical 
norms” (de Sardan 2008) that proved beneficial when negotiating his dif-
ferentiated rights on Cairo’s streets.34 Firstly, he had studied his legal rights, 
including the banned book by Omar Afifi, and knew that as a citizen he had 
the right to ascertain that a plain-clothes officer on the street really belonged 
to the police forces. But the mere knowledge of one’s rights would fall on 
deaf ears without knowing how to deploy them. For instance, he had once 
walked a female friend to her home. As they were approaching her neigh-
bourhood, a man introduced himself as a State Security officer and asked to 
33  For example, in 2006, a student at the American University in Cairo wrote in the student paper 
of his experience of differentiated rights on Cairo’s streets: “Last Sunday, one of my friends was 
approached by policemen who asked for his national ID and then decided to search him. My friend 
objected on the basis that the police officer doesn’t have the right to search him and an argument 
took place. The policemen started swearing at us using profanity and multiple hand gestures. One 
then summoned an officer who threatened that he would frame all of us for drug charges no matter 
who we are, saying that he wasn’t scared of anyone and that he has the right to do what he wants. He 
told us that under the emergency law, he can take all of us in and do whatever he pleases with us. He 
promised to destroy our future. Finally, one of my friends managed to cool the officer down by telling 
him who exactly he was and what university we attended and what our parents did for a living. The 
officer started to change his tone and let us go.” (Caravan, May 14, 2006: 4)
34  For de Sardan, the notion of practical norms is based on the acknowledgement of normative 
pluralism in society and refers to the “refined, invisible, implicit, and subterranean regulations” in 
society that are scarcely articulated in public (de Sardan 2008: 13). Although closely associated to 
Bourdieu’s (1977) habitus, de Sardan criticizes the latter as too “dominocentric”, extending similar 
criticism of “resistocentrism” against both Scott (1990) and de Certeau (1984) (de Sardan 2008: 14).
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see their ID cards.35 The activists improvised they were cousins but, before 
showing their ID cards, Ahmed requested that the man first display his own. 
This he initially declined to do but, after a tit-for-tat argument on the issue, 
he reluctantly produced it. The card indeed belonged to a State Security 
officer, but the man concealed the name of its holder with his index fin-
ger. Ahmed requested that the man show his name, but the latter refused. 
An argument took place, after which the man let the two go. In retrospect, 
Ahmed said that, from the outset, he had recognized the man as a State 
Security officer, but speculated that the latter would not want to disclose his 
name in the local neighbourhood, perhaps for fear of later being recognized 
later as someone working with the notorious state institution. 
A single incident among many, Ahmed’s experience amounts to what 
Holston calls an “act of public standing” (Holston 2009) or a way of argu-
ing one’s position on the basis of legal authority in a situation when citizens’ 
formal rights, as inscribed in law and the constitution, are not substantiated 
in real practice. This is not incidental, since an important part of activist 
practical knowledge was to know one’s rights, and act accordingly, which 
was an important aspect of the “political awareness” they saw as lacking 
among average Egyptians. When I met Ahmed two years later in 2010, 
he seemed an experienced activist in the eyes of many of his peers. Dur-
ing the previous two years, he had studied in an open-university program 
and worked part-time in a private newspaper with the aim of saving for 
the future. He had also met a girl he cared for, and cultivated the prospect 
of marriage. Their relationship did not blossom, however, and he used the 
savings to buy a laptop and a digital camera. These were not only important 
commodities and markers of symbolic and economic capital within activist 
circles, but he also needed them for building a career in journalism. Pass-
ing time in the same ahāwī, his social status – an early member of April 6 
Youth, with the activist tools he had not possessed in 2008 – he had tangibly 
changed in two years. His new friends, who were mobilized as volunteers 
in the ElBaradei-campaign in 2010, were keen to hear his stories and expe-
riences of events he had personally witnessed. By then, he had withdrawn 
from April 6 Youth but he would meet or bump into his former associates 
regularly in downtown Cairo and at opposition events.
For some, the experiences in youth movements themselves encompassed 
a learning curve on coalition politics. One told me in 2008 that the main 
35  Egyptians, by law, were obliged to carry their national IDs, and such policing practice was a fre-
quent occurrence on Cairo’s streets.
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lesson from his involvement in Youth for Change was that that coopera-
tion with diverse youth groups, especially partisan groups, simply does not 
work. During the 2010 parliamentary elections, which resulted in the NDP’s 
landslide victory and marked the high water mark of frustration and per-
ceived lack of prospects within the political opposition, a former April 6 
Youth member complained to me:
We [the young activists] have not learned anything from the past, 
and make the same mistakes over and over again. Everyone is out 
there for the fame; to be in positions of power. We should have a 
bigger picture of what’s going on. 
At times youth coalitions did not move forward beyond the initial idea. 
Islam, the young liberal who earlier memorized Salah Jahin’s poetry to 
express his generational consciousness – “silent, but with much to say” – 
had tried to form a coalition with young members of different opposition 
parties in 2008. He managed to get them together to a couple of meetings 
but found it an impossible venture: “We started with coming up with a name 
for what we should be called, but couldn’t even agree on that!” His experi-
ences are telling of the fact that youth movements, such as Youth for Change 
or April 6 Youth, were by no means self-evident developments.
4.3. HOW TO ACT TOGETHER?
As we have seen, youthful dissent took many forms via several avenues in 
Egypt’s public political life in the late Mubarak era. Some would appropri-
ate autonomous political roles by combining direct street action with the 
tactics of “cyber-dissidence” (Fahmi 2009) thereby gaining new niches and 
visibilities in the wider prodemocracy movement. I have also suggested the 
value of closer examination of the internal differences and dynamics among 
the youth themselves, and their differential experiences of engaging in pub-
lic political life over time. The field of youth activism was in many ways 
characterized by social hierarchies but also struggles for resources, legiti-
macy and influence. For instance, the various organized groups – Liberals, 
Leftists, Arab nationalists and so on – were periodically at loggerheads over 
political demands, appropriate lines of action and power hierarchies, despite 
the initial aim of leaving differences of opinion aside so as to be united in 
their public demand for the end of Mubarak’s presidency.
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Finally, let us turn to the issues of horizontal organizational forms that 
characterize political youth activism and public mobilization in the global 
era (Nikolayenko 2007; Feixa, Pereira and Juris 2009; Abdelrahman 2011). 
While the young activists’ collective rejection of formal organizational affil-
iations in many ways provided them with a degree of autonomy, a closer 
look reveals the dynamic and overlapping processes of group formation.
4.3.1. Limits to coalition politics
In the late 2000s, it was evident that those, such as bloggers and individual 
Facebook users, who could resist being socialized into formal organiza-
tions, were most able to continue their individuated actions over time. The 
wider phenomenon of Internet-based dissent involved synoptic intrusions 
and also what Linda Herrera (2014a: 115-118) terms “vemes”, or virtual 
memes, which transmitted anti-regime ideas, imageries and attitudes in 
the making of the oppositional consciousness in the run-up to 2011. In this 
sense, the expanding online communities could also be seen as digital era 
nonmovements – or “digital encroachment” – whereby individual Internet 
users participated in the wider phenomenon of shared contestations over the 
truthful representations of the world in public life (Bayat 1998, 2010). At 
the “offline” street level, however, whenever young people devised a group 
initiative of their own, gained a degree of autonomy, a membership base 
and public prominence, they were faced with the perennial practical ques-
tion: how to act together?
Let us return to the two youth movements with which we are already 
familiar, namely, Youth for Change and the April 6 Youth Movement. As 
soon as Youth for Change emerged in the summer of 2005, and its members 
started galvanizing horizontal, face-to-face ties between themselves, they 
had to find modes of organizing their collective actions in an effective and 
meaningful way. The early debates revolved around questions of whether 
they should divide themselves into “working groups” or “committees”, 
and how many members, chosen on what basis, the latter should include. 
These debates, which involved partisan youth and those who claimed to be 
organizationally “independent”, created a deterrent for those who did not 
want to engage in such wrangling. Ultimately, the youth movement gradu-
ally adopted an organizational form that resembled many other prodemo-
cracy coalitions of the period, including the Kifaya movement, electing a 
general coordinator (munassiq ‘ām) and a coordination committee (lagna 
Henri.vaitos.final.indd   131 18.5.2015   8.55
132
tansīqiyya), as the main decision-making body, for three months at a time. 
The members of the coordination committee headed respective subcommit-
tees that took charge of different operational areas such as media, communi-
cations, culture, art and outreach (e.g. Fahmi 2009: 96). The strife between 
partisan and organizationally independent youth persisted, however, and 
internal elections gradually became rather contentious spectacles. Former 
members, who were critical of internal politicking, complained to me that 
the same partisan interests that marred Egypt’s opposition – that is, the 
competition over scarce resources, membership base and public notoriety 
– had found their way into the youth movement. According to some, the 
recruitment of young activists to existing political groups had effectively 
removed the ideological commitment of members to their shared interests, 
and internal strife, coupled with renewed state pressure on street activities, 
led to the group’s disintegration in late 2006. 
April 6 Youth arguably emerged as the most enduring youth movement 
in the late Mubarak era. But, as with Youth for Change, its members’ col-
lective actions were by no means easy to achieve. The group opted for a 
similar organizational form at the outset, namely, a general coordinator, 
a coordination committee, and a given number of subcommittees. It was, 
however, more particular about selecting new members on an individual 
basis rather than as representatives of political parties or groups, and used 
Facebook as its main medium for political mobilization, social networking 
and debate. Another difference was more distinctive: its general coordina-
tor, Ahmed Maher, a former Youth for Change activist, acted as the general 
coordinator from the outset and his position was not subject to internal elec-
tions. In late 2010, Maher explained that he had learned the lesson from 
Youth for Change that it was necessary to defend the movement from disin-
tegration. Further, he was adamant that the youth movement should be man-
aged through top-down structures.
Some others would further explain that there had been dire instances of 
internal strife within April 6 Youth that had brought the group to the brink 
of collapse in 2009. At stake had been the group’s internal governance as 
well as disagreements about the movement’s activities on its “anniversary” 
of April 6 and its response to President Obama’s official visit to Cairo on 
June 4. Over the summer, debates on the movement’s relationship with for-
eign organizations also became heated after a few members accepted invita-
tions to attend meetings abroad, including a seminar by Freedom House in 
Washington, and an activist workshop organized by CANVAS, established 
by former Otpor members, in Belgrade, Serbia. By July 2009, a grave divi-
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sion had emerged between, on the one hand, Maher and his supporters who 
were in the clear majority and, on the other, a group of partisan youth affili-
ated with the Amal Party which included spokesperson Dia al-Sawi (Sa‘ud 
2009). Both groups publicly claimed to be the genuine April 6 Youth Move-
ment. Maher argued in the press that dealing with Western organizations 
was acceptable as long as these do not interfere in the movement’s affairs 
(Sumayka and Adiib 2009). The second group, with a stronger Arab Nation-
alist orientation, made accusations against the Liberals in particular for 
cooperating with the “West” and Washington-based organizations, echoing 
the contentious arguments against “foreign funding” in Egypt (Pratt 2006). 
The situation was resolved when Maher’s group managed to keep the 
upper hand and, in consequence, the so-called founders’ committee (lagnat 
al-mu’assisīn) began to operate as an unelected body within the movement 
in parallel with its general committee.
In light of these developments it is apparent that while the youth move-
ments that emerged in Egypt’s public life in the 2000s did promote horizon-
tal organizational forms, this image is only partial. The committee-based 
structure and the emphasis on individual membership were not specific 
to youth movements but had been part and parcel of Egypt’s new protest 
movements and prodemocracy coalition initiatives since the turn of the mil-
lennium. Shehata (2011) argues that the Egyptian People’s Committee for 
Solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI) was an important prede-
cessor in promoting the principle that members join as individuals, and not 
as representatives of political groups or parties:
Movements such as EPSCPI and Kefaya have contributed to the 
general increase of societal mobilization and youth mobilization 
by introducing new forms of political organization that bypass the 
legal constraints that the state has imposed on all formal channels 
of political participation. By organizing informally and horizon-
tally and without seeking official license or recognition and by 
relying on direct forms of collective action such as street protests, 
these actors were able to create news spaces and forms of organi-
zation that youth were able to emulate. (Shehata 2011)
That youth movements adopted and gradually developed these orga-
nizational forms should be viewed, however, in a context where the more 
formal organizational structures were governed by top-down and person-
centred hierarchies. Ultimately, the question was as much about “how to act 
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together” as it was about how to manage interpersonal relations, to pursue 
shared goals, and to keep relations of trust, loyalty and solidarity – precious 
as they were in the contested sphere of politics – as intact as possible.
4.3.2. Heterogenous responses
While some former members of Youth for Change found their way into 
April 6 Youth in 2008, and some into existing political parties and groups, 
others moved into network initiatives. For instance, Muhammad, a Leftist 
blogger, told me in 2008 that the main lesson he had learned from Youth for 
Change was that political coalitions involving different ideological groups 
simply “do not work” – thus echoing the experiences of both Hamdi and 
Said described above. Following the disbanding of Youth for Change, he 
volunteered with several issue-based campaigns and network initiatives 
on an individual basis. At times he cooperated with other Leftist networks, 
including Solidarity (Taḍāmun) that took shape along parallel lines with 
April 6 Youth in 2008.
Solidarity was established in February 2008 and attracted former Youth 
for Change activists, especially those with Trotskyist and Marxist orienta-
tions. In contrast to April 6 Youth, they did not promote a particular youth-
based identity but, instead, emphasized that demands for democracy and 
human rights cannot be divorced from socioeconomic conditions and the 
grievances of the working classes. Consequently, their most meaningful tac-
tic – namely, the Trotskyist goal of the “united front” – was to facilitate 
building concrete social relations between the existing protest movements 
that would otherwise be confined to the local level (e.g. Mansour 2005; 
Abderahman 2009). At the outset, Solidarity activists focused on the daily 
struggles of fishermen to maintain their livelihoods, but later extended their 
activities to different localized protest movements across the country.
In comparison with April 6 Youth, Solidarity activists sought closer coop-
eration with the workers’ strike movements. During and after the strike day 
on April 6, 2008, for instance, they held frequent meetings at the Hisham 
Mubarak Law Centre in Cairo and, together with members of other net-
work initiatives, such as the Committee for the Defence of Workers’ Rights, 
turned its premises into a press and contact centre for al-Mahalla al-Kubra 
activists.36 Solidarity members were prepared to provide media support 
36  As noted in Chapter 3, these kinds of support campaigns were important predecessors for the 
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and legal aid to strike movement activists, detainees and their families. On 
another occasion, in Ramadan (September) 2008, they hosted an ifṭār din-
ner bringing together various protest and labour activists such as real estate 
tax collectors and teachers from Greater Cairo, fishermen from Port Said 
and labour leaders from al-Mahalla al-Kubra. The ifṭār, breaking the daily 
fast during Ramadan, represents an important social institution in Muslim-
majority society that provided good opportunities for opposition groups to 
socialize and recreate relations across ideological and partisan boundaries.
During 2010, when the ElBaradei campaign mobilized new members 
into the prodemocracy movement, the issues of internal strife and gov-
ernance did not diminish within April 6 Youth. By mid-2009, the Amal 
Party-affiliated youth had established an initiative called Lan Tamurru 
(Don’t Pass By) and, in 2010, two further youth movements emerged from 
its ranks. One of them was called Youth for Justice and Freedom (shabāb 
min ajl al-‘adāla wa-l-ḥurriya) that conjoined a range of Leftists, including 
Trotskyist students, who were formerly affiliated with the student group My 
Right (Ḥaqqi) at Helwan university, as well as independent Arab National-
ists. Its members, albeit small in numbers, would take visible roles in, for 
instance, sloganeering during public opposition protests. Another offshoot 
initiative, the Free Front for Peaceful Change (al-jabḥa al-ḥurra li-l-taghyīr 
al-silmī), conjoined a more liberal-oriented gathering. Its members experi-
mented with different street performances, including one in which they 
brought along pots, pans and plates as a way to protest against the continu-
ing rise in the prices of daily foodstuffs.
Towards the end of the decade of the new millennium, youth activ-
ism was expanding and had dispersed in several directions. Some either 
returned to or joined existing political parties; others volunteered in the 
ranks of ElBaradei’s signatures campaign in parallel with partisan youth 
groups, such as the Democratic Front Party and the young members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2010, the Revolutionary Socialists had also 
divided into two organizations. Some Left-oriented youth also joined the 
recently formed Popular Democratic Movement for Change (Al-ḥaraka 
al-sha‘biyya al-dīmūqrāṭiyya min ajl al-taghyīr), while Facebook-based 
dissent was involving growing numbers of young members in contesting 
the ruling elites. In the run-up to 2011, the diverse off-shoot movements 
– as organized groups, social networks and politicized individuals – col-
lectively diversified the avenues for public political dissent. Although social 
emergence of the Front for Defend Egypt’s Protesters.
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divisions and internal strife persisted within the political opposition, by the 
time of the NDP’s landslide victory in parliamentary elections in December 
2010, the processes of internal division (inqisām) had at least contributed 
to a certain heterogeneity of resistance which, through online and offline 
avenues, were increasingly difficult to govern. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter I have examined in some detail the actual political activi-
ties of young Cairenes who aimed to diversify and to challenge the conven-
tional forms and avenues of opposition politics in the late Mubarak era. In 
doing so, they preferred to organize unlicensed street protests in the popu-
lar, lower-class residential areas and to tap into the subversive potential of 
the ICTs and social media, thereby compensating for their lack of politi-
cal opportunities elsewhere. I have noted that what have been termed tacti-
cal transgressions – the activists’ attempts to reach out to wider publics via 
both offline and online methods – were more easily adopted by those who 
either had the necessary social networks in place, including family support, 
or the available time and the economic means to do so. In this context, a 
privileged socioeconomic background, such as being educated in private 
universities or coming from relatively affluent families, was generally a 
more decisive factor than gender in enabling political engagements over 
time. Those who were less privileged and less equipped for public dissent, 
however, could nonetheless acquire new combinations of practical skills, 
knowledge and social connections that enabled them to harness innovative 
ways of enacting their critical, anti-regime stances through everyday speech 
and action. In this sense, the young activists were embedded in the evolving 
oppositional counterculture wherein they mobilized not only new members 
but also youthful forms of political action and imagination. In comparison 
with the burgeoning workers’ movement across the country that was gain-
ing concessions from public authorities, and the campaigns by human rights 
advocates, the young activists’ street actions and online dissent perhaps 
seemed in many ways inconsequential to social change. For the young pro-
tagonists, however, these were important ways to enact their sense of mean-
ingful political action, and be part of mobilizing a critical mass that held the 
promise of a better future in a post-Mubarak Egypt.
For the young, being and becoming an opposition activist in the late 
2000s was also about learning how to keep track of what was happening in 
society, and how to engage in public dissent with others. In the late 2000s, 
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the social media provided increasing opportunities for political communi-
cation, social networking and deliberation among the wired generation of 
young Egyptians (Herrera 2014b), which helped further to reproduce a criti-
cal generational consciousness among the young, as they could consume 
and contribute to counter-hegemonic imageries of the social world. In this 
context, the blogger-activists had played pioneering roles since the mid-
2000s. At street level, the activists’ attempts to assume urban spaces were 
often prevented by the security apparatus, resulting in events that would 
further contribute to the growing reserve of stories of youthful resistance 
and consequent injustice, as these were reported and debated online, and at 
times made headlines in the national and global news outlets. At the same 
time, the efforts they were exerting towards building and maintaining coali-
tions were faced with a number of challenges. The practical requirements 
of collective decision-making and gaining publicity, for instance, were 
issues that required attention, yet also encompassed the seeds of potential 
disarray. Towards the end of the decade, the processes connected with inter-
nal factionalism among the young tended either to generate new offshoot 
groups or, alternatively, encourage newly politicized youth to join existing 
campaign networks, political groups and parties. These divisions hindered 
coalition politics, but they had the result of diversifying available sites and 
avenues for political socialization, which would eventually converge with 
other contentious movements early in 2011. 
In the run-up period, under the volatile circumstances of authoritarian 
rule, being an opposition activist required active maintenance of trust, loy-
alty and everyday solidarity, an issue I shall examine more closely in the 
next chapter.
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5 ON FRIENDSHIP AND EVERYDAY 
SOCIALITY
In April 2007, I joined Muhammad (26), whom I had met by chance only a 
few days earlier, and Said (28) in a small, dimly-lit restaurant in downtown 
Cairo. A leftist blogger and former Youth for Change activist, Muhammad 
was a sharp-witted character who proclaimed himself an anarcho-commu-
nist. Although his online writing stirred up the occasional controversy, he 
was respected in activist circles for his political blogging and for his persis-
tent and courageous actions at the front lines of democratic struggle, includ-
ing fighting riot police and balṭagiyya which had resulted his being detained 
several times over the past few years. His friend Said, a young Esmatist 
– a follower of Egyptian Arab Nationalist intellectual Esmat Seif al-Dawla 
(1923-1996) – was currently unemployed but active in independent groups. 
We entered into diversified and rather heated debates on current politics in 
the noisy, crammed and smoky atmosphere. The restaurant, which was also 
one of the few downtown places that served beer to its clientele, provided 
a realm of experience that provided a stark contrast to the convivial chat-
tering on religious issues at the Journalists’ Syndicate which I just left. It 
had been the occasion of the 5th Cairo Anti-War Conference held since the 
outbreak of Iraq war in 2003, and I had departed a happy man after meet-
ing a number of young members of the Muslim Brotherhood, both men and 
women, whom I wished to interview at this nascent stage of research.
Muhammad and Said, like many other Leftists, boycotted the Cairo Con-
ference in 2007. The main reason for their disengagement was the active 
and public role the Muslim Brotherhood took in both the conference’s 
Henri.vaitos.final.indd   139 18.5.2015   8.55
140
organizing committee and during the conference itself.37 The two abstain-
ers could not fathom why Trotskyist Revolutionary Socialists, themselves 
hard-line secularists and co-organizers of the event, should want to ally 
with the Brotherhood, even on the pretext that revolution in Egypt could not 
materialize without collaborating with the Islamists.38 On the other hand, 
Muhammad admitted that he and Said were not entirely natural companions 
either: he usually hates Nasserists and Arab nationalists, such as Said, for 
idolizing Gamal Abdel Nasser. Although Muhammad appreciated the vast 
socioeconomic reforms that had taken place under Nasser, the regime had 
hit hard at Egypt’s communist movement at the turn of 1950s and 1960s, 
incarcerating many of Nasser’s political rivals and dissenters for a number 
of years, including Ahmed Nabil al-Hilali, a pioneering human rights law-
yer-activist and one of Muhammad’s long-time idols.39 Muhammad further 
deplored what he saw as nepotistic practices in current Nasserist groups, a 
line of criticism that soon encompassed most opposition parties and also 
some NGOs. Said, having had dire experiences of party politics himself, 
could only agree. 
*   *   *
Among the characteristics of Egyptian youth activism of the 2000s was that 
young people from across the ideological spectrum would try to act together 
and forge alliances regardless of the accustomed ideological strife and “per-
sonal politics” that prevailed in the political opposition. I have previously 
explained that their collective actions were connected to the processes of 
expressing a generational consciousness in order to position their politi-
cal activities in more autonomous spaces. On the other hand, when public 
prestige and social hierarchies came into play, especially in terms of coali-
tion building, these collective pursuits were subject to internal factionalism. 
37  One manifestation of their role was that the MB Supreme Guide, Mahdi Akef, gave a speech at 
the opening plenary session, during which the younger MB members distributed the print-outs of it in 
both Arabic and English on coloured leaflets, with the appropriate contact details and the MB website 
printed on them. Other organizers at the 2007 conference included representatives from the Karama 
and Amal Parties, and Revolutionary Socialists.
38  The Trotskyist activists I encountered during the conference referenced the work of Chris Har-
man, from the London-based Socialist Workers Party, to make this point (Abdelrahman 2009), or 
Sameh Najib’s al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn: Ru’yā ishtirākiyya (Najib 2006).
39  Al-Hilali (1928-2006) was the son of Ahmed Naguib, the last Prime Minister of Egypt before the 
1952 July Revolution (Goldschmidt 2000: 77-78). As a communist, he was imprisoned in the 1960s, 
and respected for the fact that he had dedicated his working life to the defence of ordinary Egyptians 
(Stork 1987). 
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Nonetheless, being an activist in the late Mubarak era was not only about 
the “high” moments of democratic struggle; it also involved hanging out 
with friends in places and moments in which protest narratives were circu-
lated, shared experiences told and retold, and political subjectivities mutu-
ally constructed.
In this chapter, I look more closely at the dynamics of trust, belong-
ing and everyday solidarities – often regarded as the virtues of friendship 
– that shed some light on the ebbs and flows of collective action among 
young activists. The issue of friendship emerged at a rather late stage of 
this research, and much of the analysis connected with it is based on retro-
spective reworking of field notes made in 2008. As the divisive processes 
within April 6 Youth described earlier indicate, the pertinence of friendship 
became all the more salient in interviews in 2010. Friendship is, however, 
so important an issue that describing and trying to understand young Egyp-
tians’ experiences of public political life in the late Mubarak era would fall 
short without it. In this vein, I start the first section by contextualizing the 
notion of friendship: in other words, the activists’ experiences of having 
good friends and being a good friend to others. I also probe more closely the 
bases of commonality, such as lifestyle choices and shared anomalies in the 
public eye, which provided young activists specific opportunities for creat-
ing and maintaining friendship relations over time. 
The first section, therefore, highlights aspects of social confluence; the 
second section, however, discusses some of the vulnerabilities inherent to 
their friendship relations. Finally, in the third section, I discuss the notion 
of shilla as a local type of group formation that sheds some light on the 
dynamics of coalition politics among young activists.
5.1. FRIENDSHIP AS BELONGING TO THE WORLD 
Friendship is an important aspect of the human condition that is based on 
the fact that we experience and inhabit the world together. My interest in 
friendship is based on the observation that most young people in Egypt – as 
elsewhere – cherish the company of good friends. This observation, in all its 
banality, assists the recognition that, in the lifeworlds of young people who 
have learned to live in relative autonomy from their natal families, friend-
ship ties forged at school, university and through leisure activities provide 
immediate experiences of trust, reciprocity and shared everyday existence. 
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In other words, friends serve the young as an additional social layer to kin 
and formal organizations and, due to their particular life stage, provide them 
with important, yet precarious, avenues to collective life. This was certainly 
the case in the late Mubarak era, when authoritarian stances on public polit-
ical dissent, coupled with internal strife in the opposition, created particu-
lar values, exigencies and opportunities in terms of friendship relations. In 
what follows, I shall address these issues, beginning, however, from a less 
politicized context.
5.1.1. Ali’s shilla: “Friends come first”
In 2008, Ali and his friends, Midhat and Karim, were university students 
in their early twenties. They had known one another since childhood and 
formed the core of their localized shilla (group of friends) in the midst of 
high-rise buildings near Haram Street in Giza.40 They seldom travelled 
downtown but, rather, met daily at their local hang-out, an ahwa in their 
home neighbourhood, where they had grown up and where everyone knew 
each other. They would meet in the evenings after classes and spend hours 
on end with their friends, talking about life events, girls, music and univer-
sity studies. Despite matching the profile and oppositional attitudes of the 
young activists, they had no experience of direct personal involvement in 
public political life. After I pressed them on the issue of political inclina-
tions, they declared themselves Nasserists “at heart” (guwwa), despite their 
deeply suspicious attitudes toward opposition parties – which they regarded 
as fundamentally corrupt and defunct – and anti-Mubarak protesters who, 
as they saw it, did not achieve anything by shouting in the streets.
The three friends lived with their families, but they agreed with Mid-
hat that they and their parents lived somewhat separate lives. According to 
Midhat, parents did not have the slightest idea of what their offspring, espe-
cially their adolescent sons, were thinking about, or of what really went 
on in their lives. Even at the level of language, his parents did not under-
stand some of the slang words and expressions commonly used among the 
young, which Midhat at times exploited at home when discussing “delicate 
matters”, including girls, with his friends. Good friends, Midhat contended, 
were far more important than family: 
40  Shilla can also be translated as a “clique” which is a point I discuss in more detail in Section 5.3.
Henri.vaitos.final.indd   142 18.5.2015   8.55
143
Good friends come first (al-aṣḥāb ahamm ḥāga). If you’re 
depressed, they come and cheer you up. If you fail in your exams, 
or if you’re heartbroken because your relative has died, they share 
your sorrow (humma za‘lānīn zayak). 
The Youth Aspirations Survey, which also probed into friendship ties in 
the lives of Egyptians aged between 10 and 29 in the late 2000s, produces 
conclusions similar to those in Midhat’s account (Population Council 2011: 
133-138). Three emerging trends from the survey are particularly interest-
ing: first, regardless of region and educational level, young men had more 
friends than young women; second, the more urban and educated the young 
were, the more probable they would have friends of the opposite sex; and 
third, young people discussed their personal life – especially romance, puberty, 
growing up and friendship relations themselves – predominantly with friends. 
While friends also rated highly in discussing issues like school performance, 
bullying at school and one’s personal future, these subjects were raised more 
often with parents although, in general, were more likely to be discussed with 
the mother than with father. Young people were also introduced to the Internet 
predominantly through friends, and the Internet was mostly used – with the 
exception of “seeking general knowledge” – for social purposes, such as chat-
ting with friends and writing and reading emails.
Although more age specific and regionally delimited data, such as that 
confined to Greater Cairo, could have been useful for our purposes, this sur-
vey data closely correlates with the three friends’ account of a generational 
gap between Egyptian youth, especially young men, and their parents. In 
my observation, too, friends provide young Cairenes with intimate social 
circles in which they share and mutually contemplate their concerns, joy, 
epiphanies and everyday experiences.
5.1.2. Friendship as a subject of study
Despite the salient importance of friends in the everyday lives of young 
Egyptian activists, there is little research on the issue. The important role 
of friendship as a micro-level site for political mobilization is, nonethe-
less, hardly a new discovery (Passy and Giugni 2000; Della Porta and Diani 
2006: 15, 128). Friendship provides everyday experiences of trust and 
solidarity that, it has been argued, are the most effective channels through 
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which political actors commit to social movements.41 My aim here, how-
ever, is to look at how friendships are experienced, ruptured and recreated 
in a more general sense, not only with reference to a specific social or politi-
cal movement. In anthropology, as Killick and Desai (2013b: 4-8) observe, 
the relative lack of ethnographic research on friendship partly stems from 
the discipline’s long-lasting preoccupation with kinship. In comparison to 
the ascribed dimension of being a member of one’s family, friendship rela-
tions seem, as Bell and Coleman argue:
defined solely on the basis of the social contract which really 
exists and is continually worked upon: participation depends on 
the relationship created over time between the particular people 
involved, while what brings people together in friendship may not 
be what keeps them together (Bell and Coleman 1999b: 6).
At the minimum, they suggest, the analytic of friendship can serve the 
aim of examining “social relations that may include but are not reducible 
to kinship; that are sustained beyond single or short-term encounters; that 
involve the search for some form of sentiment or at least empathy and 
common ground between persons” (1999b: 16). In general, however, it is 
contended that Western experiences of friendship provide little analytical 
value when it comes to examining friendship relations in other parts of the 
world: there is, in particular, a risk of reproducing powerful assumptions 
about freedom, choice and individualism that are often valorized in studies 
based on Western middle-class experience (Paine 1999; Bell and Coleman 
1999a; Desai and Killick 2013a). Thus, when studying friendship relations 
the aspect of choice should be balanced with that of constraint, as both are 
embedded in and shaped by wider social, political and economic processes 
(Allan 1989: 30-48). 
Although friends do matter to people of all ages, including the elderly 
(Allan 1989: 85-103), the life stage of being young attaches rather specific 
values to friendship relations. In childhood and adolescence, social rela-
tions and identities are traditionally forged around the family and locality, 
according to residential neighbourhood or, when younger, nearby streets 
41 Here I borrow Scholz’s notion of “political solidarity” as a “moral relation that marks a social 
movement wherein individuals have committed to positive duties in response to a perceived injus-
tice” (2008: 6) As such, it is differentiated – but not exclusive from – other forms of solidarity, such 
as civic and social solidarity, in emphasizing “individual conscience, commitment, group responsibi-
lity, and collective action” (Scholz 2008: 33).
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or alleyways (El-Messiri 1978). Those who finish high school with com-
petitive results may enter a university where the campuses expand student 
lifeworlds, suggesting alternative, yet still confined, urban spaces for con-
gregating and learning new modes of socializing. Although family expec-
tations and pressure with regards activities are highly gendered, relative 
autonomy from both on campus also provide students with new opportuni-
ties to make friends with the opposite sex. Modern schooling prolongs ado-
lescence and transforms not only students (ṭalaba) but also youth in general 
(shabāb) into meaningful social categories, and it continues to offer one 
of the major social environments for the experience of being young (Farag 
2007). In Ali’s experience, and those of Umar, too, when skipping classes 
to go to the city centre, for example, friends can provide important sup-
port networks, such as taking down lecture notes in the absence of others. 
Beyond campus life, the young urbanites coalesce around leisure activities, 
including shared tastes in films, music and fashion, and socialize on a regu-
lar basis online or, alternatively, in their home neighbourhood and in differ-
ent parts of Greater Cairo. For the young, both having friends, and being 
a good friend, can be immensely important in arranging the structure of 
everyday life, involving emotional, social and often economic investments 
over a prolonged period of time. It also implies a willingness to meet oth-
ers regularly, outside work, studies and political activities. Indeed, friends 
spend time or “hang out” together even when there is not much to do. Shar-
ing and co-enduring the idle moments of boredom can be in itself very 
meaningful (Schielke 2008). 
5.1.3. Shared experiences
In public political life, it is hard to overestimate the importance of friendship 
relations in the young activists’ lives. In the late 2000s, acting as they were 
in the contentious sphere of politics where the perpetual state oversight of, 
and security infiltration into, their daily lives was a real concern, friendship 
relations provided them with vital experiences of trust, loyalty and belong-
ing. At pivotal moments, such as in clashes with the police or in detention, 
good friends were those who could be trusted and whose solidarities could 
be counted upon. Undoubtedly, there was a tacit deal among young activists 
to go and protest in the case of anyone – especially a fellow party member 
– getting arrested, but at these junctures, individuals were wont to rely on 
the fact that, at the minimum, good friends would try and drag them from 
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the arms of the Central Security Forces, if possible; at the least they would 
chase the police wagon so as to locate the exact police station they were 
being taken to. In cases of detention, close friends were actively involved 
in contacting family members and journalists, designing online banners and 
circulating messages over the Internet so as to make the case as public as 
possible. Friends would also be active in helping to organize solidarity pro-
tests calling for release and, later, a welcome home party.
Muhammad and Said befriended one another while being confined in 
the same cell after having been detained during the “Judges affair” in May 
2006. Said’s large family, encompassing a number of siblings, brought 
in various kinds of food almost daily which he then shared with fellow 
inmates, amounting to a “feast” in Muhammad’s opinion. Despite the odds 
of ideological strife and political rivalry, and their different friendship cir-
cles, they gradually developed a sense of acceptance of one another. During 
my time in Egypt, I heard several stories about activists forging new friend-
ship relations due to being confined in the same cell, co-enduring the forma-
tive experiences of incarceration. Although the fundamental basis of such 
contact was a shared struggle against the Mubarak regime, and the sense of 
resolute purpose in this aim, it could also be about very mundane acts, such 
as sharing food or lending a smuggled mobile phone. Sharing moments of 
dissent, of facing injustice, and of everyday solidarities served to forge con-
crete friendship relations that could endure over time. 
Even the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kifaya) was built on pre-exist-
ing friendship relations. The idea for establishing an anti-Mubarak coalition 
was first conceived in November (Ramadan) 2003 when a group of opposi-
tion politicians congregated at the home of Abu Ela Madi, the Wasat Party 
leader, to break the daily fast over an ifṭār dinner (Browers 2007). They 
belonged to the 1970s’ generation of former student activists and, although 
affiliated to different and even competing political trends, they had known 
one another since they were young. As Ahmed Baha Eddin Shaban, a Marx-
ist intellectual and one of those present, told me:
We were, well, a generation that was raised in the student move-
ment, and we had developed relations of mutual trust (thiqa 
mutabādila). So there is a certain extent of friendship (qadr min 
al-ṣadāqa): We went to prison together, we got out from prison 
together. And we know each other for a long time, whether we 
are Leftist – Marxist – or whether we are Nasserist, Islamist, or 
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Liberal. We share a common experience (tagruba mushtaraka) 
and trust and respect one another. 
As we have previously seen, the global era drastically altered the ways in 
which Egyptian youth learned and gained alternative information about the 
social world. The changing patterns of online communication and network-
ing – through the Internet and social media such as Facebook and Twit-
ter, mostly used by the young – have also brought tangible changes to how 
young and “wired” Egyptians negotiate their friendship relations. While the 
issue of online friendships goes beyond the scope of this discussion, it is 
mentioned here to remind us that the making of generational consciousness 
in the late 2000s was less based on direct experiences than on those medi-
ated through the new ICTs (Edmunds and Turner 2005). Andrews (2002) 
also emphasizes the role of dialogue and stories in producing critical aware-
ness in the formation of active generations that builds on “a consciousness 
of generations which have come before and which will follow” (2002: 81). 
Drawing on Paolo Freire’s notion of conscientization, Andrews suggests 
that the stories that people tell about themselves and their lives, and those 
of others, “are not only the way in which individuals process their own 
lived experiences, but they are also inherited and remade anew” (ibid.: 84; 
Edmunds and Turner 2002b: 9). 
One of the charges explaining the political apathy of young Egyptians I 
encountered was that they do not have exemplary role models, yet I have 
already suggested that the previous experiences of the 1970s’ generation, 
the human rights advocates and the biographies of politicized families fed 
in different ways into the democratic struggle in the late Mubarak era. In 
the 2000s, the shared respect for, and commemoration of, certain opposition 
figures and public personalities, either living or dead, also helped to gener-
ate common grounds for friendship relations as well as intergenerational 
solidarities. In 2006, both Muhammad and Said went to the funeral of al-
Hilali, the pioneering human rights lawyer, at Tahrir Square, an event that 
amounted to a rally attended by a number of opposition members across 
ideological divides, which, according to an observer, “brought together 
men of different generations, young people as well as old” (Issa 2006). 
Al-Hilali was known for defending protesters after the Bread Intifada in 
January 1977 and, more generally, political detainees irrespective of their 
political orientations and, in this role, was also involved in the making of 
the 1970s’ generation. To provide another example of affective role mod-
els: as a youngster, Umar, the young Nasserist student, enjoyed watching 
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action movies and cherished the stories of Salah El-Din, who fought against 
the Crusaders (Western aggressors), as well as those about Umar ibn al-
Khattab, the fourth Caliph, as he went disguised among ‘his people’ to look 
at how they lived, wearing a galābiyya. These stories of heroic virtue and 
justice were connected with Umar’s current, yet periodic, commitment to 
public political life. 
At the same time, as already noted, some activists also found common-
alities from realms outside politics (e.g. Bayat 2010: 128-136). The more 
affluent and cosmopolitan youth, for example, who lived rather different 
lives from Umar, could find resonance in globally circulating tastes and 
commodities such as rock music or online movies, adopting lifestyle choices 
distinguishing them from those who did not have access to such luxuries. On 
the other hand, in contrast to rather pricy restaurants, most young Cairene 
activists preferred to socialize with friends in downtown cafés. Participat-
ing in leisure activities was in general more constrained for young women 
whose families expected them to remain within the safe contours of stud-
ies, work or domestic life, especially in the evenings, although the Internet 
would alleviate these differential opportunities based on gender. One added 
aspect of the digital era was that, as the potential of ICTs was recognized by 
Egyptian human rights organizations, workshops and seminars have been 
organized around the use of the Internet as a political tool since the mid-
2000s. The Arabic Network of Human Rights Information (ANHRI) was 
influential in this respect, thereby enabling blogger-activists from Egypt and 
other Middle Eastern countries to share their experiences and get to know 
one another (e.g. ANHRI 2008, 2009). The function of forging transnational 
activist networks between diverse groups has been an important feature of 
ICTs during the 2000s, not only in Egypt, but also at transnational confer-
ences attended by bloggers from Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, 
creating transnational communication networks through which they could 
exchange information, opinions, political tactics, and in cases of detention, 
solidarity operations across the region and globally.
Closer to street level, young opposition activists were in many ways 
“deviant” characters in society, which in itself confined them to rather nar-
row social urban spaces. Some young Egyptians, who did not participate 
in any political activities, told me that they shared many of the activists’ 
dissenting views and secretly admired their courage and readiness to sac-
rifice for a good cause. Nonetheless, implicit in their admiration was the 
understanding that befriending them would be somewhat risky. Huda – the 
young female April 6 Youth activist whose incarceration on April 6, 2008, 
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mentioned in Chapter 4 – told me that once she became active in the April 
6 Youth in the summer of 2008, her friends at the university abandoned 
her socially, to the point where her potential boyfriend called her a “crazy 
girl” (magnūna) and other fellow students with whom she normally “hung 
out” at the campus began to avoid her. On the other hand, being labelled in 
the public eye a “crazy person” (magnūn) or one of those “eccentric down-
town people”, could also provide some opposition activists with a sense of 
relative freedom and an additional impetus to transgress social norms (Sa‘id 
2010). However, because oppositional activism was regarded in society in 
such a detrimental light, others concealed their political engagements at the 
university campus, or within their families and the home neighbourhood. 
Although this issue was more pertinent to young women, it was not so easy 
for young men either. In 2008, for example, I witnessed the happy reunion 
of Basem and Mahmoud in downtown Cairo when they both turned up in 
an ahwa that was then frequented by April 6 Youth activists. Familiar with 
each other from their home city in the Nile Delta, they had met at the cam-
pus almost daily, but neither had ever openly disclosed his political dissent 
or personal sympathies for April 6 Youth. Released from this constraint by 
the location, they laughed aloud, hugged each other and, chatting enthusi-
astically, renewed their friendship in an atmosphere that no longer required 
the concealment of an important dimension of their private selves; the per-
sonal disclosure seemed to strengthen their mutual bond beyond the every-
day relationships they were used to at the home campus. 
This kind of sensitivity to one’s self-comportment in public spaces in 
Egypt is related to the very circumstances in which they lived. For the pre-
vious generations in the 1980s and 1990s, passing time in coffee shops was 
an important pastime for men in local neighbourhoods in order to exchange 
news and favours, but also to hear of job openings directly from friends 
(Singerman 1997a). Although the young Egyptians attained much wider 
opportunities to communicate and network with each other online, the need 
for “face-to-face” interaction among young activists had not withered away 
in the late 2000s. On the one hand, it was common knowledge that the 
Internet was volatile means of communication due to digital surveillance 
and hacking. Some would even use their mobile phones to leave missed 
calls with pre-arranged meanings - usually a mundane “lets meet where we 
usually do” – as a tactic to circumvent potential surveillance, although the 
parallel, and more mundane reason was to save on the phone bill. On the 
other hand, however, the relations of trust, solidarity and group belonging 
required sustained face-to-face interactions so as to be verified and recre-
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ated, a phenomenon that particularly concerns the political sphere in which 
alliances and informal networks could be volatile and fast-changing. 
5.2. POLITICS OF THE TABLE
As important as it is to recognize the vital role played by democratic strug-
gle in the lives of the young activists, it is also essential to bear in mind that 
periodic street protesting, online campaigns, awareness raising stunts, pub-
lic seminars and other engagements with political dissent occupied only one 
aspect of everyday existence. During in-between moments, which actually 
amounted to most of the time, many would meet friends in places of their 
preference, giving rise to the daily question: Where to sit down, and with 
whom? The young Cairenes, who lived in various parts of the capital city, 
and whose everyday trajectories involved criss-crossing the metropolis, 
normally congregated in different parts of the centre where several politi-
cal parties, NGOs and trade unions have their headquarters, and where the 
main sites for public protest and social congregation are located. In this con-
text, the repeated acts of “sitting together” (na‘’ud ma‘ ba‘d) were impor-
tant moments for recreating and managing friendship relations. They would 
involve negotiating social proximities between one’s self and others, and 
also offered prime opportunities to hear the latest news, recap past events, 
devise future engagements and joke around while there was little else to do. 
Although I started this chapter in a smoky restaurant, the majority of young 
activists met in the context of oppositional events; nonetheless, during lei-
sure moments, they preferred places such as cafeterias, public parks, the 
workplace or the street corner. 
5.2.1. Al-Bursa
If I had to name one area in downtown Cairo that played a decisive role in 
everyday social interactions among activists in 2008, I would nominate Al-
Bursa. It refers to a specific quarter delineated by the commercial streets of 
Qasr al-Nil, Sherif Basha, and Mohammed Sabri Abu ‘Alam, lying to the 
east of Talat Harb Square. Since the late 1990s it has been renovated in the 
fashion of the 1920s’ “belle époque” era and today encompasses a number 
of financial institutions, including the Central Bank and, as echoed in the 
area’s popular name, the Egyptian Stock Exchange (El Kadi and ElKerdany 
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2006: 364-366). As part of the same project, the quarter was converted 
into a pedestrian area – itself a rarity in overcrowded Cairo – that houses a 
string of relatively inexpensive street-level ahāwī that expand their trade, 
in legions of chairs and tables, onto the pavements. In the evenings, from 
roughly 6 pm onwards, and during weekends, Al-Bursa unfolded into a 
completely different scene. Its pedestrian streets were filled with a constant 
buzz of life, the “to-and-fro” of clientele, friends, colleagues and associ-
ates from various backgrounds: from young professionals and students to 
foreign expatriates, local artists, musicians and other breeds of “cultured 
people”. Journalists from private newspapers would come after office hours 
with the latest gossip and news, before it made the headlines the follow-
ing day. Young men and women could socialize with relative ease, unlike 
in the more localized and male-dominated ahāwī in popular quarters of 
Cairo where cross-gender socialization and, for instance, the sight of young 
women smoking cigarettes or a shīsha (waterpipe) with unrelated young 
men could potentially create a minor stir.
During the heyday of the anti-Mubarak mobilization in the mid-2000s, 
the pedestrian area of Al-Bursa became a central hub for the everyday trajec-
tories of young opposition activists. Members of different political groups 
such as Liberals, Communists, and Nasserists, passed numerous evenings 
there with their fellow activists, including both “friends” and “foes”. For 
the young from outside Cairo, like Basem and Mahmoud, visiting Al-Bursa 
was a must experience so as to have a sense of the capital city’s “activist 
scene” and the buzz of its political life. Contentious conversations would 
occasionally flare up within and between different congregations, and seat-
ing arrangements were modified accordingly. Young activists would leave 
their tables to join political events such as protests and seminars, only to 
return afterwards to recount their views and fresh experiences, and to plan 
future actions.
In comparison with the more exclusive menus in the Western-style cof-
fee shops, the ahāwī of Al-Bursa served its clientele in 2008 in terms of 
popular (sha‘bī) sensibilities – plastic chairs, coffee, tea and soft drinks for 
1.5 L.E.  – while nearby restaurants offered traditional sandwiches filled 
with fūl (fava bean paste) and ṭa‘miyya (chickpea rolls) (for 1.25-1.50 L.E. 
each) –  which often amounted to their customers’ first meal of the day. Al-
Bursa’s milieu in the heart of the country’s financial life, and its architecture 
and relative cleanliness of city-scape, sets it apart from the localized ahāwī 
in the popular neighbourhoods. The old colonial-era buildings, the streets 
named after national heroes and the statues erected in their memory, cater to 
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a sense of a glorious history: that of liberation and national pride. It can be 
seen as “hybrid” urban space (Nederveen Pieterse 2009; Sanchez, forth.) in 
that it conjoins nostalgia for a glorious past, for freedom and the country’s 
intellectual life, with popular sensibilities and sociability – and relatively 
low prices. 
5.2.2. Lopsided friendships
Thus, beyond the growing connectedness generated by social media, urban 
places like Al-Bursa provided important sites for recreating friendship rela-
tions in the late Mubarak era, but the rather romanticized notion outlined 
above of one of the social hubs of Cairene activists’ daily trajectories was 
only part of the picture. In 2010, when I visited the area after a two year 
absence, it had undergone at least two changes. First, personal laptops had 
only had a marginal presence in the cafeterias in 2008 but their numbers had 
visibly multiplied in the course of time, and certain cafeterias had started 
to offer free WLAN access to their customers. In 2008, only a handful of 
young activists brought their laptops, some accessing the unsecured WLAN 
connections from nearby buildings: knowing the exact spots amounted to 
useful practical knowledge in this respect. The WLAN services offered in 
some cafeterias partly explained the change, along with the diversification 
of the groups during previous youth mobilizations, including the ElBaradei 
campaign and Facebook activism in 2010. Moreover, the number of Inter-
net users had grown rapidly by 2010, giving these cafeterias a “niche” mar-
ket in this respect, too.
Another visible change was that the activist youth had dispersed to a 
greater number of cafés and the April 6 Youth members no longer congre-
gated or held meetings as an identifiable group as they did in the move-
ment’s early phase in 2008. Some explained that this was due to the fact 
that Al-Bursa was full of security (shurṭa) since it was, after all, the run-up 
period to the 2010 parliamentary elections; the dire experiences of inter-
nal divisions within the youth movement also provided a background to the 
development. I had already, however, encountered similar changes in atti-
tude towards Al-Bursa in 2008. Some appeared to have poignant feelings 
about no longer voluntarily going to the area, while not choosing to explain 
why; others, however, were much more explicit. “Al-Bursa is like sewage,” 
said Mahdi, citing a characterization common among his friends with which 
he agreed, adding: “It is a place for things, of course, to be decided, for 
Henri.vaitos.final.indd   152 18.5.2015   8.55
153
some plans to be made, but not always for the best of the country.” In his 
grim view, it was the prime arena where careerist youth waged plots against 
others, where the “rumour mill” went into higher gear, and where it was 
impossible to remain neutral in terms of one’s allegiance and loyalty:
If you go there you get involved – even if not directly, it will be an 
indirect process, and if not fast, it will take a longer time. But, still 
at the end, what will happen to you is that you will get an infec-
tion. It is a very bad infection; it’s a terrible disease. 
In other words, his view was that spending time in these spaces would 
sooner or later result in an entanglement in contradictory webs of social 
relations in which it was seldom easy to navigate without taking up posi-
tions against one or the other:
We were all stupid to think it should be the place where we sit. Of 
course you don’t learn easy, you learn the hard way. Also it was 
the place where things changed from being groups based on ide-
ologies to groups based on interests […] to get the best possible 
gain out of the movement, and of persons like myself, who were 
foolish enough to trust them.
Because friendship relations were important sites of trust, belonging 
and solidarity in contentious politics, and involved daily flows of social, 
economic and emotional investments, the moments and processes whereby 
friendship – or what had been perceived as such by at least one of the 
participants – broke up had long-term repercussions in individuals’ lives. 
Ismail remembers the painful experiences of prolonged detention during the 
Judges affair in 2006, when people he considered friends chose to disown 
him on ideological and personal grounds. Some even went as far as declar-
ing him a disbeliever (humma kaffarūnī!). He was subjected to psychologi-
cal and physical torture during detention which, coupled with the sense of 
betrayal, left him temporarily traumatized after release, and unable to return 
to “normal” life. While Mahdi’s characterization of Al-Bursa was the most 
extreme I encountered, it resonates with other views of the “symptomatic” 
qualities of Egyptian politics in general. One would bemoan that “politi-
cal life in Egypt is ill” (al-ḥayā al-siyāsiyya fī maṣr marīḍa) and, another, 
“there is no love in politics” (mafīsh ḥubb fī al-siyāsa). While the more 
pessimistic accounts encompassed the undertakings of the ruling elite, these 
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charges also targeted the political opposition and, as mentioned in the previ-
ous chapter, the field of youth activism was not immune to partisan inter-
ests, personal differences and ideological strife. A popular Egyptian proverb 
– “Your friend swallows stones for you[r sake], and your enemy wishes 
for your mistakes” (Ḥabībak yibla‘ lak al-zalaṭ, wa ‘aduwwak yitmannā 
lak al-ghalaṭ ) – is indicative of the degree of intensity placed on friend-
ship solidarities, which were, as suggested above, of heightened importance 
when engaging in public political dissent. The competition between opposi-
tion groups over resources, membership base and public prominence also 
involved constant definitions of friendships in relation to those who were 
considered rivals.
This reverberates with views that the distinction between friends and 
foes is constitutive of political life in general. In his breath-taking essay 
“The Politics of Friendship”, Jacques Derrida (1993) argues that the Aris-
totelian ideals of “genuine friendship” - that inform many Western ideals 
of friendship and are based on the mutual encouragement of virtue in one 
another – do not hold in political life. On the one hand, coalition build-
ing among young activists involved rivalries, for instance, between certain 
Liberal-oriented and Arab Nationalist-oriented youth, while on the other, in 
the context of everyday interactions, friendship relations were constantly 
negotiated through the intricate details of everyday practices, and it was 
often the seemingly mundane things that mattered the most, as Laleh Khalili 
(2013) also observes among political activists in Lebanon. In Cairo’s cafés, 
as in Beirut’s bars, actions such as paying for the rounds of drinks, offer-
ing to buy fūl sandwiches “to go” or lending a mobile phone contributed to 
the daily exchanges that helped to maintain friendship relations. Over the 
Internet, befriending or defriending someone on Facebook, liking and com-
menting on another’s postings or sharing Twitter messages, contributed to 
similar processes of exchange in the virtual spaces. In both realms, if these 
social and economic exchanges were not reciprocated when the occasion 
arose to do so, it would be seen in a detrimental light and possibly generate 
rifts between friends. 
5.2.3. On social proximity
As noted earlier, political activism involved a learning curve for young 
Cairenes, and many became conscious about the boundaries of their pri-
vate and public selves which they enacted on a daily basis when being and 
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doing things with others. We are thus concerned with culturally specific 
veils of privacy and intimacy – or emotional “proximity zones” (Castrén 
and Lonkila 2004) – between the self and the other which were an aspect 
of the learning processes involved in political activism in the late Mubarak 
era (see Section 4.2.). Some friends can be closer than others, but adopting 
universal scales for measuring the experiences of closeness in friendship 
relations would be misplaced in ethnographic inquiry (Bell and Coleman 
1999a; Desai and Killick 2013a). However, in the volatile circumstances in 
which young activists lived, acted and experienced politics, coupled with 
the constant threat of security infiltration and surveillance, one of the most 
meaningful activities was to recreate the bonds between trusted friends 
on a regular basis. In other words, it was important to keep the circles of 
trust and solidarity intact, and out of harm’s way, which involved regular 
social interactions and different forms of investment – emotional, social and 
economic – in order to keep the group going. The management of social 
proximities ran parallel with other notions of social relations such as zamīl 
(“colleague” or “fellow” in a group or movement), rafīq (“comrade” in 
Leftist circles), akhī (“my brother”) or ukhtī (“my sister”), and these could 
be used interchangeably at times. Nonetheless, they draw attention to the 
differential relationships, including affective and corporate relations, that 
young activists maintained on a daily basis, while also harnessing different 
senses of sociability.42
“Friends and acquaintances”
Undoubtedly, different activists cultivate their own views of, and categories 
for friendship which may transgress social cleavages and attributes such as 
age, gender and class, and I do not claim to understand them all. But, with 
a view to the contested field of youth activism, let me recall what Ahmed 
had to say about friendship over the summer of 2008 when he explicated 
what he saw as a clear distinction between two forms of friendships that 
prevailed among young activists, namely, acquaintanceship (‘ilāqa, lit. a 
“relation”) and friendship (ṣadāqa). He explained that young activists usu-
ally have a large number of acquaintances with whom they meet regularly 
and engage in oppositional activities. They may appear to be close friends 
but their alliances are mostly forged in order to defend specific political 
42  I follow here Allan’s conceptualization of sociability, as “the way in which informal relationships 
are routinely organised and patterned and the boundaries that are constructed around these relation-
ships, defining what is included and excluded” (Allan 1989: 148).
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positions or opinions and, especially, to pursue their personal interests 
(maṣāliḥ shakhṣiyya). Thus, acquaintances stand in contrast to what Ahmed 
sees as true friendship, which is characterized by mutual loyalty, affection 
or love (ḥubb) and genuine interest in the other’s wellbeing. In comparison, 
Ahmed’s view of acquaintances is that they are more instrumental and often 
constituted in opposition to others. Such relations, he contended, usually 
last as long as the grounds for these tactical alliances are in place, but, in 
the politicked and fast-paced sphere of youth activism, acquaintances often 
prove interstitial, giving way to new alliances. 
Ahmed’s practical knowledge about the division between the two modes 
of friendship – that could be termed instrumental and affective – resonates 
with my own observations of daily interactions among the young opposi-
tion activists. Because genuine trust and loyalties were so scarce in the poli-
ticked environment, some – especially the more experienced with “activist 
credibility” – were resolved on the subject of whom they consider their close 
friends. “We are not friends, but we know each other” (iḥnā mish aṣḥāb bas 
‘ārifīn ba‘ḍ); or “I know him/her” (anā ‘ārifuh/hā); or “he is close to me” 
(huwwa ’urayyib minnī) were common claims in terms of relationships with 
others, with the effect that these kind of attributes also contributed to shared 
understandings of the composition of informal networks at the micro-level. 
To draw on Ahmed’s practical knowledge: young activists could have 
numerous acquaintances but they did not necessarily disclose their inner 
feelings, personal matters or their real interests in everyone’s company. For 
example, as a researcher or at best as a “partial insider”, I sometimes heard 
things, even mundane details, about persons with which some of their daily 
associates were not cognizant. From afar, a group of young activists could 
seem close friends at times but the boundaries between them were usually 
mutually known. It was seldom that those who did not know one another 
well asked about each other’s private lives, including where they lived and 
what their parents did for living, without crossing the line into what was 
considered personal and therefore inappropriate for conversation between 
acquaintances. 
At the time, Ahmed did not personally know Muhammad, the blogger-
activist, though he had followed him online and talked to him a couple of 
times. While respecting the latter’s courage and self-sacrifice in the anti-
Mubarak movement, he had reservations in case talking with him made 
him doubt religion. Ahmed and Umar, on the other hand, knew one another 
through mutual friends and they would all frequent Al-Bursa during my 
fieldwork in summer 2008. While not being precisely “close” friends, they 
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would at times sit around the same table. Although Ahmed was at the time 
critical of April 6 Youth, he still considered himself a member and, while 
taking time to see the direction in which the initiative was developing, he 
still defended the nascent group against outside criticism. One evening, 
Umar, disparaging April 6 Youth’s claim to “non-ideology”, joked repeat-
edly with Ahmed, trying to win over his allegiance in a bidding war. He 
started from 20 L.E. (2.5 EUR) though during the evening his bid rose to 
500 L.E, insinuating that an April 6 Youth activist would be for sale. At 
Umar’s last bid, Ahmed quickly bantered back to the Nasserist: “For five 
hundred, I can sell my soul – but not my intelligence!” 
In August 2008, I found myself sitting in a downtown café with a group 
of young partisan activists that comprised an unusual gathering of young 
Communists, Nasserists, and more Islamist-oriented youth around the same 
table. I had interviewed some of them, while others I knew more as friends. 
Amr, a leftist journalist, joked: “Look, Henri has gathered his own shilla 
here!” We found this observation funny and laughed, and I even felt a bit 
proud of this social achievement. Soon afterwards, however, Umar noted 
that only the day before Amr had refused to sit with them at the same table. 
A few moments later, Amr told his child in sarcastic tones to move away 
from someone else who was present so as not to absorb “bad influences” 
from him. It was not the cheeriest of gatherings and I am almost certain 
that, without my presence, they would not have voluntarily spent that half 
evening together. Amr’s remark about “Henri’s shilla” was informative, 
however, highlighting the term as a specific form of sociability and group 
membership that sheds some light on the dynamics of coalition politics 
among young activists in Egypt.
5.3. NEGOTIATING SOCIAL BOUNDARIES 
One central characteristic of friendship relations in the “late advanced soci-
eties” of the West is, Allan suggests, that it is rarely institutionalized in any 
meaningful manner (Allan 1989: 4), thereby drawing attention to situations 
where becoming a friend does not involve “rituals” and where friendship 
relations are constantly changing. At the same time, he notes: “There may be 
no clear-cut rules governing friendship, but there are cultural scripts about 
the ways in which friend relationships should be structured” (Allan 1989: 
99; Bell and Coleman 1999b: 11). In other words, friendship relations may 
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not involve rituals per se in many parts of the world, but still some forms of 
friendship are more institutionalized than others. In addition, as Jo Freeman 
(1973) suggests, the ideals of equality and “structureless” self-organization 
abound in emancipatory social and political movements. In her case these 
refer to the 1960s’ feminist movement in the United States, though these 
were challenged by different notions of tasks, power, prestige, social stand-
ing, talents as well as pre-existing friendship groups.
5.3.1. Shilla as an informal network
In Egypt, shilla (pl. shilal) refers to a relatively persistent form of group for-
mation that is best translated as “group of friends” or “clique”.43 As a social 
institution it enables the sanctioning of friendship relations within a small 
group of individuals, and against other shilla formations. In a general sense, 
shilla in Egypt refers to a close-knit group of friends who got to know each 
other at university, in the army and so on, and who continue to meet regu-
larly over time, in some cases throughout their lives, providing mutual loy-
alties, assistance and exchange in the form of job offers, flat arrangements 
and other services (muqāyḍa). A closer look, for instance, into connections 
among political elites after independence reveals that the leading mem-
bers of the Free Officers, including Nasser, Sadat and Field-Marshal Amer, 
belonged to the same graduation group (duf‘a) at the Military Academy in 
the late 1930s, laying the basis for the strategic generation that ruled Egypt 
in the post-independence era (Springborg 1975; Migdal 2001). In the 2000s, 
opposition activists occasionally characterized the Mubarak-era political 
elite as shilla fāsida, or the “corrupt shilla”, while “Gamal’s shilla” referred 
to the group of Gamal’s associates, including those in the NDP’s Policies 
Committee. These reflect the long history of elite recruitment and political 
appointments in Egypt and the role of shilla and duf‘a-based loyalties as the 
strategy used by ruling elites to recreate personal authoritarian rule in Egypt 
(Springborg 1975; Kassem 2004a; Migdal 2001).
In existing literature, shilal are often mentioned together with duf‘a as 
two informal forms of sociability and networking in Egypt that cut across 
43  As I write this, the etymology of shilla has been difficult to ascertain. Some sources indicate 
that Arabs “invaders” used it in a denigratory way in late 19th century to denote Berber tribes as 
“outcasts” in North Africa (Cunninghame Graham 1997 [1898]: 111). On the other hand, Hinds and 
Badawi (1986: 476) suggest that its Egyptian usage derives from the same root as shalla, or “hank” 
or “skein”, which would in a way emphasize the “inward entanglement” of interpersonal relations 
which shilla formations often involve.
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organizational and bureaucratic structures and connect their members 
through mutual support, loyalty and obligation. However, shilal are often 
mentioned in passing, predominantly in the context of public political life, 
as a way of explaining the persistent clientelism or corrupt practices behind 
the public façade of formal organizations (e.g. Reid 1980; Johnston 1986; 
Rubinstein 1998). These accounts border, unwittingly or not, on a norma-
tive venture to locate the corrupt practices and persisting primordial ties 
in society that somehow hinder the functioning of democratic institutions 
or even undermine modernity at large. In this context, the salience of an 
instrumental mode of friendship is presented as the main dimension of 
shilla formations. Others, who take a more balanced view and acknowledge 
the complex processes of state formation and overlapping modalities of 
collective action in postcolonial societies, argue for the centrality of these 
informal networks in Egypt’s public political life (Springborg 1975; Migdal 
2001). For instance, Ayubi emphasizes the role of shilla as “the most sig-
nificant informal bond in contemporary Egyptian society” (Ayubi 1980: 
467-468, op. cit. in Dawoud 2011: 156), while Joel Migdal confirms the 
role of shilla-based loyalties in high-level state appointments, noting, in a 
more general sense, that Egyptians tend to consider it as a kind of “family” 
whose membership is clearly defined: “There is no question of who is part 
of the group and who is not” (Migdal 2001: 76). Springborg (1975, 1978), 
who has written relatively extensively on shilla formations in Egyptian pol-
itics in the post-independence era, describes them in the context of Egyptian 
trade unions as:
… small groups of friends united by bonds of personal, economic, 
and/or political interest is shilla. It is shillas, rather than large for-
mal organizations - - - that perform crucial functions in the Egyp-
tian political system. (Springborg 1978: 275-276)
Sakr (2002: 842), in turn, emphasizes the gendered character of shilla 
formations in the professional field of journalism, where recruitment takes 
place largely through informal channels. In this context, they appear as 
male-dominated “cliques”, that could be best translated as “old boy net-
works” whose members exchange information, news tips and job oppor-
tunities within closed social circles and thus reproduce the patriarchal 
privileges and hierarchies common to Egyptian journalism.44 Indeed, most 
44  In her study on localized social identities in Cairo’s popular quarters, El-Messiri also translates 
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writers emphasize the aspect of instrumental relations underlying shilla for-
mations, in similar ways to how quanxi relationships in China are generally 
treated (Smart 1999). As a characterization it is partly true: in the absence 
of direct access to formal bureaucracies, people continue to rely on informal 
networks, their friends, and duf‘a- and shilla-based solidarities as vehicles 
for pursuing their interests or the services they need.
5.3.2. Aspects of everyday sociality
Against this background, de Koning (2009) offers a refreshing account of 
shilal in her ethnography of upper-middle-class youth in contemporary 
Cairo. To begin with, de Koning does not place shilla on a normative con-
tinuum between democratic and undemocratic practices but, rather, equates 
it with a “group of good friends” in the lives of young, affluent and in many 
ways privileged urban professionals. They meet almost on a daily basis, 
exchange news, opinions and gossip in the modern, Western-style cafés and 
other cosmopolitan milieus in the global city of Cairo. Their shilal provide 
members with their principal social circles in which to enjoy and experience 
life and their rather exclusive tastes and senses of cosmopolitan belong-
ing. Although de Koning does not elaborate the social institution of shilla 
beyond “group of friends”, her detailed account of the everyday loyalties 
and friendship relations between young professionals affirms understand-
ings of Ali’s localized shilla near Haram street (see above): shilla forma-
tions can be as much about everyday conviviality as about politics. 
In other words, shilal also play a role in the more recreational spheres 
in the lives of young Egyptians when they revolve around certain purposes 
such as sport, football, music and other leisure activities. It was common-
place, for example, to see groups of young men and women, normally not 
exceeding ten in number, in the public and semi-public spaces of Cairo. 
However, while they may have arrived together at a park, a café, a shopping 
mall or along the Nile Corniche, sooner or later they disbanded into couples 
who sat and chatted in pairs at a distance, at times holding hands. The recre-
ational shilal, common among university students, highlight socially sanc-
tioned forms of mixed-gender gathering which channel friendship as well 
as courtship practices. 
shilla as a “clique” in the more recreational sense (El-Messiri 1978: 109). She shows that, at the turn 
of 19th and 20th century, local male residents in the butchers’ quarter of al-Husainiya would join a 
“clique” whose members shared their taste for wine and hashish parties every night (ibid.: 66).
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In this sense, they can involve substantial peer pressure and demands 
for conformity. Zuhur (1992) argues in the context of the Islamic revival 
that friendship groups based on shilla and duf‘a solidarities were crucial in 
the spread of veiling practices among young women in Egypt in the 1980s. 
Zuhur’s observation provides a complementary view of the practices of eth-
ical self-formation that the women members of a Salafist piety movement in 
Cairo adopted, as a way to better embody religious mores and to conform to 
public piety (Mahmood 2005). According to Zuhur, shilla and duf‘a forms 
of reciprocity, which are “extremely common and popular in Egypt”, do not 
involve only peer pressure or mutual interests but, importantly, “social con-
nections, fallbacks, introductions to mates, and favour exchanges. Young 
women and men feel an essential need to ‘belong’ inside or outside the fam-
ily circle” (Zuhur 1992: 105-106).
For our discussion, it is interesting to note that, after Youth for Change 
had dissolved, Egyptian researcher Abdelrahman (2007: 189) observed that 
the main pattern for the emergence of “Kifaya youth” was in the form of 
sporadic and scattered shilal, which involved forging new friendship rela-
tions outside the party structures. Indeed, he suggests viewing shilla sociali-
ties in parallel with more corporatist relations and party affiliations: 
This intimate period of shilla formations (al-ḥāla al-shilaliyya 
al-ḥamīma) was remembered by the majority with a deep sense of 
nostalgia for the past that, in comparison, seems far distant from 
the present state of recession (ḥālat al-rukūd al-ḥāliyya) which is 
dominated by partisan activities.45
5.3.3. An insight into coalition politics
We have seen already that collective actions within youth movements, espe-
cially in terms of coalition building, were prone to internal factionalism 
when issues of public prestige and social hierarchies came into play. Some, 
like Islam, tried to form youth coalitions in vain, claimed that sectarian-
ism (ṭā’ifiyya) persisted between certain political groups. In general, we 
have seen that the more leverage and membership youth movements gained 
in public life, the more prone they were to breaking up, observations that 
correspond with the analytic division Springborg (1975) makes between 
45  Translation from Arabic is mine.
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organic and political shilal. In general, he suggests that organic shilal are 
important forms of collectivity and collective action in forging horizontal 
relations between people but, as soon as they get entangled in vertical rela-
tions of power and patronage in public life, shilla-based solidarities come 
under strain. These shilla types correspond, but do not correlate with both 
Ahmed’s division between acquaintances and friendships, as well as dif-
fering modes of sociability, namely, instrumental and affective relations. It 
seems, indeed, that creating and maintaining social boundaries in political 
life involves acts of power and an exclusion/inclusion dynamic. 
At the same time, being exclusive could at times serve to maintain rela-
tions of trust and solidarity – prime values of friendship in political life 
– within small social circles. Some of the “newcomer” activists in the late 
2000s in particular characterized the groups of experienced activists as 
exclusive. “They like to have their own space,” one told me, indicating that 
he considered their social circles distant and exclusive. During my time in 
Egypt, rival groups would sometimes characterize each other as shilal, har-
nessing rather negative connotations with the term. In these contexts, they 
appear as exclusive social circuits in which everyday socialities and soli-
darities are maintained, distributed and experienced in the course of specific 
purposes, political goals or personal interests. It is however problematic 
to describe political shilal in great detail. On the one hand, I concur with 
Springborg that “it is difficult for an observer, or indeed, even for a partici-
pant in Egyptian elite politics, to successfully monitor changes in personal 
alliance networks, for shilal periodically fragment, giving rise to new com-
binations of alliances, and individual commitments are never total” (Spring-
borg 1978: 275-276). Political shilal, thus characterized, were indeed 
exclusive, and often formed around shared interests and against other alli-
ance networks, but their degree of internal cohesion was, and still is, often 
based on outsiders’ speculations or moral statements. Partly for this reason, 
it would run counter to research ethics to describe in detail which activists 
or groups were seen as “shilla politicians” by others.
On the face of it, shilal appear as informal networks which mediate per-
sonal and collective experiences of reciprocity, solidarity and obligation 
and which can be operationalized as “the framework for effective politi-
cal, social, and economic action” (Eickelman 2002: 319).46 In other words, 
46  As such, shilla formations echo other forms of informal structures that connect private lives with 
public political life in other parts of the world, such as equipos (teams) in Mexico, panelinhas (little 
saucepans) in Brazil, diwaniyas (salon debates) in Kuwait and dawrahs (circle) in Iran (Springborg 
1978: 275; Eickelman 2002: 318-320).
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sometimes their members meet for recreation and leisure and, at other 
times, for more predetermined collective action in pursuit of their particu-
laristic goals. Belonging to a shilla potentially secures its members, through 
informal channels, resource-full, yet exclusive, everyday connectedness – 
or wāsṭa – to associational life and formal political institutions. At a mini-
mum, the shilla-based friendships help to unravel some of the dynamics 
in coalition politics in Egypt’s political life, and also among the young. 
Before concluding, however, it needs to be emphasized that I am cautious 
about advancing exotic accounts of shilla formation or presenting them as 
cultural features of Middle Eastern exceptionalism. Practices, such as the 
political appointment and recruitment of trusted friends, or helping old 
“school mates” in their pursuit of a job, a partner or an apartment, also hap-
pen elsewhere. In this sense, shilal defy single definitions and are structured 
by larger processes of social change in the neoliberal era, such as the rapid 
expansions in the use of the Internet and social media, the prolonged period 
of being young, differential access to urban spaces and the globally circulat-
ing youth cultures. Shilal, just as with friendship networks more generally, 
cut across different arenas of collective life including family, workplace, 
studies and politics. Given that experiences of belonging to one, or several, 
may differ from person to person, and from group to group, it is less fruit-
ful to view shilla formations as having a fixed logic of micro-level con-
gregation and collective action that resists time or place, than as a form of 
belonging and doing things together.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, I have acknowledged that engaging in public political life in 
the late 2000s provided much more varied experiences for young Cairenes 
than merely the acts of dissent which represented rather periodic events. 
Importantly, it also involved participating in a dissident lifestyle that incor-
porated sharing moments of being and doing things with others on a daily 
basis. In the absence of representative political institutions, the experiences 
of having friends and being a friend to others offered intimate avenues to 
public political life that stretched beyond kin ties and formal organiza-
tions. Although the field of youth activism was in many ways divided along 
lines of class, gender and political affiliation, the young could forge mutual 
grounds for friendship relations on the basis of their shared tastes, lifestyle 
choices and mutual respect for exemplary public figures. The shared experi-
ences, especially those of youthful resistance and injustice, such as prison 
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cell stories, could connect young activists despite the group divisions and 
ideological strife that was prevalent in the political opposition. Oftentimes 
fallout from potential differences of opinion could also be avoided through 
treating one another with respect and reciprocity. Furthermore, despite the 
decisive role of the ICTs and social media in mediating friendship rela-
tions in the late 2000s, the daily need for “face-to-face” social interactions 
remained important due to the politicized and policed circumstances in 
which they lived. In this context, safeguarding the bonds of trust, belonging 
and everyday solidarity – the ideal values of friendship – were highly mean-
ingful daily activities. The processes of internal strife bestowed somewhat 
particular exigencies, opportunities and challenges to the social interactions 
among young activists, and, therefore, an important aspect of being young 
activist was also to learn how to negotiate one’s public self in political life. 
In this context, shilla formations provided the young with informal net-
works that coincided with partisan and organizational affiliations in Egypt’s 
public political life. On the other hand, they also provided intimately felt 
sites for friendship and everyday belonging in the lives of young Cairenes, 
the creation of which was conditioned by political and economic con-
straints, and their members’ differentiated opportunities and tastes for cer-
tain lifestyles and leisure activities. Nonetheless, when shilal were formed 
in the politicized context of youth activism, they became the recipients of 
increasingly ambivalent and negative connotations as vehicles for pursu-
ing personal interests and shared goals while being subject to shifting alli-
ances. While oscillating between the informal and formal areas of public 
political life, shilal mediated both affective and instrumental connections 
as the basis of friendship relations within close social circles. The concomi-
tant notions of personal interests, however, point to the ethical dimension of 
youth activism in the late Mubarak era, an issue which will be the subject of 
the next chapter.
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6 LIFE AS FREEDOM
In February 2011, at the height of Egypt’s popular uprising on Tahrir 
Square, I witnessed several moments when protesters, usually groups of 
young men, spontaneously burst into singing a famous line from a poem of 
Ahmed Fouad el-Negm (1929-2013). The original version, written in 1969, 
begins as follows:
al-gada‘ gada‘ wa-l-gabān gabān 
The brave man is brave, and the coward a coward.  
bīna yā gada‘, haninzil al-mīdān 
Let’s go you brave ones, down to the battle front.
al-midān ba‘īd, min gawf al-madīna 
The front is far away, beyond the inner [depths of] the city.
Yā tār ish-shahīd, Dīr Yasīn wa Sīnā 
Oh (you are) the martyr’s revenge, Deir Yassin and Sinai. 47
El-Negm wrote this particular poem at the height of the student pro-
test movements while in jail. At the time, it expressed the popular disil-
lusionment and widespread sense of national loss after Egypt’s defeat by 
47  The direct reference to Dir Yasin, a Palestinian village stormed by Zionist militias in 1948, draws 
parallels between Sinai and the occupation of Palestine in1448. Deir Yassin and Sinai are highly 
symbolic sites of Arab defeat under the Zionist project of the Israeli state. The Palestinian village of 
Deir Yasin was occupied by Israeli forces in 1948, and Sinai was lost in the 1967 war to Israel, where 
Egypt was defeated. The translation into English is mine, with a view to conserving as much of the 
literal translation of the words as possible.
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Israel in the 1967 war (Abdalla 2000). It called upon Egyptians to fulfil 
their national duty and to do their share in regaining the occupied land. El-
Negm became notorious for his sharp social critique and political commen-
tary, often mocking the political elites and better-off members of society, 
using the Egyptian dialect and vernacular expressions rather than Classi-
cal Arabic. His verses were performed by the singer and composer Sheikh 
Imam, and the concerts and recordings of this “revolutionary couple” had 
become an integral part of the collective experience and moral landscape of 
the Left-oriented opposition since the turbulent 1970s. But, it was not only 
their political messages that gained them popularity and moral approval. 
They also chose to live modestly in the popular quarters of Cairo “like any 
other” despite having had the opportunity to become rich and famous on the 
condition that they soften their language (Hindi 1979; Beinin 1994; Booth 
2009). Both had been imprisoned several times since the 1960s for inciting 
the masses, and Imam’s recordings were banned from state media for over 
four decades under the rule of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. Their songs con-
tinued to circulate among political dissenters, however, via word of mouth, 
cassette tapes and, later, CDs and the Internet.
In 2011, the protesters on Tahrir Square appropriated these lines, yet 
added something of their own, for instance:
al-gada‘ gada‘ wa-l-gabān gabān 
The brave man is brave, and the coward a coward. 
bīna yā gada‘, hanu‘’ud fi-l-mīdān 
Let’s go you brave ones, let’s stay on the square. 
In the Egyptian dialect, the term al-mīdān – as in Midan el-Tahrir (Liber-
ation Square) – has a dual meaning which has at times escaped journalistic 
accounts of the revolutionary moment (e.g Young 2013). In the original ver-
sion, it refers mainly to the “battle front” where Egyptians should fight to 
regain the losses suffered by the military during the Six-Day War and, most 
notably, the loss of the Sinai Peninsula to Israeli occupation, but in 2011 
Egyptian protesters exhibited their flexibility towards poetry as a subver-
sive cultural resource.48  In the middle of a revolution, they emphasized the 
48  Protesters in other countries, like Tunisia, also resorted to subversive poetry at the important 
junctures of popular revolutions in 2011 (e.g. Colla 2012). These practices of using pre-existing sym-
bolic resources have also been analyzed in the context of other popular uprisings in 2011, prompting, 
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second meaning of al-mīdān (as in “public square”) and urged fellow pro-
testers to stay put on Tahrir Square, which had become the symbolic hub of 
the popular revolution. That the two registers of meaning – battle front and 
public square – would collude so seamlessly in 2011 was not arbitrary:  they 
were a perfect fit with the revolutionary ethos of the time.49 On January 28, 
the protesters had succeeded in reoccupying Tahrir Square and defending 
their position against Central Security forces and, on February 2, they had 
gained a victory in the “battle of the camel” against Mubarak’s support-
ers. Since then, “staying put” had been their primary political act. Public 
squares, circumscribed as they were under the Mubarak regime, now repre-
sented the principal physical spaces for heroic virtues and bravery, popular 
resistance and shared attempts to regain dignity for the Egyptian people.
*   *   *
In this final chapter, I inquire into the ethical dimensions of public dissent 
among young activists and explore more closely the makings of the “critical 
consciousness” (Andrews 2002) prevalent among them in the late 2000s. 
While there is no doubt that they collectively wished for greater justice, 
rights, democratic pluralism and the end of Mubarak’s presidency, their 
everyday lives were filled with a number of ethical considerations concern-
ing what they should do, how to act with others, and why they had engaged 
in opposition politics in the first place: dilemmas which were not only about 
right and wrong, but also addressed the circumstances of living under an 
authoritarian form of rule in which personal involvement in public politi-
cal dissent entailed the potential for immediate risks, and repercussions in 
their future lives. In this vein of exploration, I begin with a general overview 
of the broad public claims which framed the anti-regime attitudes of young 
activists as members of the wider anti-Mubarak mobilization in the late 2000s. 
for instance, Bouzoita to use Umberto Eco’s notion of “semiotic guerrillas” to characterize Tunisian 
artists who reappropriated and reinterpreted the national anthem in the run-up period to the Tunisian 
revolution (Bouzoita 2013: 290-291).
49  It can be argued that Negm’s original poem also played with the two registers of meaning at 
the turn of the 1970s and the 1960s. The call for al-mīdān that lies far from al-madīna can also be 
interpreted to insinuate that the students should move from the campuses – or the student dormitories 
(madīnat al-ṭalaba) – and occupy central squares in downtown Cairo. At the time, this represented a 
concrete debate among student activists. For instance, when Sadat ordered the CSF to arrest Leftist 
students at campuses in January 1972, thousands of students marched on downtown areas, including 
Tahrir Square, and the CSF were unable to curb their protests (Abdalla 2008: 183-184). According to 
Abdalla, it was “the first occasion on which President Sadat had had to face street riots, and it set a 
precedent which he never forgave or forgot” (ibid.: 183).
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In the second section, I look more closely at the social and moral worlds in 
which they were embedded and the prevailing notions of courage, self-sac-
rifice and optimism that were considered prerequisites for continuing their 
oppositional engagements. In the third section, I discuss the different practi-
cal decisions and judgements that the young faced making when engaging 
in public political life in the late Mubarak era. 
6.1. DEFENDING THE NATION
In the run-up to the 2011 uprisings, young activists would, by and large, claim 
to be true patriots. It was a position that was often expressed through depic-
tions of the potential Egypt has in terms of natural resources, cultural innova-
tion and its important role in the history of humanity as the “cradle of human 
civilization”; in everyday parlance it was often expressed through a deep love 
of Egypt. At the same time, their claims for social justice (‘adāla ijtimā‘iyya), 
freedom (ḥurriyya) and dignified life (ḥayā karīma) also run deep in popular 
imageries of Egyptians as a people who have lived for centuries, if not millen-
nia, under the rule of centralized powers that have for the most part been, if 
not foreign to, then at the least exploitative of its social fabric. 
According to Amr (23), the young student from Giza, Egyptians are “by 
nature” very resilient people who have lived and survived from Pharaonic 
rule to the Ottoman Empire, and from European colonialism to the era of 
Mubarak, and continue to live, even if beaten to the ground, by eating its 
soil. Strong patriotic sentiments did not only prevail among the Left-ori-
ented youth, in Marxist, Nasserist and Arab Nationalist circles, but also 
among Liberals and Islamists. Emad (23), a blogger who had once been 
affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, explained his patriotism to me 
in 2008 with a famous quote by Mustafa Kamel (1874-1908), one of the 
heroes of Egyptian nationalism in the early 20th century: “If I wasn’t an 
Egyptian, I would wish to be an Egyptian.”
In July 2008, I talked to Arif, who had recently joined the April 6 Youth 
Movement. For him, as with other members I encountered, the main task 
for the nascent group was to raise Egyptians’ political awareness, since they 
deserve much better than the “gang” (‘aṣāba) that governs them through 
“corruption and tyranny”:
We do it because it’s the right of our generation to try to take its 
role (yakhuṭ dawruh), and regardless of whether we succeed or 
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not, we will leave this experience for the generation that comes 
after us (hansīb tagruba li-l-gīl illī ba‘dinā) who can continue 
until we can make Egypt into a much better place (makān ’afḍal 
kitīr).
The sense of frustration I encountered among opposition activists can 
be regarded as deep, shared sentiments of injured patriotism: the Egyptian 
people were being plundered before their very eyes, and their resources and 
land were being “stolen” for the benefit of political and business elites and 
their associates abroad.50 During the global financial crisis in 2008, public 
outrage over the “bread crisis” and the coinciding labour protests – which 
overshadowed the early stages of my main fieldwork and led to the emer-
gence of the April 6 Youth Movement – represented for young activists yet 
further confirmation of a complex set of predicaments that inflicted contem-
porary society. Various events and localized disasters (kawārith), such as the 
sinking of the Al-Salama Boccaccio 98 in the Red Sea in February 2006 – a 
ferry carrying some 1,400 passengers, mainly Egyptian migrant workers, to 
Saudi Arabia; the landslide in al-Duweiqa in September 2008; and localized 
farmers’ protests against the privatization of land, coupled with widespread 
problems in healthcare, traffic, pollution and public education, all fed into a 
collective sense of protracted and escalating crisis (azma). In the aftermath 
of the al-Mahalla al-Kubra uprising, as the media had conveyed stories of 
impoverished Egyptians being killed during scuffles in front of bakeries, 
one activist noted that the government had made a “fatal mistake” (ghalṭa 
mumīta) because it had encroached on the loaf of bread – the symbolic and 
de facto staple food of most impoverished Egyptians.
Sentiments of this kind were hardly the prerogative of members of the 
political opposition. During my fieldwork in Egypt, encounters with Egyp-
tians in buses, public parks and on the street produced similar conclusions: 
their society and livelihoods were deteriorating by the day and the authori-
ties were either incapable or unwilling to act in the best interests of the 
country. The sense of impending crisis was linked to one of injustice due to 
the impunity of those who were seen as responsible for it. In 2007, Emad 
Siyam – a Leftist intellectual affiliated with the Kifaya movement – charac-
terized the grumblingly contested legitimacy of Mubarak’s regime and the 
political “dead-end” as follows:
50  Arriving at this analysis is supported by reading a number of articles written by opposition politi-
cians (e.g. Qandil 2005; Sha‘ban 2006; Kifaya 2005).
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The survival of the regime of tyranny and corruption now relies, 
alongside its oppressive security services and arsenal of freedom-
restricting laws, on a political culture none other than that of 
despotism and scaremongering that prevailed over many decades. 
This culture has succeeded in doing away with all resistance on 
the part of opposition groups and movements, and in destroy-
ing the institutions through which they would have been able to 
express themselves and voice their political and social demands, 
independently or collectively. The citizen became a mere individ-
ual in the face of the full might of the state and its instruments of 
tyranny, forcing everyone to buckle under, accept the fait accom-
pli and learn to live with it. (Cited in Sha‘ban 2007)
In the 2000s, voicing dissenting views, especially in public space, was 
constrained by the state to the point that opposition groups sometimes 
framed Mubarak’s position at the apex of political power in terms of a 
present-day “pharaoh”, thereby connoting not only his centralized politi-
cal clout but also his old, if not “ancient”, age. These claims also implied a 
refusal to see Mubarak through the imagery of a “just tyrant”; that is, one 
who rules by force but defends the wellbeing of his subjects by, at the very 
least, providing order in society – a role that had, according to some, har-
nessed a degree of popular acceptance of authoritarian rule in the Middle 
East (e.g. Korany 1994).51 
The background to discontent thus exhibited the fragile legitimacy of the 
Mubarak regime and the argument that it did not represent Egyptians and, 
indeed, barely acknowledged its responsibilities towards them (Albrecht 
2013: 24-36). In some ways, the rhetoric of the prodemocracy movements 
comprised a statement by the urban middle-classes that they needed to 
defend the Egyptian nation from further peril at the hands of an oppressive 
and unjust regime. The imagery of the Egyptian people (al-sha‘b al-maṣrī) 
51  Egyptian political scientist Bahgat Korany observed in the 1990s that the stagnant political life of 
Middle Eastern countries was connected with their aging leadership (Korany 1994). At the time, he 
argued that the popular legitimacy of public authorities – especially in “rentier states” – was partly 
based on religious notions of a “just autocrat” which helped the public authorities to claim hegemony 
over public political life: “The influence of this hegemony could even go deeper to influence the col-
lective mind and reinforce people’s dependence on the state. For the state becomes the sole provider 
of collective and individual goods as well as of political order. Did not Ibn Taymiya [1263-1328] 
inform the people that 60 years under the authority of a just tyrant is better than one night without 
government? No wonder, then, that segments of Arab political discourse are littered with descriptions 
of the enlightened dictator, the heroic leader, the exceptional Za‘im and revered head of the family.” 
(ibid.: 511)  
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– and the average “Egyptian citizen” (muwāṭin maṣrī or ‘ādī), at the core of 
which lay the male individual – served as an imagined community (Ander-
son 1991) that was increasingly disenchanted and impoverished under 
Mubarak’s rule, and paying the price, in terms of livelihoods, dignity and 
future chances, for a societal trajectory which only benefited the few. The 
notion of “the people” is central to nationalist sensibilities of emancipation 
and resonates powerfully in everyday discourse with the popular or work-
ing classes, impoverished as they were during Mubarak’s presidency, while 
also providing a reminder of their revolutionary potential. Lockman (1994: 
182) suggests that the notion of “people” was adopted by early-20th-century 
Egyptian nationalists, such as Mustafa Kamel, to mobilize the masses into 
the liberation movement with the aim of evoking a “desirable frisson of 
populism, of heroic virtue, of activism, of a democratic, egalitarian, and 
possibly even revolutionary inclination.” 
In the 2000s, the claims of the anti-Mubarak movements would also tap 
into social histories of popular resistance (muqāwama sha‘biyya) to out-
side oppressors, including British colonial rule in the pre-independence era; 
Britain, France or Israel during the Suez Crisis in 1956; the Israeli occupa-
tion of Sinai – as well as Gaza, the Golan Heights and the West Bank – in 
1967.52 Hence, just as the 2000s’ anti-Mubarak mobilization encompassed 
the formation of critical awareness among Egyptians, it encompassed these 
junctures in the national past and also informed the moral exigencies of 
“losing fear” and “taking our right” (nakhud ḥaqqinā) that prevailed among 
the activists who talked to me prior to 2011. Being interrelated, these nor-
mative claims encouraged a subversive analysis of the present in which the 
incumbent authorities would not voluntarily give citizens the formal rights 
or entitlements which they are due on the basis of law and the constitution, 
accompanied by a shared conviction that they must be fought for.
These sensibilities of injured patriotism, fused with the moralities of 
reclaiming dignity, are the lens through which I interpret the Egyptian pro-
testers’ two central messages at the crucial junctures of the popular upris-
ings in early 2011 (Onodera 2011a). Among the protesters, the resolved 
sense of togetherness and purpose was at moments almost tangible, with the 
slogan “the people want the regime down!” (al-sha‘b yurīd isqāṭ al-niẓām) 
comprising the initial and central tenet. It articulated the diverse demands, 
wishes and aspirations of large segments of the population and, simulta-
52  At the World Social Forum 2013 in Tunis a young Cairene explained to me that, due to their 
geographic location at the juncture of wars and national liberation, the Canal cities of Port Said, 
Ismailiya and Suez occupy an important role in this imagery of popular resistance in Egypt.
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neously, constructed anew “the people” – elusive as that notion may be 
(Salvatore 2011) – as the source of public legitimacy and the quintessential 
locus of social change. On the day of Mubarak’s resignation on February 
11, 2011, I witnessed the spontaneous vocal outburst of “Raise your head 
high, you’re an Egyptian!” (irfa‘ ra’sak faw’, inta maṣrī) among the protest-
ers. Again, it echoed the past, specifically one of Nasser’s central slogans in 
the post-independence era – “Raise your head high, the age of imperialism 
is over” – implying that similar processes of national liberation were being 
enacted before us (Hatem 2000: 45). It was a moving moment on Tahrir 
Square, bearing witness to the sudden and collective experience of regained 
dignity on the part of Egyptians, and thereby expressing a two-way sym-
bolic movement that was instantly ingrained into the revolutionary narra-
tive: the downward fall of an unjust regime and all who represented it, and 
the proudly “erect posture” of an Egyptian.
6.2. “LOCAL” MORAL WORLDS OF YOUTH ACTIVISM
To return to a period when these events were still in the future, the gen-
eral framing of injured patriotism that I described above functioned as a 
main unifying element across the social divisions and cleavages among 
young activists. Importantly, these ideational references were part and par-
cel of oppositional culture – its events, public rhetoric, social networks and 
shared social memories – in which young activists lived their daily lives. In 
this sense, they were simultaneously both socialized by, and contributing 
to, certain “moral worlds” which, as Kleinman proposes, also encompass 
“micromoral settings [that] are particular, intersubjective, and constitutive 
of the lived flow of experience” (Kleinman 1995: 123):
They are not simply reflections of macro-level socioeconomic 
and political forces, through they are strongly influenced by such 
forces. The micro-level politics of social relationships, in the set-
ting of limited resources and life chances, underwrite processes of 
contesting and negotiating actions. Yet micro-contents are not for 
the most part so greatly fragmented or disorganized as to be lack-
ing distinctive forms or coherence. (Ibid.)
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In the 1990s, Kleinman provided an insight in the field of medical 
anthropology that harnessed special attention to the experiences of human 
suffering and illness. At the time, it implied that ethical considerations and 
moral experience were embedded in everyday life and belonging in com-
munities, neighbourhoods and social networks at specific localities (Klein-
man and Kleinman 1996).53 As noted earlier, the new ICTs undermined the 
importance of physical locale for daily communication and interaction, and 
the young activists were increasingly exposed – with some contributing – to 
counter-hegemonic imageries of daily injustice and stories of popular resis-
tance not only across Egypt, but globally. For some, especially the rooted 
cosmopolitans, global cultural flows and transnational activist cultures 
– including the Global Justice Movement and anti-war movements of the 
early 2000s – provided additional references and concrete social networks 
through which to articulate claims for justice, democracy and human rights. 
At the same time, the moral worlds in which they operated also encom-
passed prevailing notions of bravery, commitment and personal integrity 
which had been articulated to oppositional culture since long before the 
events of 2011. 
To return to Negm’s poem quoted above: I had come across it – and its 
central trope, the notion of gada‘ – on a number of occasions before 2011. 
During the 2010 parliamentary elections, for instance, Muhammad – who in 
April 2008 had chastised me for smoking a cigarette while walking – com-
mented that the only candidate who merited his moral approval was Gamila 
Ismail, a former TV presenter and the wife of Ayman Nour, ex-leader of 
the liberal Ghad Party who was in jail at the time: “I don’t agree with her 
politically, but I respect her, she’s a gada‘a”. Ismail was known for her cou-
rageous stand against the state authorities and had led a vocal campaign 
against the NDP’s Hisham Mustafa Khalil, son of the former prime minis-
ter, in the Qasr Al-Nil constituency in downtown Cairo, gathering support 
from young prodemocracy activists. 
I have already mentioned that the Leftist Solidarity Group organized an 
ifṭār party – marking the end of daily fasting – during Ramadan 2008 (see 
Section 4.3.2.). As the event was coming to an end, and most guests had 
already left, an ‘ūd player’s performance of Negm’s poem above reinvigo-
53  Arthur Kleinman (1998: 359) would later modify his conception of local worlds so as to encom-
pass the specificities of the global era, noting that “even in a vast sea of globalization, in which we 
are more acutely aware that local worlds have permeable boundaries, undergo frequent change, and 
that their members may belong to several different networks at the same time – even with these 
qualifications the local perdures as the grounds of social life.”
Henri.vaitos.final.indd   173 18.5.2015   8.55
174
rated the atmosphere through collective song, with everyone but me know-
ing its lyrics by heart.54 On this occasion, and many others, Negm’s poetry 
served as a celebration of political dissent and the virtues of personal com-
mitment, courage and self-sacrifice. In my observation, what was highly 
valued across a broad spectrum of young activists was a personal sense of 
justice: respect for the integrity of speech and action was an issue that trans-
gressed social and ideological boundaries. Rather than being mere abstract 
notions, the virtues of courage, justice and integrity were not only enacted 
in moments of public resistance but also shaped the activists’ social inter-
actions in daily life. In this sense, they represented circulating “normative 
registers” (Schielke 2009) which mediated certain moral qualities in both 
speech and action and, far from settled, shaped the moral terrain on which 
activists positioned both themselves and others.
6.2.1. Ideal traits of bravery and righteousness: Being a gada‘
In the Egyptian dialect, the notion of gada‘ usually refers to a man who has 
one or several of the following characteristics: “nobility of character and 
integrity, intelligence and application, and manly toughness and courage” 
or “fellow, young man” (Badawi and Hinds 1986: 151; e.g. Elyachar 2005: 
137). In Cairo, it traditionally has had forceful impact on the sociabilities 
of working class men and, more generally, on the local moral worlds of 
the popular (sha‘bī) neighbourhoods. In her ethnography of the craftsmen’s 
workshops in Madinat al-Hirafiyeen on the outskirts of Greater Cairo, Julia 
Elyachar (2005) situates the personal traits of gada‘ in the local social and 
economic exchange systems, observing that the personal qualities to which 
the term refers relate to someone who is generous in giving both material 
resources and time to benefit others, and who devotes himself to solving the 
problems of friends, relatives, colleagues and neighbours (Elyachar 2005: 
137-139, 158-161). In a similar vein, Salwa Ismail (2006) emphasizes that 
the notion of gada‘ carries the ideal traits of braveness and toughness that 
prevail among lower-class residents in an informal district of Cairo and 
connects it to “the classical ibn al-balad [son of the country] masculine 
construct of the popular-class male who embodies the spirit of the country” 
(Ismail 2006: 100), referring to Sawsan El-Messiri’s influential ethnography 
54  The ‘ūd is a traditional Middle Eastern string instrument that resembles the European lute. It was 
also played by the singer and composer Sheikh Imam.
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Ibn al-Balad: A concept of Egyptian identity (El-Messiri 1978). El-Messiri 
suggests that the term gad‘ān (plural of gada‘) was used to denote the local-
ized gangs in Cairo’s popular neighbourhoods after the 1919 popular revo-
lution against the British (ibid.: 50, 66-68)55 who were not petty criminals 
(or balṭagiyya) but, rather, the sons of local families and neighbourhoods 
who settled disputes by engaging personally and at times confrontationally 
with adversaries, wrong-doers and outsiders. They were traditionally noto-
rious for:
…their excellence in beating and fighting and [...] specialized in 
protecting those who sought their help. The police used to fear 
them, and prison to them was an honour that they could boast of. 
It is often said to someone who gets imprisoned, “Prison is for the 
gad‘an”, meaning that it is only the strong and the honorable who 
are imprisoned. (Ibid.: 82)
While Negm’s poem promotes gada‘ as the opposite of gabān (cow-
ard) – thereby shedding light on the moral worlds of injured patriotism and 
even the revolutionary ethos of early 2011 (Ghannam 2013) – the traits of 
manhood implied by the term should be viewed in relation to others such 
as kāsib (family breadwinner) and fahlawī  (“clever”, and talented at con-
vincing others) (El-Messiri 1978: 50, 55; Ismail 2006: 100; Ghannam 2013: 
54-57).56 Traditionally the ideal traits of gada‘ combine bravery, a sense of 
justice and caring for others and, as El-Messiri elaborates, apply to “some-
one who knows his duty and is eager to fulfil it” (1978: 50); someone who
…would not tolerate improper behaviour; he would interfere 
to correct it or at least oppose it. This attitude is well expressed 
in the saying, “he takes his rights by his own arms”. He does 
not accept injustice or tyranny and usually stands for the weak 
against the strong. He does not stab his friend in the back or fool 
55  El-Messiri relies here on Ahmed Amin’s book Al-Sa‘laka wa al-Futuwwa fi al-Islam (1952, 
Cairo: Dar al-Ma‘arif) which, at the time of writing, I have not been able to find.
56  Egyptian anthropologist Farha Ghannam (2013: 55) observes that “[W]hile labels like “real 
man” and “gada‘” are desired and aspired to, […] there are other ways of being a man that are 
socially stigmatized and negatively viewed. People use words such as khawwal (submissive), hafa’ 
(insignificant), kheekha (weak or sissified), or ‘ayyil (childish) to describe a man who does not effec-
tively materialize social norms that equate a real man with domination, assertiveness, and decisive-
ness. Other words may include hayyif (trivial, a man who overlooks the important things and makes 
a big issue of trivial ones), hafiyya (nobody, or insignificant), khafeef (not serious, talks too much).”
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him, nor would he strike a person in his own neighbourhood, for 
this would be an improper act of a protector to his guest. (El-
Messiri 1978: 82-83)
During my research, I heard the term gada‘ being used – and at times used 
it myself – as a complimentary term when describing persons. I never heard 
it being used as an auto designation except in collective recitals of Negm’s 
poem which materialized the symbolic weight of the term as a marker of 
ideal “activist virtues”. Those who were simultaneously tough (with the 
police) but just and helpful (towards fellow activists and citizens), who 
abided by their moral principles and were prepared to sacrifice their well-
being to safeguard others, were often respected across organizational lines, 
ideological strife and friendship circles. In this sense, the ideal qualities of 
gada‘ also border on the ideal qualities of a good friend. Among Leftists 
one could hear someone characterise a young Muslim Brother by saying, 
“He’s a Muslim Brother, but still a gada‘” (huwwa ikhwān bas gada‘) as a 
way to downplay mutual differences and rivalries and show respect. These 
value statements, however, predominately targeted the younger generation 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, and bloggers especially, for having voiced pub-
lic criticism against Mubarak’s regime and, importantly, for waging internal 
disputes with the conservative leadership of their own organization.
As I have already suggested, the notion of gada‘ does not refer only 
to the working classes or solely to men. Women activists were also com-
plimented in these terms, as in, “She is a girl but a gada‘a” (hiyya bint 
bas gada‘a); or even, “She’s a girl but also a man” (hiya bint bas rāgil or 
rugūla). These comments highlighted the notion of self-sacrifice and per-
sonal stakes in engaging in righteous deeds. For instance, when the land-
slide victims of al-Duweiqa protested in central Cairo, I met Nermin (25), a 
young student, who had spent days in the landslide area helping the victims: 
fetching food, moving rocks and searching for survivors. A few days later, 
she was one of the last to remain at the scene, as others had lost heart due 
to lack of food and sleep. A friend of mine told me about what Nermin had 
experienced, explaining that she had her university exams the following day 
but that, due to the circumstances, she had not prepared for them. He com-
mented to me, out of her hearing: “She’s a gada‘a, really.” 
To talk about gada‘ as a fixed social category or a stagnant reference to 
an “ideal activist” would, however, be misleading. Nor was it used within 
opposition circles alone. As Negm’s poem illustrates, it has a persistent 
presence in the national history of popular resistance and patriotism, and, 
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as a symbolic resource from popular culture that is fused with contempo-
rary activist subcultures, it exhibits various uses and situated meanings. 
Indeed, the youth activism of the 2000s did not emerge in Cairo’s work-
ing-class quarters but, rather, through daily interactions in both cyberspace 
and the physical sites of sociability in central Cairo. Young activists, who 
in the main came from the relatively privileged backgrounds of the “con-
tent classes” with the available means and time to frequent the city centre, 
transposed the localized conceptions and popular (sha‘bī) ideals of person-
hood into the non-localized hybrid spaces of central Cairo, fusing them with 
today’s “activist virtues”.
6.2.2. “Doing something is better than doing nothing”: Against salbiyya
At the same time, one thing activist youth saw as their main challenge in 
society was overcoming the prevailing attitudes of salbiyya (lit. “negativ-
ism”) that was framed in both interviews and everyday talk as a kind of 
political apathy and carried forceful implications of acquiescence, a sense 
of defeat, pessimism and, even, selfishness. It was claimed that Egyptians, 
and youth in particular, should overcome their fear, voice their grievances 
to the incumbent authorities, and play a role in the making of the future 
Egypt. Some young activists were deeply disappointed by fellow citi-
zens who shied away from politics and concentrated on making a living, 
although they conceded that the prevailing sense of defeat and pessimism 
in society was a product of the Mubarak regime’s longstanding strategies to 
stay in power through the exercise of fear and patronage. Others, however, 
especially the rooted cosmopolitans, were reflexive about their privileged 
positions: they had means, connections and precious time at their disposal, 
unlike most Egyptians whose lives and energies were consumed by daily 
struggles to make ends meet. Hence, for some, the sense of class privilege 
was linked to a sense of duty to do something. It was apparent that the pos-
sibility of public political dissent was unevenly distributed among young 
activists: for the less privileged, such activity subsumed more ambivalent 
trajectories and ethical considerations, as they risked greater personal stakes 
should outcomes be negative.
What Ahmed told me in 2008 illuminated the deep frustration he felt 
about the few options he sensed he had in his life. Current social conditions 
were already so bad that, regardless of whether he decided to engage in 
opposition politics or not, he would die (kida hamūt, wa kida hamūt), and he 
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felt it was better to do so content in the knowledge that he had at least tried 
to do something rather than staying at home and do nothing. For Ahmed, 
the notion of staying at home implied remaining “idle” in his parents’ house 
and its neighbourhood. For Ahmed’s friend Hisham (28), an April 6 Youth 
activist, however, the option of staying at home carried somewhat differ-
ent meanings that included obligations and responsibilities. Firstly, in com-
parison to many others, he was lucky to have a secure job and an employer 
who tolerated his political activities. On the other hand, he was married and 
the father of a young child, and his family life had suffered from his activ-
ism, which often took place late in the evenings, because his wife and par-
ents lived in constant fear that one day something might happen to him. He 
had been detained several times and also undergone physical torture during 
interrogation. But these experiences seemed to have made him even more 
committed. I pressed him on the subject by asking why, given the various 
options he had in life – including a job, a family and a child – he pursued 
the risky line of opposition activism. After a few moments of reflection, his 
short and simple response was: “I am hopeful” (‘andī ’amal). A seemingly 
mundane statement, its subversive content was shaped by the circumstances 
in which he uttered it.
The options of doing something or staying at home, alluded to by both 
Ahmed and Hisham, was a recurring allegory among young activists that 
expressed the alternative paths of reaching out to the world with the aim 
of changing it, or leaving as it was while trying to make the best of it. In 
addition to the problematic of good/wrong, and the constitution of bravery 
and gallantry, there was an added dimension to their political experience, 
namely, the active maintenance of optimism – or ījābiyya (lit. “positive” 
and “affirmative” attitude), the opposite of salbiyya – as a way to resist 
acquiescence and passivity. Arif, for his part, had been arrested several 
times since the anti-war protests in 2003 and he had lost his job at a small 
shop due to being detained in 2008. When I asked about his readiness to 
face the personal risks that were involved in opposition politics, he admit-
ted that, personally, he certainly wished to get married, have children and 
spend his old age by the sea somewhere outside Cairo. At the same time, 
he wanted his offspring to have the chance to live in “a society that is much 
better than the one in which we live”, adding: 
When a human being wants to believe in what he does, he doesn’t 
feel other problems as time passes. Maybe at first you’re worried 
about getting arrested, but after the first time you get arrested, 
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tortured, beaten up, and oppressed, you see things differently. For 
me, our most important mission is […] to invite people from their 
negativism towards optimism. And this is so important, much 
more important than personal problems – that I’m afraid, I secure 
only my own safety (a’ammin nafsī) – because this country is 
much more important than myself, Egypt is much more important 
than individual persons (maṣr ahamm kitīr min afrād).
Thus, for some, an important aspect of political experience was to invest 
hope – as precarious as it was under the current conditions – in the Egyp-
tian people (al-sha‘b al-maṣrī) as the source of public legitimacy and the 
quintessential locus of social change that, eventually, would have to arise 
from silence, take matters into its own hands, and steer the course of his-
tory towards a world without Mubarak. Furthermore, although most of the 
youth to whom I talked did not emphasize their religiosity, those who were 
more outspoken about their religious beliefs emphasized that their ethical 
considerations and future trajectories involved life not only after Mubarak 
but, importantly, also after death. Emad, for example, wondered aloud in 
the summer of 2008 about the readiness of certain Leftists to sacrifice them-
selves for politics without citing the element of religion, adding:
I don’t want to be passive (mish ‘āyiz akūn salbī). I want to play 
a role in what happens in my country. At the same time, being a 
Muslim, when I die Allah will ask me: “What did you do in your 
country? Did you live only for yourself, for your own ambitions, 
for your family, earning money and enjoying life? Or did you have 
the aim in your life to change society and your country for the bet-
ter (taṣallaḥ al-mugtama‘ wa taṣallaḥ baladak)?” But this doesn’t 
mean that I demand that everyone work in politics, certainly not! 
There are people who don’t like politics, but still they take a role 
in what happens in our country. For example, if you are a rich 
businessman, you can donate to poor people, or you can partici-
pate in politics, or do charity, things like that.
I met Emad a few times over the summer of 2008 when he had only 
recently resigned from the Muslim Brotherhood. He had joined the move-
ment at university but, after the draft of its party platform was leaked in 
2007, he increasingly questioned his affiliations to an organization that did 
not seem to represent his opinions and wanted to exclude women and non-
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Muslims from high state positions (e.g. Brown and Hamzawy 2008). Inter-
estingly, he resigned from the movement, just as he had joined it, by letting 
his friends know about his decision. By December 2010, when I next met 
Emad and his friend Sherif, also a former member, his criticism had become 
entrenched. They both were passionate about movies, and complained that 
some Muslim Brothers – including those who entered the People’s Assem-
bly in 2005 – wanted to ban public concerts and even the cinema because 
many blockbusters, despite being censored, showed “immoral” sexual 
content and, furthermore, that film-going allowed the mixing of unrelated 
men and women in the confined spaces of dim-lit movie theatres. At the 
period, as Emad saw it, there were many more pressing issues, such as the 
redistribution of public resources, freedom of the press and higher educa-
tional reform, and the preoccupation of aging moralists with public piety 
was clearly not among them. He further added that he had gradually been 
embracing a more secular outlook on life – or secularism (‘almāniyya), an 
almost blasphemous term for the conservatives – which by no means meant 
compromising his personal beliefs. Rather than framing it as a lifestyle 
choice, Emad and Sherif contended that their disdain for the Muslim Broth-
erhood was more a matter of how to interpret religion (khilāfāt al-fiqh), and 
a shared refusal of top-down dictates on how to be a good Muslim.
In general, the young activists who emphasized their religiosity to me 
evoked notions of the afterlife and the idea that engaging in opposition poli-
tics implied a sense of fulfilling a religious duty or even of being “closer to 
God”.  In this context, they situated intention as a basis of morality, recall-
ing, like Emad, that God will judge Muslims on the Day of Resurrection on 
the basis of their good intentions as well as thawāb – the reward gathered 
through good and pious deeds in life – and not solely on the basis of what 
they have done.
Most of the young activists in this study did not share the Islamists’ 
emphasis on Islamic jurisprudence nor the Islamic “frame of reference” 
(marja‘iyya islāmiyya) as the constitutive framework for their political 
actions. In other words, they did not exclusively emphasize religion as the 
basis for morality but, rather, pointed to Egypt’s present and future trajecto-
ries during their own lifetimes or, at least, that of their offspring. While the 
requirements and opportunities of parenting did not surface with the major-
ity of male activists as much as their prospects of marriage, some young 
women were decisive that they did not want to raise children in the present 
conditions. In light of the prevailing sense of injured patriotism, their com-
mitment to social and political change seemed as much tied to the pursuit 
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of being a good Egyptian as of being a good Muslim. Moral stances that 
draw on patriotism and religion are not naturally mutually exclusive, how-
ever, and both men and women could articulate them, for instance, through 
enacting the gada‘ ideals of personhood in everyday situations.
6.2.3. On whose behalf?
Meanwhile, discussions of whether “this” or “that” person was really act-
ing for the common good, or merely pursuing particularistic goals, were 
rife. Some were accused of engaging in shilla politics as a way to safeguard 
personal or partisan interests and to overhaul their rivals. Others were said 
to cultivate instrumental friendship relations in their careerist pursuit for 
employment opportunities in either political parties or civil society organi-
zations. Although these accusations at times echoed the differences between 
the so-called reformists and those who called for more radical change, it 
was commonly held that seeking positions in formal hierarchies was the 
first step on the way to becoming corrupt, or at least of putting oneself at 
risk of being seduced by the prospects of material wealth and social stand-
ing. Often the question was also one of who may legitimately represent 
Egypt’s young activists in public life and who may not. 
Indeed, activists were blamed for benefitting from public limelight 
in many ways, including media presence, invitations to seminars abroad 
(barra) or future funding opportunities, the latter particularly concern-
ing those who had acquired the needed foreign language skills and educa-
tional levels. In these kinds of situations, suspicions were framed in terms 
of means to suspect ends, namely, that activism was not only about public 
claims of rights and democracy, but also about instrumental values in terms 
of accruing social status, prestige and better life chances and livelihoods in 
the future. The issue of foreign funding (tamwīl), as we have seen, was a 
highly contested and divisive issue in this context, though charges of “for-
eign interventionism” are not exclusive to Egypt as such. They also gener-
ate running conspiracies along with considerable social pressures for public 
political actors to legitimize themselves in the postcolonial aid-recipient 
countries of the Global South where “accusations abound in heated public 
debates over national sovereignty, patriotism and, even, cultural authentic-
ity” (Kontinen and Onodera 2015: 3). 
In Egypt, accusations against foreign funding not only served the state 
in undermining the legitimacy of Egyptian human rights advocates but they 
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also prevailed among civil society professionals and the political opposition. 
In this context, Nicola Pratt (2006) observes two main arguments that are 
often deployed simultaneously: the first is based on “the paradigm of depen-
dency that rejects foreign funding because the West is economically stronger 
and, therefore, can employ funding to exploit Egyptian NGOs for its own 
purposes”; and the second rests on “a paradigm that rejects foreign funding 
on the basis of essential moral characteristics of the West, that is, the West is 
not Egyptian and, therefore, must necessarily be morally dangerous to Egyp-
tian national interests” (ibid.: 115-116; e.g. Sayed 2006: 90-103).
Common good and personal interests
In this context, Emad’s remark, noted above, about trying to “make soci-
ety better” is illustrative of the wider framing of ethical reflections among 
young political activists in the late Mubarak era, particularly in their claims 
to act for the common good (maṣlaḥa ‘āmma) in contrast to safeguarding 
their personal interests or wellbeing (maṣāliḥ shakhṣiyya) (cf. Elyachar 
2005: 147-149). In the rhetoric of anti-Mubarak movements in the 2000s, 
as well as in the everyday talk of activists themselves, the common good 
or “public interest” (maṣlaḥa, pl. maṣāliḥ) featured not only in claims for 
social justice but also as a highly bifurcated normative register that shaped 
social relations. The notion of maṣlaḥa originates in long-lasting debates 
on the primary goals of Islamic jurisprudence (Abdelkader 2003: 47-57; 
Salvatore and Eickelman 2004), but, in the claims of the prodemocracy 
movements it should be seen against the popular sentiments that viewed the 
Egyptian government as a corporate actor that was not defending the com-
mon good, despite its public claims to act in the best interests of the people 
and to defend the national interest (maṣlaḥat al-waṭan) – which, in practice, 
often translated into neoliberal economic reforms coupled with heightened 
security measures constraining political rights and freedoms (Pratt 2005).
I have already mentioned how some activists, particularly those who 
had experienced deep disappointments during the course of political activ-
ism, cultivated highly cynical views of Egypt’s “political life” (al-ḥayā 
al-siyāsiyya) as a kind of contagious space which excluded “love” or affec-
tive relations, and was fundamentally “ill” (marīḍ) (see Section 5.2.2.); 
some even characterized it in terms of paralysis and “rickets” (kusāḥ). Gen-
erally, their analyses of “politics-as-disease” targeted the upper echelons of 
state power and the practices of ruling elites aimed at consolidating political 
power and economic wealth in the hands of closed circles at the expense 
of the majority of Egyptians. While these charges tended to target “high 
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level” governmental politics, they were also directed at much of the politi-
cal opposition. The parties got the largest share in that it was suggested that 
their main aim was to maintain their collective benefits while manoeuvring 
among themselves, and making alliances against their rivals, then switch-
ing sides, and, in brief, demonstrating inconsistency. Young activists com-
plained that political parties, including those in opposition, were pursuing 
their own personal benefit instead of concrete actions aimed at improving 
conditions for all. As one put it: 
There is no party in Egypt that does not have personal benefits in 
mind (mafīsh ḥizb fī maṣr malhūsh maṣāliḥ shakhṣiyya). They just 
talk (kalām bas) but in reality do not love their country (waṭan) 
and do nothing on the street.
On the one hand, these kinds of views indicate the very limited resources 
and space for manoeuvre the political opposition was allowed in the 
Mubarak era (Albrecht 2013). Mohammed Sayed al-Said, a co-founder 
of the Kifaya movement, traces these widely shared negative attitudes – 
including fear and disdain – towards “politics” to the post-independence 
era when Nasser abolished the multiparty system and introduced a series of 
freedom-restricting laws (Sa‘id 2005). By monopolizing the political sphere 
the new political elite also encroached on “public civil space” that had been 
relatively active prior to independence (ibid.: 64-68). Said suggests that the 
troubled relations between the political and the civil spheres in society con-
tinued into the 2000s in the sense that the popular antipathy towards public 
political life
...involves an outright condemnation of politics per se, which it 
blames for all the decadence that Egypt is facing, even within the 
civil field. This type [of widespread attitude] emerged in reaction 
to political manoeuvres, which revealed “politics” to be devoid of 
any coherent behaviour and lacking integrity and loyalty. Politics 
is also perceived as being an abusive practice, seeking individual 
interests and clientele relationships rather than public interest. 
(ibid.: 65) 
Political activists and NGO professionals, therefore, faced not only state 
rejection but also suspicion and social pressure from their peers and former 
associates. Young opposition activists could, to a certain extent, legitimize 
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their claims to justice, democracy and human rights through embodied prac-
tices of concrete street actions that bordered on the domain of sacrifice rather 
than political rhetoric or mere “talk” (kalām bas). They were not, however, 
immune to the bifurcated debate on what constitutes the common good 
and who could legitimately claim to defend it which permeated political 
life in Egypt, from political rhetoric to activists’ social relationships. What 
I suggest is that the degree of social proximity to each other experienced by 
young Egyptian activists can also be viewed in light of the bifurcated nor-
mative terrain between the “public good” and “personal benefits”; in other 
words, the further the social distance, the greater the ambivalence about the 
nature and modality of personal relationships while, between good friends, 
this ambivalence was seemingly resolved. It does not however preclude the 
possibility that some, even if they pursued their shared interests through 
shilla politics, could also consider themselves to be good friends, though 
in a form that is somewhat distinct from Aristotelian “genuine” friendships 
in which the central values are virtue and the mutual encouragement of one 
and other towards enacting some generalized notions of good (Ward 2011).
The everyday engagements of young activists took place on the ambiv-
alent moral terrain of public political life and constantly involved reflec-
tion on how to be and act with others, as well as ethical reflections on their 
own dissent practices that exhibited both deontological and consequentialist 
considerations: those emphasizing duties and moral values and those that 
involved the ethics of means and ends. Morality, as Lambek notes, “cannot 
be simply an act of commission or an acceptance of obligation but includes 
the reasoning behind choosing to do so and the reasoning that determines 
how to balance one’s multiple and possibly conflicting commitments” 
(Lambek 2000: 315; Schielke 2009: 162-164). I suggest that these consider-
ations were not mutually exclusive but, rather, claimed and enacted accord-
ing to time, place and social situation. One way to discuss this matter is to 
inquire how they positioned themselves against these kinds of ambivalences 
and legitimized their oppositional activities in the context of their everyday 
lives.
6.3. ON FUTURE TRANSITIONS
In 2008, Mustafa, a former Youth for Change activist, told me that he had 
to legitimize his involvement in the prodemocracy movement on several 
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fronts. He worked as an engineer in a state-owned company and his col-
leagues, despite their not being wholehearted fans of Mubarak, were 
estranged by his political activities. In the workplace he had to defend his 
position as a reformist, and not a revolutionary, although he confessed to 
me that he was convinced that a revolution in Egypt would happen sooner 
or later. Closer to home, his parents considered him crazy for undertaking 
such risky ventures. It had taken him a long time to convince them that, at 
the end of the day, he aimed to make a career out of politics, and wanted 
to become a respected opposition politician – a public figure (shakhṣiyya 
‘āmma) – in his own right. In contrast to most others, Mustafa was engaged, 
though his fiancée’s parents also considered him crazy. He had, however, 
managed to change his image in their eyes from a “political activist” (nāshiṭ 
siyāsī) to a “social reformist” (muṣṭaliḥ igtimā‘ī), arguing that his career 
choice also held the promise of becoming an earner (kāsib) who could sup-
port his wife and future offspring. Over time, he gained a degree of reserved 
endorsement from his colleagues, parents and future parents-in-law.
This final section is based on the observation that an important dimen-
sion of being a political activist was to publicly argue, and to cultivate in 
themselves, the sensibility that the future of Egyptian society was intimately 
connected to their personal and collective life trajectories. While personal 
trajectories differed according to class, gender, educational level and so on, 
their present lives also encompassed a number of potential futures specific 
to the individual. Graduating from university, finding a fob, marrying and 
becoming a parent or, for that matter, wanting to become a political activ-
ist or professional politician, all contributed to the multiple life transitions 
that had to be simultaneously navigated when engaging in public political 
life (Thiessen and Looker 1999; Herrera 2010; Assaad, Binzel and Gadallah 
2010). 
From a different angle, Passy and Ciugni (2000) suggest that attention 
paid to the synergies and tensions between “life spheres” – such as school-
ing, work, politics and friends – helps in understanding the shifting commit-
ments of public political actors, or their personal entries to, and exits from, 
specific social and political movements. Their approach is not specifically 
a critique against the life-course analytic but, rather, a suggestion that the 
synchronic or coeval dimension of different life spheres make the lived flow 
of experience an ambivalent enterprise: 
…the more the life-spheres are interlocked, or better yet, inter-
twined with a given political issue and the stronger this connection, 
Henri.vaitos.final.indd   185 18.5.2015   8.55
186
the higher are the chances that such an issue will become a crucial 
element in the construction of the self, and as a result, the higher 
the chances that their political commitment will stabilize, leading 
to sustained participation (Passy and Giugni 2000).
In this vein, Passy and Ciugni propose the analytic of life sphere as a way 
to account for the interplay between the structural positions of different actors 
and their shared understandings of meaningful political action. Moreover, it 
helps to illuminate the ways in which these understandings shape political 
experiences and strengthen embeddedness in the social networks of the politi-
cal opposition (ibid.: 125). On the other hand, the notion of life spheres is in 
some ways problematic because it raises the question of how, why and by 
whom, their boundaries are constituted. I mention it here to assist analysis of 
the ways in which some young Cairenes expressed their concerns and deci-
sions not to continue with political activism. At the same time, attention paid 
to different exigencies and future aspirations casts light on why some were 
more disposed to continue their public political dissent than those for whom 
reconciling different life demands – especially in terms of seeking employ-
ment and social justice – proved an overwhelming task (Herrera 2010).
For instance, some disengaged members of Youth for Change I encoun-
tered had distanced themselves from public politics altogether, choosing to 
pursue university studies, careers or prioritizing their new responsibilities as 
parents. One disengaged former member recalls that his personal involve-
ment in protest actions effectively cost him his small trade and created dif-
ficulties in renting an apartment due to records kept by the security services. 
The majority of occasional participants in the youth movement had, as one 
activist recalled in 2008, “simply vanished” although, as we have seen, their 
relations tended to survive the periods of demobilization, providing infor-
mal networks – including generational relations – that could potentially be 
reactivated in the future. Trying to reconcile multiple life trajectories pro-
vided the young activists with continued experiences of practical judgement 
on not only what constitutes good actions but, also, what would provide 
their best chances in life.
6.3.1. Coeval trajectories: Tensions and synergies
As we have seen, Egypt’s political life in the late Mubarak era did not rep-
resent for most people, or even for many activists, a “glorious” sphere of 
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deliberation or civic coexistence. Rather, the very notion of politics (siyāsa) 
carried derogatory connotations of corruption, discord and self-interest. In 
this light, the activists’ public political claims to support rights, democracy 
and justice were levelled not only against the similar hegemonic claims 
of Mubarak’s regime – to safeguard the people’s best interests – but also 
against popular suspicions that they operated on morally ambivalent ter-
rain that compelled them to compromise their democratic claims and moral 
principles. The tensions between political activities and earning a living 
were for some, like Mustafa, resolved by pursuing a career in politics, and 
arguing that he was not an activist but, potentially, a person of social stand-
ing in the future. In other words, despite anticipating a popular revolution 
in the future, he felt compelled to legitimize his public political activities in 
terms of consequentialist ethics on several fronts, not the least in the eyes of 
his parents, future family and colleagues.
This kind of ambivalence towards one’s own oppositional activities 
highlights an important aspect of being a young activist in the late Mubarak 
era, namely, that everyday life unfolded in ways that encompassed differ-
ing expectations, chances and sociabilities. In other words, their lifeworlds 
consisted of different areas in which transitions did not necessarily pres-
ent seamless constellations. Ethical reflection, under these conditions, con-
cerned reconciling political activism with the different choices offered by 
life, a process involving what Lambek translates as wisdom or temperance 
(or phronesis): a certain quality of “knowing how to find the judicious mid-
dle path between opposing extremes” (Lambek 2010: 20). Personal expec-
tations had to be reconciled with those of others with regard to the social 
passages and transitions demanded by their aspirations, such as graduating 
from university, entering a job and, one day, getting married and having a 
family of their own.
For many young Cairenes who wanted to be involved in public politi-
cal life, the ideal situation would have been one that resolved the tensions 
between the exigencies of livelihood and political activism. Those who were 
already employed or who had found a job in public life through civil society 
organizations, journalism or the publishing industry had better chances of 
continuing their political engagements over time. While party affiliations 
sometimes attracted suspicion from peers, being employed provided relative 
freedom from livelihood considerations and, moreover, reduced the attrac-
tion of the support networks and potential for upward social mobility that 
came with party membership. “We are untouchables,” Hafiz (28) asserted 
when I discussed this issue with him. He had graduated from a private uni-
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versity, and his family belonged to the “cultured classes” (muthaqqāfīn). He 
had taken an active part in the prodemocracy movement since 2005, includ-
ing Youth for Change, and, since then, he had operationalized his ICT skills 
– either by volunteering or through temporary contracts – in the service of 
several NGOs and campaign networks. Occasionally he had also travelled 
to seminars abroad as a representative “young Egyptian activist” before and 
after 2011. “We have travelled, we have jobs, and we are not lured by the 
incentives that political activism involves,” he said as he reflected on the 
privileges he enjoyed as a member of Egypt’s young activist “elite” in com-
parison to most of his peers. On the other hand, those who were involved 
in political parties told me that party affiliation secured them much needed 
support networks, for instance lawyers, at times they were needed.
Being cosmopolitan, or “upper class”, and competent in foreign lan-
guages, also enabled some young women to maintain their political involve-
ment over time. In general, however, the daily activities of those who were 
involved in political activities received more negative sanction from their 
families than their male peers. The parents of those belonging to the “with-
ering middle classes” (Amin 2006), in particular, expected their daughters 
to distance themselves from politics and take on extensive roles at home, 
doing chores, leading modest lifestyles, studying and working before get-
ting married and becoming mothers themselves. Salwa (24), had been 
involved in April 6 Youth in the beginning, but had become convinced that 
change (taghyīr) would come through sensitizing people in other ways than 
by protesting. Her family was also involved in opposition politics and sup-
ported her activities, though many of her friends were obliged to conceal 
their Facebook activism and visits to oppositional web sites in their homes. 
At the time that I asked her whether she cared about the repercussions pub-
lic  political activism might have on her future life, she had already found a 
job in a civil society organization and, as for marriage prospects, she joked: 
“I lost my reputation a long time ago!” 
Some young Cairenes, both men and women, found love and romance 
through activism itself, which made their practical choices between fam-
ily pressure and public political dissent less troubled. On the other hand, 
Khaled (27), an AUC graduate, told me in 2008 that he had no time for 
marriage. He joked that he had tried it once and, in any case, he was too 
busy with his political activities which, at the time, involved documenting 
the history of the revolution which he was certain was coming. Mustafa, for 
his part, wanted to build a career before getting married and settling down. 
While the aspect of choice in the context of marriage and love seemed to be 
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taken somewhat for granted by the privileged few such as Khaled and Mus-
tafa, for others the issue of settling down (istiqrār) was of grave existential 
concern. After a long discussion on the predicaments of Egyptian youth, 
Umar – the Nasserist student who lived in an agricultural village on the out-
skirts of Greater Cairo – concluded that “all we really want is to get married 
and settle down”. Continuing political activities presented him with an issue 
requiring constant reflection: “That’s a question I ask myself a lot” (al-su’āl 
da anā  bas’al nafsī kitīr). He did not want to affiliate with opposition par-
ties and, for him, political activities were not only risky but also exhausting, 
and brought no tangible benefits, while being unmarried was not so much a 
lifestyle choice as a matter of constraint. His grim prospects of finding a job 
and an apartment, or getting married, were coupled with his lack of oppor-
tunity to migrate abroad for work. 
For young men like Umar, whose access to public political life was con-
strained by class, future prospects and life chances were intimately tied to 
growing socioeconomic polarization in neoliberal Egypt. If one did not have 
the needed skills or educational levels, or the right connections, engaging in 
opposition politics would often “close doors” to the already limited avenues 
to both public and private labour markets. Since the 1990s, certain open-
ings in the publishing industry and proliferating civil society organizations 
often required a university degree, language skills or the right connections 
– or all of them – and, as such, presented both restrictions and opportuni-
ties to young Cairenes in terms of class and gender, as well as embedded-
ness in the social networks that tied them to public political life. As already 
noted, some were raised in already politicized milieux – perhaps with par-
ents belonging to the 1970s’ generation – and could draw on the fact that 
their families, despite their concern, would condone or, at least, allow their 
oppositional activities. For others, particularly young women, family worry 
and pressure curtailed involvement in oppositional groups and movements, 
although families generally provided immense support during moments of 
personal crisis such as detention or imprisonment.
On the other hand, the prolonged period before marriage and reproduc-
tive roles took over – or “waithood” (Singerman 2007) – provided further 
“leeway”, for young men especially, to engage in intense social networking 
and socialization in opposition politics. Meanwhile, although public dissent 
of young unmarried women such as street protesting and late night meet-
ings in downtown ahāwī, was often prevented by families and prevailing 
social norms, they found political agency on a more equal level through the 
Internet and its social networking sites at home. Moreover, as I have already 
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suggested, friendship relations provided young Cairenes, both men and 
women, with an additional sphere of everyday life that connected them both 
to formal organizations and informal networks which could in part accom-
modate the tensions and contradictions that were involved when engaging in 
public political life. During situated events when concrete actions of solidar-
ity were crucial, such as in street clashes with the police, the most meaning-
ful acts seemed equally attached to the normative claims of safeguarding the 
“nation” as they were performed through the ideal virtues of being a gada‘ 
or, simply, a good friend.
6.3.2. Engaging with the world
In the late Mubarak era, Egypt’s young activists, therefore, operated not only 
betwixt and between adolescence and adulthood, but also between the per-
sonal and the political and the predicaments of today and the uncertainties 
of tomorrow. The young Cairenes whom I had the opportunity to meet and 
talk to, were all experiencing growing uncertainties about future trajectories 
in Egyptian politics and society at large. “God knows,” (allāh ‘ālim) was 
a common response to my questions about what they thought would hap-
pen in the future. They hoped that neither Gamal Mubarak – an apparent 
heir to the presidency – nor the Muslim Brotherhood would seize political 
power in Egypt. Nor did they find the competing, and at times parallel, ide-
ologies of neoliberal economics and moralist Islamism particularly attractive 
alternatives.
For the young there was an added sense of having to endure the legacy 
left by older generations who had both capitalized on national resources and 
consolidated positions of power in their own hands, or, alternatively, had 
been incapable of steering the course of the country towards a better future. 
Indeed, the lived experiences of young Cairenes who were involved in pub-
lic political life in the late Mubarak era were shaped by a different outlook 
on life to that of their elders. The previous political generations, including 
the 1970ers, had already acquired education, employment, an apartment, and 
were married with children; most had been settled for decades. Reflecting on 
what life had – and did not have – to offer was for the young simultaneously 
more precarious and pertinent: both the present and the future presented 
greater ambivalence and insecurity in terms of life chances and aspirations.
In this light, my aim is not to fetishize the notion of freedom in the title 
of this chapter, or to adopt under its rubric the various socioeconomic needs 
and ambitions young Egyptians in general had in their lives (Amin 2006: 
63-74). It refers more to their aspirations to resolve the multiple tensions and 
contradictions which shaped their political experiences in the late Mubarak 
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era. What was at stake was less their daily subsistence than future opportuni-
ties, so we can conceive of freedom as the lived moments of playing a role 
in what they perceive as lying before them in their everyday lives. This cor-
responds to what Johannes Fabian (1998: 21) describes as the fragile, yet 
powerful resource for imagining the world anew:
If freedom is conceived not just as free will plus the absence of 
domination and constraint, but as the potential to transform one’s 
thoughts, emotions, and experiences into creations that can be 
communicated and shared, an if “potential”, unless it is just another 
abstract condition like absence of constraint, is recognized by its 
realizations, then it follows that there can never be freedom as 
a state of grace, permanent and continuous. As a quality of the 
process of human self-realization, freedom cannot be anything but 
contestatory and discontinuous or precarious. Freedom, in dialecti-
cal parlance, comes in moments.
Given their pervasive claims to rights, social justice and democracy, as 
well as their differing degrees of religiosity, I am not suggesting that they 
aspired to do and be as they pleased in life. Yet, at the same time, they lived 
in a society whose state authorities prohibited them from enacting the sense 
of righteousness, duty and self-sacrifice – the ideal traits of personhood – 
which young activists considered both the normative self-positioning for 
democratic struggle and also intimately connected to their shared futures. In 
this light, the futures to which they aspired implied personal and collective 
attempts to bestow a certain moral order on events, societal trajectories and 
public political life itself which they witnessed and of which they were part. 
It took me a long while to reach an interpretation of what Ahmed had said, 
early in September 2008, after he had helped remove the bodies of landslide 
victims from the rubble in al-Duweiqa and then supported their relatives’ 
protest on the lawns of Abdeen Square in central Cairo. The residents of al-
Duweiqa had lost everything – their homes and relatives – and my question 
– “Why aren’t they afraid of the police?” – sounded rather meaningless to his 
ears. For him, the events unfolding before us reminded him of the lyrics of 
an American rock band he adored – “you don’t care about how I feel, I don’t 
feel it anymore” – which he continued to play with when next we met. In ret-
rospect this wordplay could echo an aspect of a deeper experience of politics 
that, while it took highly symbolic form during the popular uprisings in early 
2011, was similar to those I encountered among young Cairenes even when 
the end of Mubarak’s rule was still an inconceivable future scenario: namely, 
witnessing the brute realities of injustice, violence and inequality in society 
was connected to cathartic experiences of purging one’s feelings of both fear 
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and aspirations about life’s future offerings. “Kida hamūt, wa kida hamūt,” 
Ahmed said; he would die with or without trying. Framed in this way, we 
can appreciate that not caring for oneself can, at certain moments, espe-
cially for those who have more to lose, go hand in hand with a heightened 
sense of caring for the world.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, I have explored some of the ethical considerations which 
young opposition activists faced when engaging in public political life in 
the late Mubarak era. While taking part in the wider processes of prodemo-
cracy mobilization, they resisted the status quo because it did not seem to 
offer them the likelihood of satisfactory futures. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the prospect of impoverishment did not generally motivate their 
political engagements as much as their aspirations to acquire greater justice 
and wider recognition as rightful citizens with a say in the making of their 
collective future. While they shared a deep sense of injured patriotism with 
their older peers, the young activists’ critical awareness was based on rec-
ognition of the social fact that Egypt’s future was more intimately tied to 
their own life trajectories as inheritors of the predicaments of the present 
world. At the same time, their involvement in public political life coincided 
with popular suspicion about the impact of their public political dissent or, 
alternatively, about possible motives for their activism such as the pursuit 
of social status and even economic gain. Despite the differences that existed 
among the activist youth in terms of class and gender, they could challenge 
these types of speculations by enacting the prevailing ideals of personhood 
in terms of bravery, righteousness and self-sacrifice, as well as those quali-
ties attached to the notion of gada‘. 
The young activists’ desire to play a role in the making of a post-
Mubarak society was often connected to their class privilege, but by no 
means always. The moral worlds in which they were embedded, includ-
ing that provided by the social media, were dominated by normative claims 
for the common good, justice, rights and dignity, and positioning one’s self 
and others in relation to these coincided with a number of reflections on 
the meaningfulness of one’s own practices of political dissent. For some, 
ethical reflections connected to the pursuit of balancing between coeval life 
trajectories and the social expectations of family, friends and colleagues. 
For others, political engagement involved much greater risks when trying 
to finish studies, find employment, get married and settle down, and having, 
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for instance, personal files in the archives of the Interior Ministry could hin-
der these life transitions. On the other hand, for others, engaging in public 
political life held the promise of upward social mobility while those who 
found synergies between different spheres of everyday life – especially in 
terms of combining oppositional activism and employment – profited from 
their relatively privileged status, while being aware that this combination 
subjected them to the possibility of further repercussions in the future. 
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7  CONCLUSIONS
British historian E.P. Thompson has famously said that the working classes 
in Britain “made themselves as much as they were made” (Thompson 1966: 
194). Resonating with Thompson’s observation, this thesis has discussed the 
ways in which young Cairenes sought new roles and visibilities in Egypt’s 
public political life, and emerged as important protagonists in the popular 
uprisings against Mubarak’s rule in January and February 2011. The criti-
cal masses did not, of course, only come from the ranks of young activists 
examined here, but consisted of Egyptians of all ages, social backgrounds 
and persuasions, protesting out of deep and long-standing resentment 
against the authoritarian state and worsening life prospects in a society that 
principally served the interests of a narrow band of elites. Wage labourers, 
in particular, intensified their industrial actions during the very last days of 
Mubarak’s rule, steering their demands for better living and working condi-
tions towards the political goal of the revolution (Beinin 2012). Moreover, 
a crucial role was played by high-ranking officers in the Egyptian Armed 
Forces who opposed Mubarak’s “succession scenario” and wanted to safe-
guard the country and their vested interests in the national economy from 
looming social disorder. Nonetheless, young activists played an undeni-
able part in triggering the street protests, not least by helping to raise public 
awareness of critical issues involving abuses by the state authorities during 
the last decade of Mubarak’s presidency.
Since 2011, Egypt’s state-society relations have gone through profound 
political, social and economic transformations. Despite the important roles 
young Egyptians played in the prodemocracy movement, concurrent soci-
etal processes and trajectories – including the Islamic revival, neoliberal 
economic reforms and military rule – have proven to be much more pow-
erful in steering the course of history in post-Mubarak Egypt. Soon after 
Mubarak’s ousting, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took 
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on the role of overseeing the transitional period, which witnessed a num-
ber of street clashes between young revolutionaries and state authorities, 
including the now infamous events on Mohammed Mahmoud Street in cen-
tral Cairo in November 2011. The Muslim Brotherhood and conservative 
Salafists won the first parliamentary elections in early 2012, and the Broth-
erhood’s Muhammad Mursi was elected president in June 2012, becoming 
the first civilian president since Egypt’s independence. Mursi’s electoral 
legitimacy was, however, outweighed by popular resentment against the 
Brotherhood’s consolidation of political power, culminating in mass pro-
tests on June 30, 2013 which, coupled with the strategic part played by the 
Egyptian Armed Forces, ousted Mursi from power on July 3, 2013. Much 
of the Mubarak-era political opposition, including the young activists in this 
study, aligned with this momentum. The consequent suppression of pro-
Mursi protests, leading to hundreds of casualties and the entrenchment of 
the military “deep state” in Egypt’s political life has, however, become a 
highly divisive issue among them: some were supportive of military rule; 
a few affiliated themselves with the Islamists’ claim to legitimacy; while 
many were left with even narrower political spaces than those experienced 
during the late Mubarak era. Several prominent youth activists were jailed 
on the basis of the newly promulgated protest law (Nr. 107 of 2013) and, in 
April 2014, the April 6 Youth movement was legally banned, while human 
rights advocates have raised concerns over the possible effects the new 
NGO legislation, now being drafted, may have on their operational space 
(Matthies-Boon 2014).
Since the military takeover and the landslide victory of Abdel Fattah al-
Sisi in the presidential elections in June 2014, the newly emerging polity 
seems to be constructed in a way that compromises citizens’ freedom of 
expression in exchange for state promises of increased security and socio-
economic welfare. Al-Sisi’s popularity is being further fed by print and 
broadcast media which portray him in the guise of a great leader of the 
Egyptian nation, not dissimilar to Nasser, who is safeguarding public order 
and defending Egyptians from aggressors both inside and outside the coun-
try. Since 2013, the attacks by armed Islamist militants in Sinai and else-
where in the country have led to the Egyptian government’s waging its own 
“war against terrorism” which will, in all likelihood, increasingly promote 
the legitimacy of the state towards the end of the 2010s. Regardless of even-
tual outcomes, however, the popular uprisings of 2011 and their aftermath 
have provided Egyptians with major formative experiences and paved the 
way for new generations who will one day need to bear the burden of the 
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historical legacies that are being made today, and reconcile the past with 
their own futures.
7.1. BEING A YOUNG ACTIVIST IN THE LATE MUBARAK ERA
In this study I have focused on the pre-2011 period, examining what it was 
like to be a young activist in an era in which the end of Mubarak’s presi-
dency was only a shared aspiration. I have focused on the lived experiences 
of young Cairenes who engaged in public political life during the period: 
predominantly young unmarried men in their 20s belonging to the relatively 
well-educated urban middle classes. More specifically, I set out to examine 
the following research questions:
1. In order to change society, what did the young opposition  
activists regard as meaningful activities? Why?
2. How did being young shape their experiences of politics?
As we have seen, there was no single way of being or becoming a politi-
cal activist, nor is there a single answer to this research problematic. Youth 
activism of the 2000s encompassed diverse life trajectories and experi-
ences. In general, I have argued that their political engagements were not 
merely about opposing Mubarak’s regime and the “succession scenario”, or 
even supporting the main grievances of the political opposition during the 
late Mubarak era. Indeed, their experiences surpassed the normative rhe-
torical level of democratic political demands in several ways. While young 
activists shared the general political demands of the wider anti-Mubarak 
mobilization – such as justice, freedom, democratic pluralism and civilian 
rule – the meanings and relevance of their collective pursuits were in an 
important way geared to realizing the young as legitimate political actors 
and rightful members of contemporary society, as well as inheritors of the 
future. In this sense, being a young opposition activist involved an existen-
tial journey towards positioning the self not only against an authoritarian 
state but also in potential dissonance with the very immediate social envi-
ronment in which they lived.
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7.1.1. Multiple public engagements 
To better understand the activists’ political experiences it has been neces-
sary to bear in mind the levels of popular antipathy towards public political 
life in the late Mubarak era. Prevailing sentiments framed it as a stagnant, 
distant and morally ambivalent sphere that was largely immune to influence 
and pressure from outside. Yet in order to gain new roles and visibilities 
in public life, one of the central arenas in which to build influence was the 
political opposition itself, though many young Cairenes saw the latter – and 
party politics in particular – as not productive of tangible changes to the sta-
tus quo. Operating on the fringes of wider processes of contentious politics, 
such as the prodemocracy mobilization and the workers’ strike movements, 
in the 2000s they resorted to finding multiple avenues to public political life 
and alternatives to the conventional ways of doing opposition politics so as 
to forge a generational consciousness and to imagine their political oppor-
tunities anew. 
In this respect, movements such as Youth for Change and April 6 Youth 
were important instances of collective action by young Egyptians which 
expressed their collective will to organize themselves and to do things on 
their own. The youth initiatives provided the young with alternative sites 
for political socialization as well as establishing precedents for carving 
out relatively autonomous spaces for political action through the acqui-
sition of a “young activist” habitus, the achievement of which generated 
subversive understandings of youth (shabāb) as a potent and in some ways 
privileged social location and realm of experiencing politics. It involved a 
certain sense of being a member of a disenfranchised generation and raised 
political awareness (wā‘ī siyāsī) of the lived realities in society, but also 
promoted the view that doing something is better than not doing anything 
at all. However, maintaining the autonomy of the new youth movements 
demanded constant effort on the part of members to legitimize themselves 
as potent actors and to avoid being socialized into existing hierarchies and 
formal institutions requiring various clearances from the state authorities in 
order to act, which would have limited their independence and spontaneity 
of operations. In this context, they benefited from tactical alliances with, 
and symbolic, social and material support from, earlier political generations 
such as the 1970s’ generation and human rights advocates in their 40s and 
50s – whether parents, colleagues or friends.
In order to gain new roles and visibilities in public political life, young 
activists experimented with innovative modalities of political action that 
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combined nonviolent civil disobedience on the streets with dissident knowl-
edge management, making heavy use of the avenues provided by emergent 
ICTs and social media. This compensated, to some degree, for the lack of 
opportunities elsewhere, though another important project was the attempt 
to build bridges between popular grievances and the goals of the wider anti-
Mubarak camp in Egypt: a social interface that was carefully controlled by 
Mubarak’s security state. The emergence of the neoliberal media landscape 
in the 2000s enabled them to consume and to contribute to alternative depic-
tions of the social world; meanwhile, their street actions, which were cir-
cumscribed by the police, gained new audiences through the social media, 
private newspapers and, at times, global news outlets such as Al-Jazeera 
and The Washington Post, as well as global human rights organizations. In 
order to harness popular support for their democratic struggle, some activ-
ists also appropriated elements and expressions from popular culture. The 
youth movements and new forms of Internet activism generated fresh dyna-
mism between previously demobilized youth and the various groups in the 
opposition, such as the ElBaradei campaign, opposition coalitions and civil 
society organizations. Some found their way into opposition political par-
ties and new offshoot movements, while others gained employment through 
the networks accessed via political engagements; both routes, coupled with 
the new generation of young NGO professionals, journalists and lawyers, 
contributed to intergenerational synergy and social reproduction in public 
political life and further expanded the scope and diversity of public political 
dissent towards the end of Mubarak’s presidency.
It is apparent, therefore, that young activists in this study by no means 
represented a homogenous group but, rather, demonstrated a variety of life 
trajectories, something which is important to acknowledge. I have sug-
gested that social divisions based on class, gender, cosmopolitan connect-
edness, ideological orientation and group affiliation prevailed among the 
young and shaped both their social interactions as well as their experiences 
of opposition politics in the late Mubarak era. Meanwhile, the opportuni-
ties for young men and women to engage in public political life were fur-
ther conditioned by prevalent norms and social expectations through which 
some could manoeuvre, to a degree, using tactical practices and innovations. 
Some were socialized into oppositional culture from an early age by virtue 
of their families’ political orientations, and were more disposed to continue 
with public political dissent later on. Others, who were not brought up in 
the oppositional culture, faced relatively more obstacles in order to continue 
with political activism. In addition, although gender roles would shape the 
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political experiences of all young men and women, these differences were 
not as pronounced for those who belonged to more affluent and cosmo-
politan families. Although being unmarried – or in the prolonged period of 
waiting for adulthood (Singerman 2007) – was not a life situation to which 
many aspired, it did provide young urbanites with greater opportunities to 
engage in intense social networking, to hang around in the city centre and 
attend oppositional events, and to develop self-organized forms of resis-
tance before the exigencies of reproductive roles and family life took over.
In addition, being a young opposition activist involved learning about 
politics, society and collective action; mastering the skills to manage one’s 
public self under state surveillance; and learning to transgress the prevailing 
norms of what was permitted and what was not in the urban spaces of the 
Greater Cairo area. In order to manage the risks and expectations that were 
involved in opposition politics, it was crucial to acquire the practical skills 
necessary to circumvent the panoptic gaze which security services exerted 
over urban spaces and communication. It was equally important to become 
acquainted with certain websites, social media platforms and alternative 
sources of information so as to keep tabs on what was happening in soci-
ety, in order to pinpoint the manifest contradictions between official state 
rhetoric and lived realities on the ground. Inasmuch as it involved tapping 
onto globally circulating mediascapes, being an activist thus also involved 
a gradual socialization into Egypt’s pre-existing oppositional culture, and 
learning its stories of contention, events and personalities, and then rein-
terpreting Egypt’s national history in light of this newly acquired informa-
tion. For some, learning about Egypt’s oppositional culture coincided with 
the aim of learning only as much as was necessary to avoid being social-
ized into it, while, for others, group and party affiliations were beneficial, 
providing support networks and facilities. More generally, the young activ-
ists’ own shared experiences contributed to the social memories and narra-
tives of resistance which grew in scope toward the end of the first decade 
of the new millennium. Rather than fixed and unalterable, these “hidden 
transcripts” (Scott 1990) provided a symbolic reserve from which to draw 
in order to articulate new meanings, reinterpret contemporary society and 
imagine its alternative futures. It should be noted that these processes of 
self-realization were rarely experienced in isolation but, rather, in tandem 
with others through the everyday social interactions which represented an 
integral dimension of what it meant to be young activist in the late Mubarak 
era.
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7.1.2. Everyday sociality and commitment to change
Undoubtedly, being an opposition activist in the late Mubarak era involved 
much more varied experiences than merely those acquired through acts of 
public political dissent. In the moments in between, that is, for much of 
their time, young Cairenes frequented a range of different downtown ven-
ues such as cafeterias, parks, party headquarters, NGO offices and street 
corners. Thus, becoming embedded in various micro-social worlds in the 
political opposition would also coincide with learning how to do things 
and how to interact with others in certain ways. In authoritarian settings, 
we can conceive of oppositional youth activism as a specific lifestyle and 
youth subculture that, coupled with the narrow social spaces afforded by the 
police state and prevailing norms of public quiescence, amounts to intense 
processes of negotiating social proximity between the self and the other, 
and of managing the social bonds of trust, solidarity and belonging on a 
daily basis.
In this context, friendship relations provided highly intimate avenues to 
public political life. The importance of friendship was heightened at pivotal 
moments, such as street clashes or during detention, as an additional “safety 
net” that stretched beyond kin and formal organizations. Having friends and 
being one to others often amounted to a full-time activity, involving con-
stant flows of social, economic and emotional investment. While the young 
activists’ social interactions were shaped by social cleavages such as those 
mentioned above, they could also forge common ground for friendship 
through seemingly non-political areas of life that included lifestyle choices 
and shared tastes, as well as a shared generational consciousness that being 
young posed them specific challenges and roles as inheritors of a post-
Mubarak Egypt. But because friendship relations mediated the bonds of 
trust and mutual expectations of solidarity in the contentious sphere of poli-
tics, the processes whereby they fractured would at times result in dire per-
sonal experiences and rapid alterations in the patterns of everyday sociality 
and group formations. Consequently, many learned to be cautious about the 
boundaries of their private and public selves, which they enacted on a daily 
basis, and about whom to trust in, rely on, and consider their real friends.
In this light, although Egyptian youth activism in the 2000s corresponded 
in many ways with the characteristics of concurrently emerging activist 
subcultures globally, the claim that their collective actions operated only 
through horizontal and non-hierarchic forms of organization seems partial. 
Friendship ties that provided young activists with alternative avenues and 
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sites of mobilization beyond kin and formal organizations were both highly 
precious and volatile. On the one hand, some were willing to work together, 
to encourage and to support one another, and to share everyday existence 
with fellow activists in often very vivid, intense and personal ways. For 
some, their most meaningful activities related to the constant goal of main-
taining their circles of trust and solidarity intact and out of harm’s way. In 
other words, keeping the group “going” became the principal social task as 
it enabled continued oppositional engagements over time; meanwhile, rec-
reating social bonds under the rubric of friendship could be seen as enact-
ing an ideal social order at a microscopic scale: a micro-polity where the 
experiences of mutual trust, solidarity and the goals of democratic struggle 
would converge. 
On the other hand, being a young opposition activist also involved learn-
ing how to operate within antagonistic personal relationships; for instance, 
when attempting to outdo rival groups. As we have seen, many youth-based 
prodemocracy movements in Egypt – including Youth for Change and April 
6 Youth – gradually developed organizational structures which were soon 
subject to contentious processes of disbandment and internal factionalism. 
In addition to partisan interests and ideological strife, which marred the 
political opposition in general, an important dimension of these processes 
relates to “lopsided” friendship relations of trust, loyalty and obligation. 
Moreover, a closer look at these processes of group formation suggests that 
oppositional youth movements encompassed fluctuating and overlapping 
forms of affiliation behind their public façade. In this context, I have sug-
gested that shilla formations, as culturally informed modes of group belong-
ing and as informal networks, remain understudied with regards Egypt’s 
young activists in the global era. Although they refer to a longstanding and 
widespread type of group formation among young Egyptians, comprising 
closely-knit groups of friends, they invite increasingly negative connota-
tions as shared interest groups or even political cliques as soon as they enter 
public political life and become entangled in vertical relations of power and 
patronage. These different sides of shilla formations, and the affective and 
instrumental modalities of friendship implied, however, should be seen as 
different aspects of the sociality that was involved in the local moral worlds 
of oppositional youth activism in the late Mubarak era, rather than being 
regarded as mutually exclusive.
Furthermore, legitimizing one’s place in public political life was, by and 
large, a collective and intersubjective pursuit in which the issues of soci-
ality and public morality intertwine. In this sense it is difficult to dissoci-
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ate friendship and everyday sociality from ethical reflection, particularly as 
the young activists’ lives and undertakings were embedded in an ambiva-
lent moral terrain that was bifurcated by the contested notions of the com-
mon good (maṣlaḥa ‘āmma) and personal welfare (maṣlaḥa shakhṣiyya) in 
public life. Activist youth was, to say the least, often compelled to position 
itself against the prevailing social suspicions that held the realm of poli-
tics to be a self-interested sphere in which to pursue privilege, social status 
and material gain or, alternatively, one in which its actions did not lead to 
any tangible results. Against this background, young activists promoted the 
view in public life that the two contrasting normative registers were by no 
means incommensurable: their goals in the present were forcefully linked 
to the social trajectories which they would inherit when the older gener-
ations’ time had passed. They could in part accommodate their claims to 
defend Egypt’s interests by privileging concrete actions over mere speech, 
and by fusing transnationally circulating ideals of democracy, human rights 
and freedom with local conceptions of bravery, righteousness and personal 
integrity like those encapsulated in the notion of gada‘. Although the con-
cept of the common good is historically linked to religious jurisprudence, 
theirs was framed mainly through different degrees of patriotism and the 
collective duty to do their share to save Egypt from potential peril. Hav-
ing these principles and acting accordingly, despite it possibly being against 
one’s own safety and wellbeing, was a normative ideal that they promoted 
in public life.
7.1.3. Being young and oppositional 
A question that has been addressed in the course of this study is how, in the 
late Mubarak era, the young activists’ experiences of politics differed from 
those of others, including their older peers; and whether being young shaped 
these experiences. The first elements to be considered here are the specific 
historical circumstances in which they were born and raised. Unless they 
were socialized into an oppositional family, Egyptian youth was raised in 
the awareness that it was detrimental, if not outright futile, to voice dissent 
or criticize the incumbent authorities in public, unless one was prepared to 
deal with the responses of the police state, and potential repercussions in 
the future. At the same time, the globalized world of the 2000s also exerted 
a number of influences which shaped their ways of experiencing the world, 
as they appropriated trends, tastes and sensibilities from globally circulating 
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subcultures. This was compounded by their socialization into an already 
fragmented public sphere that had been diversifying since the advent of 
neoliberal Egypt, with the help of new media and satellite television, and 
was already questioning the conventional notions of public authority. In 
contrast to conditions affecting the earlier political generation of the 1970s, 
the university campuses did not provide meaningful spaces for public polit-
ical dissent (Shehata 2008) which was instead channelled into direct street 
action and dissident knowledge management through the Internet and social 
media. 
In addition, they were also part of the unprecedented number of young 
Egyptians, or “youth bulge”, whose educated members cultivated a collec-
tive sense of frustration, lack of prospects and the increasing difficulties in 
attaining the lives they wished for themselves (Herrera 2010). Unless enjoy-
ing relative security in terms of livelihood, as some rooted cosmopolitan 
youth did, the majority were left with aspiring to a number of transitions in 
several areas of life – such as education, marriage and employment – which 
did not seem to offer satisfactory trajectories. Some could accommodate 
political activism with the other requirements of the everyday by affiliat-
ing with political parties on the basis of family connection, upward social 
mobility or ideological conviction. Others were able to find employment in 
“civil society” formations, such as NGOs and advocacy groups, or through 
pursuing careers as journalists. For yet others, the tensions rising from the 
risky practice of activism were too high and they chose to disengage from 
public oppositional politics altogether. Importantly, all these alternatives 
were conditioned by wider political, economic and cultural processes taking 
place in neoliberal Egypt. Paying attention to coeval life trajectories, with 
their overlapping private and public future aspirations, sheds light on the 
social expectations with which the young activists had to deal when involv-
ing themselves in contentious politics during the late Mubarak era. 
On the other hand, the political and economic constraints on livelihood 
prospects served as an important feature in framing the ways in which at 
least some young activists justified their personal involvement in opposi-
tion politics. At the minimum, the exigencies of entering the labour mar-
ket, making a living and getting married at some future point had practical 
relevance for the majority. For those with a university education, and the 
right connections in the labour market, it was possible to combine the dif-
ferent demands of life, should they want to continue with the risky line of 
political dissent. For others, it was also necessary to legitimize their opposi-
tional activities in their immediate social environment, including the family, 
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in terms of the consequentialist argument that engaging in public political 
life holds the promise of employment, public recognition and social stand-
ing. Thus, oppositional activism overlapped with the pursuit of alternative 
futures for both society and also the self.
These observations serve to demonstrate that being a young activist does 
not refer in any way to a static predicament but, rather, to an ambivalent 
state of becoming (Vigh 2006); in other words, it is as much about shap-
ing the world as it is about shaping the self in the process (Foucault 1982; 
Mahmood 2005). The political subjectivities young Egyptian activists col-
lectively acquired and performed combined today’s specialized techni-
cal knowledge and globally circulating influences with local conceptions 
of bravery, righteousness and sacrifice. Enacting these new ways of being 
political in urban spaces and through online presence further contributed 
to the ways in which being a political activist was locally conceived in the 
run-up period to the events of 2011. 
In this sense, their political engagements encompassed the collective 
goal of cultivating courage in the face of fear, certainty out of uncertainty, 
and the sense of being free to value principles and to take meaningful politi-
cal stances in public. As much as being an activist encompassed the search 
for recognition and legitimacy, it was also about resisting outside pressures 
to lose hope, and to keep going. In these circumstances, hope, perhaps more 
than anything else, was the most precious thing. Against the odds, they 
claimed their share in the making of a better future; and that what they did 
and the ways they chose to spend their lives encompassed the acts of imag-
ining anew what Egypt should be. In practice, the existential need to play a 
role in shaping the future and seek rights in a world that denied them, was 
juxtaposed with the aims of finding employment, love and a place in soci-
ety. Being a young opposition activist involved playing for different stakes 
than those of older peers in the opposition who had established themselves 
in life and at least in some ways settled down. Navigating through adoles-
cence in the 2000s presented multiple challenges which affected future life 
chances and livelihoods: ethical reflections and practical judgements were 
more immediately linked to the exigencies of negotiating and reconciling a 
number of coeval trajectories into possible future scenarios that life had to 
offer. 
In this light, political engagements as “transformative acts” can be seen 
to cut across both different areas of social life and also the porous bound-
aries between personal and political aspirations. As much as the young 
activists strove to resist the state, the prevailing norms of public acquies-
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cence, and the given trajectories to which they seemed destined, their con-
tinued efforts (and ways of being political) stemmed from a shared desire 
to acquire and enjoy a sense of purpose, certainty and direction. Although 
they did not envision a limitless array of choices in life to do with as they 
wished, their aspirations to realize themselves as legitimate members of 
society and as agents of social change evolved within certain parameters 
that were shaped by a number of norms pertaining to, for instance, religion, 
patriotism and local conceptions of courage and self-sacrifice. They aspired 
not only to feel liberated from the constraints of authoritarian rule, but also 
to feel free to reflect, to judge and to act for the sake of living a future that 
had value, both for themselves and others, and to connect their joint des-
tiny to that of the Egyptian nation as a whole. In other words, although 
there were no single ways of being or becoming a young opposition activist, 
the young opposition activists’ experiences of politics were in an important 
way tied to a shared awareness and a social fact that, whatever happens, the 
future would be theirs to bear.
7.2. ON THE RINGSIDE SEAT OF HISTORY
This thesis began as an ethnography of the lived experiences of young 
prodemocracy activists in contemporary Egypt. Faced with the sudden 
revolutionary moment in 2011, and the rapid socio-political changes that 
ensued, it has practically transformed into a micro-level history with a focus 
on one sector of the protagonists – young opposition activists in Cairo – 
during the final years of Mubarak’s presidency. The popular uprisings and 
their aftermaths in Egypt, Tunis and other countries of the Middle East and 
North Africa are and will be written in history textbooks, and studied and 
analysed time and again by social scientists, historians and other academics. 
Although I have described the lives and undertakings of a narrow seg-
ment of young Egyptians, I hope this research provides empirical reference 
for further studies in comparative social science, especially in sociological 
and anthropological studies of youth mobilization and social movements in 
authoritarian settings. On the one hand, Egyptian youth activism coincided 
with the wider processes of transnational mobilizations at a global level, 
which brought together progressive social movements and NGO coali-
tions – the so-called Global Justice Movement – to seek alternatives to the 
neoliberal hegemony and global corporate power structures that have been 
gaining increasing strength since the turn of the millennium (Hatem 2015). 
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On the other hand, the new youth movements that emerged in Egypt were 
in many ways similar to subversive youth movements elsewhere, includ-
ing those of the “post-Soviet generations” in Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia and 
Russia (Nikolayenko 2007; Lyytikainen 2014). In both national democratic 
struggles, and the global activist networks, young people were at the fore-
front in adopting the new ICTs and innovative direct action as part of their 
political activism. 
Soon after Mubarak’s resignation, observers were quick to point out the 
similarities between Egyptian youth movements and those of the “Colour 
Revolutions”, and also that a few April 6 Youth activists had accepted invi-
tations to workshops abroad where they received “activist training” in the 
late 2000s (Bensaada 2011; Nixon 2011). These personal ties with global 
activist networks and movements – including CANVAS, a think-thank on 
civil resistance run by former Otpor activists in Serbia – created public 
debate, both inside and outside Egypt, over whether the “January 25” upris-
ings were orchestrated from abroad and, in particular, from the foreign-pol-
icy circles in Washington. However, even if some connections developed 
between Egyptian activists and their global contemporaries, as well as for-
eign entities such as US-based “high-tech” companies and funding organi-
zations (Herrera 2014a: 146-149), these links hardly suffice to explain the 
overall readiness of Egyptians to join the popular uprising in early 2011.
In this study I have aimed to produce a pluralist view of youth activism 
in the run-up period to the January 25 uprising in 2011, exploring some of 
the internal dynamics of the processes through which youth emerged as a 
potent collective actor in Egypt’s public life. As this exploration has been 
oriented around both informal and formal avenues to political engagement, 
attention paid to shilla formations as informal networks enabled acknowl-
edgement of the ways in which even the informal avenues to public political 
life can be conditioned by cultural forms of friendship and group belong-
ing. Partly connected to this, we have seen that maintenance of the youth 
movements and their collective actions over time was far from an assured 
trajectory. Young opposition activists faced – individually and collectively 
– grave challenges to their autonomy, whether through being socialized into 
bureaucratic and gerontocratic institutions, such as established opposition 
parties, or of being rooted out by the paramount state security services. In 
addition, internal strife could have led to the disbandment of April 6 Youth 
Movement over the summer of 2009, just as had happened to Youth for 
Change and several other youth coalition initiatives. Being attentive to 
these ruptures at the micro-social level is part of the proposal that we should 
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be careful when looking retrospectively at the causal processes that led to 
the popular uprisings in 2011. From the vantage point of everyday life, they 
seem less like linear and cumulative trajectories than a series of struggles, 
minor defeats and victories on the part of the wider political opposition and 
civil society campaigns in which young Egyptians certainly had roles to 
play.
On a more conceptual level, the notion of political engagement has pro-
vided me with relatively open analytical terrain on which to examine the 
different ways in which people strive to have a meaningful part in changing 
the social world they inhabit. In comparison with political participation, it 
has enabled me to follow better the themes that emerged during fieldwork 
and upon analysing the empirical material. While this kind of conceptual 
stretching is by no means an original argument, it has allowed me to discuss 
four areas of analysis – namely, generational consciousness, tactical prac-
tice, friendship and ethical reflection – as different, yet interrelated dimen-
sions of activists’ experiences of engaging in public political life in the late 
Mubarak era. The normative meanings of their political engagements corre-
spond to forceful articulations of justice, dignity and freedom, and an array 
of public activities geared to realizing these goals in society. For the young 
activists it was relevant to gain a degree of autonomy within the field of 
opposition politics by cultivating a subversive generational consciousness 
and by deploying the available technical tools and cultural resources. It was 
equally pertinent to devise new ways of experiencing politics in a tactical 
move to avoid the conventional forms and arena of opposition politics in 
the late Mubarak era. In the context of everyday lives, keeping the friend-
ship groups together – in the face of infiltration, rival groups or other social 
networks – was highly relevant politically, although it was as much as about 
experiencing life together and jointly anticipating a future. Moreover, prac-
tical judgements about the meaningfulness of one’s own political action 
comprised intimate ethical experiences, involving not only attempts to rec-
oncile the diverse expectations and future trajectories in different spheres of 
life but also aspirations for a meaningful present (cf. Bayat 2010: 248-251). 
My analysis has moved, if you will, from a sociologically-themed 
inquiry into the processes of collective action towards a more anthropolog-
ical preoccupation with everyday life. This analytic journey has oriented 
me towards conceiving public political actors more through who they are, 
than merely through what they do (ibid.: 120). This does not belittle the 
important role that democratic struggle played in the lives of my subjects, 
but it also acknowledges that they were acting, feeling and reflecting per-
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sons for whom being an activist was not a self-evident trajectory. In other 
words, depending on their life circumstances, it required constant reflection, 
learning and judgement, as well as the social pressure to justify one’s public 
deviancy not only to state authorities, and friends and family, but also to 
one’s self.
In this sense, the young Cairenes’ political engagements encompassed a 
series of daily efforts to throw one’s self, and be thrown with others, into an 
ambivalent sphere of public political life that involved risks and uncertain-
ties but, at the same time, held the promise of changing its course. Grounded 
and simplified, this viewpoint acknowledges that their practical concerns 
revolved around the questions of whether to do things alone or with others, 
and whether to prioritize personal wellbeing over the common good. Even 
if we hold that that these terms lend themselves to debate and are construed 
intersubjectively, we can conceive of a certain moral terrain that would 
frame the ethical experiences of young activists when engaging in public 
political dissent. We should also take into account that, being young, their 
political subjectivities were shaped by a certain sense of future-oriented 
activities that involved balancing between different areas of life. Thus this 
grounded suggestion of political engagement can potentially complement 
studies of how people come to act together and what roles reflective justi-
fications of their own dissent practices may play in the processes whereby 
their collective actions permute between passive and active social networks 
(Bayat 2010). To say the least, the young activists in this study aspired to 
have, enact and perform the sense of playing a meaningful role in the world 
as it unfolds. By extension, these activities in the present implied the added 
aspirations to cultivate certain memories for the future when they age and 
settle down, and when their offspring and future generations come of age, 
and, even, after they die. 
In terms of methodology, this thesis has demonstrated that ethnographic 
research yields fruitful insights into the processes that take place beyond 
public political activism. I have suggested that the emergence of youth as a 
socio-political category in the run-up to 2011 was by no means a seamless 
process, but, rather, consisted of a widening of the scope of what young 
Egyptians could consider as possible political action during the previ-
ous decade via both offline and online avenues. In addition, being young 
involved living through a particular and culturally informed life stage that 
anticipated a number of life transitions through which the members of earlier 
generations had already passed, thereby highlighting a critical generational 
consciousness that conditioned their political experiences as forcefully 
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future-oriented activities. When studying the agencies of people living and 
acting under authoritarian governance, attention paid to the experimental 
and experiential aspects of everyday life helps to unravel different dimen-
sions that may be overlooked in research informed by certain normative 
traits in conventional approaches to political participation. In this sense, the 
notion of political engagement moves the analytical focus from the modern 
nation state and public political processes as the main constitutive frame-
work for meaningful activities towards everyday life itself. In retrospect, it 
concerns an attempt to complement the implicit assumptions that political 
participation – as activity that aims to influence public political decision-
makers and bring changes to public policies – often carries, prioritizing the 
calculus of instrumental rationality and consequentialist ethics. One way to 
diversify this kind of inquiry has been to discuss the practical judgements of 
young protagonists and to suggest a turn towards virtue ethics when exam-
ining what drives public political actors to do things whose consequences 
will, most certainly, have a bearing on their personal safety and wellbeing. 
These stances are perhaps best characterized in moments of catharsis and in 
activities that are performed for their own sake and for what they mean at 
the very moment they unfold. Ethnographic research potentially yields new 
understanding of these kinds of political engagements as situated practices 
that involve multiple ethical considerations, not least in terms of coeval life 
trajectories that are, regardless how limited, also part of the present.
I proposed in Chapter 4 that an attention to the seemingly mundane acts 
of “sitting down” can potentially provide fruitful insights into the dynam-
ics of group formation and everyday sociality. In the context of this thesis it 
yielded a closer understanding of the activists’ everyday social interactions 
as well as downtown Cairo as the main physical site of their daily move-
ments. Indeed, sitting down is an everyday activity, if not a physiological 
need, shared by all human beings, usually occurring in certain spaces and 
at certain times. The questions of “where to sit down” and “with whom” 
can yield – especially with the added “why” – informative observations that 
also illuminate the researchers’ own practices and social positioning during 
fieldwork, although I am not suggesting that researchers should document 
every social situation when they rest during fieldwork: a rather painstak-
ing exercise. At the same time, our need to sit down also draws attention 
to one of the main tropes of ethnographic research, and an important stage 
in anthropologists’ professional production: in other words, to the imagery 
of the “armchair” as the comfortable, yet distant, site for reflecting on (and 
resolving) what we have done, seen and experienced. Moreover, posing to 
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oneself the question: “why I am not still there?” – as I have done many 
times when writing up this study – can yield yet another line of inquiry 
about our practices of knowledge production.
7.3. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER INQUIRY 
This thesis has pointed out certain ways to better understand what it was 
like to be a young activist in the late Mubarak era. At the time of writing 
these lines, it seems to have raised more questions than it sought to find 
answers to. The study has in a sense been concerned with the events, pro-
cesses and lived experiences whereby young Cairenes participated in rec-
reating the “political activist” (nāshiṭ siyāsī) as a specific social category 
in Egypt’s public life. While it is certainly not a new term as such, it is one 
that seems to have gathered highly derogatory connotations since the “Janu-
ary 25” uprising. Although my empirical materials do not allow for detailed 
inquiry into this matter, the permutations and processes whereby the cat-
egory of political activist has subsequently coexisted with others, such as 
“revolutionary”, “patriot” or even “citizen”, and how it has informed young 
Egyptians’ experiences of political life, will be of scholarly interest for years 
to come. Moreover, a more focused attention paid to how young women 
have acquired new political roles and subjectivities in relation to these, and 
other, categories is also highly important, not least because of the different 
social expectations they generally face regarding their role in Egypt’s pub-
lic political life.
While conceiving of youth activism as a pluralist phenomenon has its 
merits, especially in acknowledging its internal dynamics and heterogene-
ity, it seems also pertinent to attend to Egypt’s current changes from the 
vantage point of particular groups – such as Leftists or, for that matter, the 
new youth coalitions that have emerged since 2011 – at a time when many 
protagonists may have, quite simply, better things to do than writing their 
own histories. In this context, more extensive use of social movement theo-
ries would be beneficial. Descriptive analyses could, for instance, inquire 
into the following questions: In very practical terms, how do the particu-
lar groups seek to maintain their autonomy? By extension, what do their 
members understand by autonomy or independence in an environment that 
requires constant networking and social interactions with others?
Furthermore, contestations over what constitutes the common good or 
the “national interest” (maṣlaḥat al-waṭan) in post-Mubarak Egypt are 
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likely to remain as they are today: an important aspect of state formation 
in the post-colonial Middle East. The notions of the common good and per-
sonal welfare represent a charged moral debate in public life in which, if 
some prediction is allowed, the state authorities’ claims to defend the for-
mer will regulate the ways in which public political debates are framed in 
post-Mubarak Egypt. Tracing the processes which determine who sets the 
terms of debate over the common good and, by extension, personal inter-
ests, from the viewpoint of particular actors, media or institutions would 
benefit social analysis being carried out at this crucial period in Egypt’s 
modern history. Who claims prominence to speak in its name in public life? 
On what form of social authority do these claims rest? In what ways do 
notions of the common good manifest themselves in Egyptians’ everyday 
lives and in relation to what kinds of collective sensibilities? Why?
Finally, the issue of friendship emerged during fieldwork as an impor-
tant analytical element in accounting for the everyday experiences of young 
political activists. In the context of this study, friendship relations proved, 
on the one hand, important in amalgamating the bonds of trust and soli-
darity beyond kin connections and formal institutional hierarchies. On the 
other, they came under strain when juxtaposed with different practices of 
individual and collective action, and self-positioning in terms of the nor-
mative register of the common good in public life. Despite their salient 
importance, friendship relations have attracted little empirical research 
among young Egyptians before and since 2011, and further research on how 
they transform at the micro-level – or how friendship relations survive, last 
and are broken – in the midst of wider societal changes may yield interest-
ing empirical studies on the intersection of contentious politics, everyday 
sociality and social change. How much cohesion and consensus is needed 
from friendship relations in order for them to become vehicles for social 
and political change? What roles have they played in parallel with outright 
enmity in the making of new generations and political progress in the post-
Mubarak era? And, in what ways do friendship relations evolve in terms of 
emerging forms of public dissent and public consent in Egypt today?
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